Files deleted by us: keep them deleted.
```
git rm $(git status -s | sed -n 's/^DU //p')
```
Individual files with conflicts:
* `README.md`: keep the crypto version.
* `doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h`: keep the crypto version (with an obsolete Mbed Crypto version number).
* `include/mbedtls/error.h`:
* `ERROR`: similar additions made through parallel commits, with only whitespace differences. Align with the tls version.
* `library/CMakeLists.txt`: keep the crypto version.
* `library/Makefile`: keep the crypto version.
* `scripts/generate_errors.pl`: keep the crypto version (the relevant changes were made through parallel commits).
* `tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py`:
* `Results`: keep the crypto version, which has both the new argument to the constructor (added in crypto only) and the class docstring (added through parallel commits).
* `tests/suites/helpers.function`:
* `ARRAY_LENGTH`, `ASSERT_ALLOC`: additions in the same location. Keep both, in indifferent order.
* `tests/suites/target_test.function`:
* `receive_uint32`: keep the crypto version which has an additional bug fix. The tls changes made in tls are irrelevant after this bug fix.
* `visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj`: run `scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl`.
Review of non-conflicting changes:
* `all.sh`: 1 change.
* zlib test components: don't add them.
* `include/CMakeLists.txt`: 1 change.
* `target_include_directories`: doesn't work as is (different target name). Don't take the change.
* All other non-conflicting changes: take them.
Adapt to the change of encoding of elliptic curve key types in PSA
crypto. Before, an EC key type encoded the TLS curve identifier. Now
the EC key type only includes an ad hoc curve family identifier, and
determining the exact curve requires both the key type and size. This
commit moves from the old encoding and old definitions from
crypto/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h to the new encoding and definitions
from the immediately preceding crypto submodule update.
If psa_key_agreement_ecdh fails, there may be output that leaks
sensitive information in the output buffer. Zeroize it.
If this is due to an underlying failure in the ECDH implementation, it
is currently not an issue since both the traditional Mbed TLS/Crypto
implementation and Everest only write to the output buffer once every
intermediate step has succeeded, but zeroizing is more robust. If this
is because the recently added key size check fails, a leak could be a
serious issue.
All key types now have an encoding on 32 bits where the bottom 16 bits
are zero. Change to using 16 bits only.
Keep 32 bits for key types in storage, but move the significant
half-word from the top to the bottom.
Likewise, change EC curve and DH group families from 32 bits out of
which the top 8 and bottom 16 bits are zero, to 8 bits only.
Reorder psa_core_key_attributes_t to avoid padding.
Remove the values of curve encodings that are based on the TLS registry
and include the curve size, keeping only the new encoding that merely
encodes a curve family in 8 bits.
Keep the old constant names as aliases for the new values and
deprecate the old names.
Define constants for ECC curve families and DH group families. These
constants have 0x0000 in the lower 16 bits of the key type.
Support these constants in the implementation and in the PSA metadata
tests.
Switch the slot management and secure element driver HAL tests to the
new curve encodings. This requires SE driver code to become slightly
more clever when figuring out the bit-size of an imported EC key since
it now needs to take the data size into account.
Switch some documentation to the new encodings.
Remove the macro PSA_ECC_CURVE_BITS which can no longer be implemented.
Change the representation of psa_ecc_curve_t and psa_dh_group_t from
the IETF 16-bit encoding to a custom 24-bit encoding where the upper 8
bits represent a curve family and the lower 16 bits are the key size
in bits. Families are based on naming and mathematical similarity,
with sufficiently precise families that no two curves in a family have
the same bit size (for example SECP-R1 and SECP-R2 are two different
families).
As a consequence, the lower 16 bits of a key type value are always
either the key size or 0.
Internally, use the corresponding function from psa_crypto.c instead.
Externally, this function is not used in Mbed TLS and is documented as
"may change at any time".
Don't rely on the bit size encoded in the PSA curve identifier, in
preparation for removing that.
For some inputs, the error code on EC key creation changes from
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT to PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or vice versa.
There will be further such changes in subsequent commits.
When mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path() checks each object in the supplied path, it only processes regular files. This change makes it also accept a symlink to a file. Fixes#3005.
This was observed to be a problem on Fedora/CentOS/RHEL systems, where the ca-bundle in the default location is actually a symlink.
ssl_decompress_buf() was operating on data from the ssl context, but called at
a point where this data is actually in the rec structure. Call it later so
that the data is back to the ssl structure.
Otherwise these values are recomputed in mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt, which
currently suffers from side channel issues in the computation of QP (see
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055). By loading the pre-computed values not
only is the side channel avoided, but runtime overhead of loading RSA keys
is reduced.
Discussion in https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/347
If Y was constructed through functions in this module, then Y->n == 0
iff Y->p == NULL. However we do not prevent filling mpi structures
manually, and zero may be represented with n=0 and p a valid pointer.
Most of the code can cope with such a representation, but for the
source of mbedtls_mpi_copy, this would cause an integer underflow.
Changing the test for zero from Y->p==NULL to Y->n==0 causes this case
to work at no extra cost.
If psa_mac_finish_internal fails (which can only happen due to bad
parameters or hardware problem), the error code was converted to
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE if the uninitialized stack variable
actual_mac happened to contain the expected MAC. This is a minor bug
but it may be possible to leverage it as part of a longer attack path
in some scenarios.
Reported externally. Found by static analysis.
