config-symmetric-only.h enables MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED so it needs a
seedfile. Create it in test-ref-configs.pl so that the script works on
its own, even if it is not invoked by all.sh.
Add a reference configuration with most symmetric cryptographic
algorithms enabled, but without any asymmetric cryptography. This
checks that we don't have spurious unexpected dependencies on
asymmetric-only modules such as bignum.
Keep HAVE_ASM disabled because it's platform-specific.
Keep HAVEGE disabled because it's untested and not recommended.
Keep MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC out because it isn't related to cryptography
at all and it makes memory sanitizers ineffective.
Keep THREADING disabled because it requires special build options.
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
This removes the need for the test-only function
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(). Just call
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() followed by
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), it works now.
Move the definitions of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len() and
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to after they are used. This makes the code
easier to read and to maintain.
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
* #272: Insert doxygen comments on old algorithms so they appear in PSA documentation
* #285: SE driver: make persistent data work
* #279: Include IANA reference in the definition of ECC curves and DH groups
* #287: DRBG documentation improvements
* #297: Fix int overflow in mbedtls_asn1_get_int (Credit to OSS-Fuzz)
Consolidate the invalid-handle tests from test_suite_psa_crypto and
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management. Start with the code in
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management and adapt it to test one invalid
handle value per run of the test function.
Fix a signed int overflow in mbedtls_asn1_get_int() for numbers
between INT_MAX+1 and UINT_MAX (typically 0x80000000..0xffffffff).
This was undefined behavior which in practice would typically have
resulted in an incorrect value, but which may plausibly also have
caused the postcondition (*p == initial<*p> + len) to be violated.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
mbedtls_asn1_get_int() and mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() behave differently
on negative INTEGERs (0200). Don't change the library behavior for now
because this might break interoperability in some applications. Change
the test function to the library behavior.
Fix the test data with negative INTEGERs. These test cases were
previously not run (they were introduced but deliberately deactivated
in 27d806fab4). The test data was
actually wrong: ASN.1 uses two's complement, which has no negative 0,
and some encodings were wrong. Now the tests have correct data, and
the test code rectifies the expected data to match the library
behavior.
mbedtls_asn1_get_int() and mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() behave differently
on an empty INTEGER (0200). Don't change the library behavior for now
because this might break interoperability in some applications. Write
a test function that matches the library behavior.
When the asn1parse module is enabled but the bignum module is
disabled, the asn1parse test suite did not work. Fix this.
* Fix a syntax error in get_integer() (label immediately followed by a
closing brace).
* Fix an unused variable in get_integer().
* Fix `TEST_ASSERT( *p == q );` in nested_parse() failing because `*p`
was not set.
* Fix nested_parse() not outputting the length of what it parsed.
mbedtls_entropy_func returns up to MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes.
This is the output of a hash function and does not indicate how many
bytes of entropy went into the hash computation.
Enforce that mbedtls_entropy_func gathers a total of
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes or more from strong sources. Weak
sources don't count for this calculation. This is complementary to the
per-source threshold mechanism.
In particular, we define system sources with a threshold of 32. But
when using SHA-512 for the entropy accumulator,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE = 64, so users can expect 64 bytes' worth
of entropy. Before, you only got 64 bytes of entropy if there were two
sources. Now you get 64 bytes of entropy even with a single source
with a threshold of 32.
Add some ECDSA test cases where the hash is shorter or longer than the
key length, to check that the API doesn't enforce a relationship
between the two.
For the sign_deterministic tests, the keys are
tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem and tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem
and the signatures were obtained with Python Cryptodome:
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, SHA384
from Crypto.PublicKey import ECC
from Crypto.Signature import DSS
k2 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3077020101042049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eeea00a06082a8648ce3d030107a144034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"))
SHA384.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k2, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA384.new(b'hello')))
k3 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3081a402010104303f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76aa00706052b81040022a16403620004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"))
SHA256.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k3, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA256.new(b'hello')))
Document that passing 0 to a close/destroy function does nothing and
returns PSA_SUCCESS.
Although this was not written explicitly, the specification strongly
suggested that this would return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE. While
returning INVALID_HANDLE makes sense, it was awkward for a very common
programming style where applications can store 0 in a handle variable
to indicate that the handle has been closed or has never been open:
applications had to either check if (handle != 0) before calling
psa_close_key(handle) or psa_destroy_key(handle), or ignore errors
from the close/destroy function. Now applications following this style
can just call psa_close_key(handle) or psa_destroy_key(handle).
There were tests to ensure that each entropy source reaches its
threshold, but no test that covers the total amount of entropy. Add
test cases with a known set of entropy sources and make sure that we
always gather at least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes from a strong
source.
Always pass a context object to entropy_dummy_source. This lets us
write tests that register more than one source and keep track of how
many times each one is called.
This caused problems when running multiple jobs at once, since
there was no target matching libmbedcrypto.so with the path
prefix. It only worked if it was built first, since such file was found.
Additionally, building of libmbedcrypto.so now waits for the static .a version.
Previously, recipes for both libmbedcrypto.a and libmbedcrypto.so could run
independently when running parallel jobs, which resulted in the .o files
being built twice. It could sometimes be a problem, since linking would start
when building one of the object files was still in progress (the previous one
existed). This in turn resulted in reading (and trying to link) a malformed file.
The "|" character is followed by "order-only-prerequisites", and in this case,
makes linking of the shared version of the library wait for the .a file.
Since it's guaranteed to be always built in the "all" target, it's fine to do that.
All of the .o files are only built once thanks to this change.
* #277: Improve speed of PBKDF2 by caching the digest state of the passphrase
* #269: Add PSA API versioning
* #278: Fix on target test issues
* #286: Fix defgroup syntax for API version section
* #75: ASN.1 tests without x509
The documentation of HMAC_DRBG erroneously claimed that
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() had an impact on the initial
seeding. This is in fact not the case: mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() forces
the entropy length to its chosen value. Fix the documentation.
The documentation of CTR_DRBG erroneously claimed that
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() had an impact on the initial
seeding. This is in fact not the case: mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() forces
the initial seeding to grab MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN bytes of
entropy. Fix the documentation and rewrite the discussion of the
entropy length and the security strength accordingly.
