- Add configuration for AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES to config.h. By
default the feature is disabled.
- Add AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES configuration check to check_config.h
- Add AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES test to all.sh
- 3 additional dummy AES rounds calculated with random data for each
AES encryption/decryption
- additional rounds can be occur in any point in sequence of rounds
Found by the IAR compiler.
While at it, make 'diff' non-volatile in uECC_check_curve_integrity(), as
there is no good reason to make it volatile, and making it volatile only
increases the code size and the burden of defining access ordering.
- MSVC doesn't like -1u
- We need to include platform.h for MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED - in
some configurations it was already included indirectly, but not in all
configurations, so better include it directly.
This commit first changes the return convention of EccPoint_mult_safer() so
that it properly reports when faults are detected. Then all functions that
call it need to be changed to (1) follow the same return convention and (2)
properly propagate UECC_FAULT_DETECTED when it occurs.
Here's the reverse call graph from EccPoint_mult_safer() to the rest of the
library (where return values are translated to the MBEDTLS_ERR_ space) and test
functions (where expected return values are asserted explicitly).
EccPoint_mult_safer()
EccPoint_compute_public_key()
uECC_compute_public_key()
pkparse.c
tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
uECC_make_key_with_d()
uECC_make_key()
ssl_cli.c
ssl_srv.c
tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
tests/suites/test_suite_tinycrypt.function
uECC_shared_secret()
ssl_tls.c
tests/suites/test_suite_tinycrypt.function
uECC_sign_with_k()
uECC_sign()
pk.c
tests/suites/test_suite_tinycrypt.function
Note: in uECC_sign_with_k() a test for uECC_vli_isZero(p) is suppressed
because it is redundant with a more thorough test (point validity) done at the
end of EccPoint_mult_safer(). This redundancy was introduced in a previous
commit but not noticed earlier.
We don't really need a secure hash for that, something like CRC32 would
probably be enough - but we have SHA-256 handy, not CRC32, so use that for the
sake of simplicity.
By semi-internal I mean functions that are only public because they're used in
more than once compilation unit in the library (for example in ecc.c and
ecc_dsa.c) but should not really be part of the public-facing API.
Same motivation as for the other parameters. This is the last one, making the
curve structure empty, so it's left with a dummy parameter for legal reasons.
-Add flow monitor, loop integrity check and variable doubling to
harden mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret.
-Use longer hamming distance for nonce usage in hmac_drbg_reseed_core
-Return actual value instead of success in mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed and
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf
-Check illegal condition in hmac_drbg_reseed_core.
-Double buf/buf_len variables in mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add
-Add more hamming distance to MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON/OFF
Added an additional Makefile option of 'TINYCRYPT_BUILD' to exclude the
TinyCrypt source files from the build. This allows some tests to exclude those
files as and when necessary.
Specifically this includes in all.sh the test
'component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication' which was failing as
64bit cannot be disabled in TinyCrypt, and check-names.sh as TinyCrypt obviously
does not conform to Mbed TLS naming conventions.
This commit removes from the TinyCrypt header and source code files, the
configuration condition on MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT to include the file
contents.
This is to allow use of the library by the Factory Tool without enabling
MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT, and also removes a modification we've made to make the
code closer to the upstream TinyCrypt making it easier to maintain.
Validating the input is always a good idea. Validating the output protects
against some fault injections that would make the result invalid.
Note: valid_point() implies that the point is not zero.
Adding validation to mult_safer() makes it redundant in
compute_shared_secret().
This will make easier to add future counter-measures in a single place.
In practice this change means that:
- compute_public_key() now uses projective coordinate randomisation, which it
should as this is a protection against Template Attacks for example.
- mult_safer() now checks that the result is not the point at infinity, which
it can as the result is indeed never expected to be that
In the previous version, it was enough for the attacker to glitch the
top-level 'if' to skip the entire block. We want two independent blocks here,
so that an attacker can only succeed with two successive glitches.
Before this commit, if a certificate only had one issue (for example, if the
"untrusted" bit was the only set in flags), an attacker that could flip this
single bit between the moment it's set and the moment flags are checked before
returning from mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() could make the entire verification
routine appear to succeed (return 0 with no bit set in flags).
Avoid that by making sure that flags always has either 0 or at least 9 bits
set during the execution of the function. However, to preserve the API, clear
the 8 extra bits before returning. This doesn't open the door to other
attacks, as fortunately the API already had redundancy: either both flags and
the return value are 0, or flags has bits set and the return value is non-zero
with at least 16 bits set (assuming 32-bit 2-complement ints).
