With this commit the Elliptic Curve Point interface is rewised. Two
compile time options has been removed to simplify the interface and
the function names got a new prefix that indicates that these functions
are for internal use and not part of the public interface.
The intended use of the abstraction layer for Elliptic Curve Point
arithmetic is to enable using hardware cryptographic accelerators.
These devices are a shared resource and the driver code rarely provides
thread safety.
This commit adds mutexes to the abstraction layer to protect the device
in a multi-threaded environment.
The primary use case behind providing an abstraction layer to enable
alternative Elliptic Curve Point arithmetic implementation, is making
use of cryptographic acceleration hardware if it is present.
To provide thread safety for the hardware accelerator we need a mutex
to guard it.
The compile time macros enabling the initialisation and deinitialisation
in the alternative Elliptic Curve Point arithmetic implementation had
names that did not end with '_ALT' as required by check-names.sh.
This patch introduces some additional checks in the PK module for 64-bit
systems only. The problem is that the API functions in the PK
abstraction accept a size_t value for the hashlen, while the RSA module
accepts an unsigned int for the hashlen. Instead of silently casting
size_t to unsigned int, this change checks whether the hashlen overflows
an unsigned int and returns an error.
The test case was generated by modifying our signature code so that it
produces a 7-byte long padding (which also means garbage at the end, so it is
essential in to check that the error that is detected first is indeed the
padding rather than the final length check).
In many places in TLS handling, some code detects a fatal error, sends
a fatal alert message, and returns to the caller. If sending the alert
fails, then return the error that triggered the alert, rather than
overriding the return status. This effectively causes alert sending
failures to be ignored. Formerly the code was inconsistently sometimes
doing one, sometimes the other.
In general ignoring the alert is the right thing: what matters to the
caller is the original error. A typical alert failure is that the
connection is already closed.
One case which remains not handled correctly is if the alert remains
in the output buffer (WANT_WRITE). Then it won't be sent, or will be
truncated. We'd need to either delay the application error or record
the write buffering notice; to be done later.
When provided with an empty line, mpi_read_file causes a numeric
underflow resulting in a stack underflow. This commit fixes this and
adds some documentation to mpi_read_file.
The modular inversion function hangs when provided with the modulus 1. This commit refuses this modulus with a BAD_INPUT error code. It also adds a test for this case.
The TLS client and server code was usually closing the connection in
case of a fatal error without sending an alert. This commit adds
alerts in many cases.
Added one test case to detect that we send the alert, where a server
complains that the client's certificate is from an unknown CA (case
tracked internally as IOTSSL-1330).
Fix a buffer overflow when writting a string representation of an MPI
number to a buffer in hexadecimal. The problem occurs because hex
digits are written in pairs and this is not accounted for in the
calculation of the required buffer size when the number of digits is
odd.
When using ssl_cookie with MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, fix a resource leak caused by
initiating a mutex in mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free instead of freeing it.
Raised and fix suggested by lan Gillingham in the mbed TLS forum
Tracked in #771
The function ecp_mod_koblitz computed the space for the result of a
multiplication optimally for that specific case, but unfortunately
the function mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi performs a generic, suboptimal
calculation and needs one more limb for the result. Since the result's
buffer is on the stack, the best case scenario is that the program
stops.
This only happened on 64 bit platforms.
Fixes#569
A heap overread might happen when parsing malformed certificates.
Reported by Peng Li and Yueh-Hsun Lin.
Refactoring the parsing fixes the problem. This commit applies the
relevant part of the OpenVPN contribution applied to mbed TLS 1.3
in commit 17da9dd829.
Fixes a regression introduced by an earlier commit that modified
x509_crt_verify_top() to ensure that valid certificates that are after past or
future valid in the chain are processed. However the change introduced a change
in behaviour that caused the verification flags MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED and
MBEDTLS_BADCERT_FUTURE to always be set whenever there is a failure in the
verification regardless of the cause.
The fix maintains both behaviours:
* Ensure that valid certificates after future and past are verified
* Ensure that the correct verification flags are set.
Modifies the function mbedtls_x509_crl_parse() to ensure that a CRL in PEM
format with trailing characters after the footer does not result in the
execution of an infinite loop.
Fix potential integer overflows in the function mbedtls_base64_decode().
This overflow would mainly be exploitable in 32-bit systems and could
cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed.
Fix potential integer overflows in the following functions:
* mbedtls_md2_update() to be bypassed and cause
* mbedtls_cipher_update()
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed()
This overflows would mainly be exploitable in 32-bit systems and could
cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed.
Fix an incorrect condition in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() that compared
64 bits of record counter instead of 48 bits as described in RFC 6347
Section 4.3.1. This would cause the function's return value to be
occasionally incorrect and the renegotiation routines to be triggered
at unexpected times.
This PR fixes a number of unused variable/function compilation warnings
that arise when using a config.h that does not define the macro
MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C.
Fixes many typos, and errors in comments.
* Clarifies many comments
* Grammar correction in config.pl help text
* Removed comment about MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE.
* Comment typo fix (Dont => Don't)
* Comment typo fix (assure => ensure)
* Comment typo fix (byes => bytes)
* Added citation for quoted standard
* Comment typo fix (one complement => 1's complement)
The is some debate about whether to prefer "one's complement", "ones'
complement", or "1's complement". The more recent RFCs related to TLS
(RFC 6347, RFC 4347, etc) use " 1's complement", so I followed that
convention.
* Added missing ")" in comment
* Comment alignment
* Incorrect comment after #endif
This change fixes a regression introduced by an earlier commit that
modified x509_crt_verify_top() to ensure that valid certificates
that are after past or future valid in the chain are processed. However
the change introduced a change in behaviour that caused the
verification flags MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED and
MBEDTLS_BADCERT_FUTURE to always be set whenever there is a failure in
the verification regardless of the cause.
The fix maintains both behaviours:
* Ensure that valid certificates after future and past are verified
* Ensure that the correct verification flags are set.
To do so, a temporary pointer to the first future or past valid
certificate is maintained while traversing the chain. If a truly valid
certificate is found then that one is used, otherwise if no valid
certificate is found and the end of the chain is reached, the program
reverts back to using the future or past valid certificate.
This patch modifies the function mbedtls_x509_crl_parse() to ensure
that a CRL in PEM format with trailing characters after the footer does
not result in the execution of an infinite loop.
Fixes many typos, and errors in comments.
* Clarifies many comments
* Grammar correction in config.pl help text
* Removed comment about MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE.
* Comment typo fix (Dont => Don't)
* Comment typo fix (assure => ensure)
* Comment typo fix (byes => bytes)
* Added citation for quoted standard
* Comment typo fix (one complement => 1's complement)
The is some debate about whether to prefer "one's complement", "ones'
complement", or "1's complement". The more recent RFCs related to TLS
(RFC 6347, RFC 4347, etc) use " 1's complement", so I followed that
convention.
* Added missing ")" in comment
* Comment alignment
* Incorrect comment after #endif
The PKCS#1 standard says nothing about the relation between P and Q
but many libraries guarantee P>Q and mbed TLS did so too in earlier
versions.
This commit restores this behaviour.
Fix implementation and documentation missmatch for the function
arguments to mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Also, removed redundant if condition
that always evaluates to true.
The bracketing in some expressions where an assignment was being made in an if statement in cmac.c had been accidentally broken and was causing compiler warnings with armcc.
Minor fixes following review including:
* formatting changes including indentation and code style
* corrections
* removal of debug code
* clarification of code through variable renaming
* memory leak
* compiler warnings
Change the CMAC interface to match the mbedtls_md_hmac_xxxx() interface. This
changes the overall design of the CMAC interface to make it more consistent with
the existing HMAC interface, and will allow incremental updates of input data
rather than requiring all data to be presented at once, which is what the
current interface requires.
- use one less temporary buffer
- pedantic: in_len + 15 was a potential overflow
- use a more explicit name instead of 'flag'
- Mn was a bit misleading
The previous version had secret-dependent memory accesses. While it was
probably not an issue in practice cause the two bytes of the array are
probably on the same cache line anyway, as a matter of principle this should
be avoided.
