There are situations in which it is not clear what message to expect
next. For example, the message following the ServerHello might be
either a Certificate, a ServerKeyExchange or a CertificateRequest. We
deal with this situation in the following way: Initially, the message
processing function for one of the allowed message types is called,
which fetches and decodes a new message. If that message is not the
expected one, the function returns successfully (instead of throwing
an error as usual for unexpected messages), and the handshake
continues to the processing function for the next possible message. To
not have this function fetch a new message, a flag in the SSL context
structure is used to indicate that the last message was retained for
further processing, and if that's set, the following processing
function will not fetch a new record.
This commit simplifies the usage of this message-retaining parameter
by doing the check within the record-fetching routine instead of the
specific message-processing routines. The code gets cleaner this way
and allows retaining messages to be used in other situations as well
without much effort. This will be used in the next commits.
* gilles/IOTSSL-1330/development:
Changelog entry for the bug fixes
SSLv3: when refusing renegotiation, stop processing
Ignore failures when sending fatal alerts
Cleaned up double variable declaration
Code portability fix
Added changelog entry
Send TLS alerts in many more cases
Skip all non-executables in run-test-suites.pl
SSL tests: server requires auth, client has no certificate
Balanced braces across preprocessor conditionals
Support setting the ports on the command line
In the TLS test client, allow SHA-1 as a signature hash algorithm.
Without this, the renegotation tests failed.
A previous commit had allowed SHA-1 via the certificate profile but
that only applied before the initial negotiation which includes the
signature_algorithms extension.
The routine `mbedtls_ssl_write_server_key_exchange` heavily depends on
what kind of cipher suite is active: some don't need a
ServerKeyExchange at all, some need (EC)DH parameters but no server
signature, some require both. Each time we want to restrict a certain
piece of code to some class of ciphersuites, it is guarded by a
lengthy concatentation of configuration checks determining whether at
least one of the relevant cipher suites is enabled in the config; on
the code level, it is guarded by the check whether one of these
cipher suites is the active one.
To ease readability of the code, this commit introduces several helper
macros and helper functions that can be used to determine whether a
certain class of ciphersuites (a) is active in the config, and
(b) contains the currently present ciphersuite.
In many places in TLS handling, some code detects a fatal error, sends
a fatal alert message, and returns to the caller. If sending the alert
fails, then return the error that triggered the alert, rather than
overriding the return status. This effectively causes alert sending
failures to be ignored. Formerly the code was inconsistently sometimes
doing one, sometimes the other.
In general ignoring the alert is the right thing: what matters to the
caller is the original error. A typical alert failure is that the
connection is already closed.
One case which remains not handled correctly is if the alert remains
in the output buffer (WANT_WRITE). Then it won't be sent, or will be
truncated. We'd need to either delay the application error or record
the write buffering notice; to be done later.
The TLS client and server code was usually closing the connection in
case of a fatal error without sending an alert. This commit adds
alerts in many cases.
Added one test case to detect that we send the alert, where a server
complains that the client's certificate is from an unknown CA (case
tracked internally as IOTSSL-1330).
Separates platform time abstraction into it's own header from the
general platform abstraction as both depend on different build options.
(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C vs MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
- document why we made that choice
- remove the two TODOs about checking hash and CA
- remove the code that parsed certificate_type: it did nothing except store
the selected type in handshake->cert_type, but that field was never accessed
afterwards. Since handshake_params is now an internal type, we can remove that
field without breaking the ABI.
We don't implement anonymous key exchanges, and we don't intend to, so it can
never happen that an unauthenticated server requests a certificate from us.
fixes#310
Actually all key exchanges that use a certificate use signatures too, and
there is no key exchange that uses signatures but no cert, so merge those two
flags.
* development: (73 commits)
Bump yotta dependencies version
Fix typo in documentation
Corrected misleading fn description in ssl_cache.h
Corrected URL/reference to MPI library
Fix yotta dependencies
Fix minor spelling mistake in programs/pkey/gen_key.c
Bump version to 2.1.2
Fix CVE number in ChangeLog
Add 'inline' workaround where needed
Fix references to non-standard SIZE_T_MAX
Fix yotta version dependencies again
Upgrade yotta dependency versions
Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc
Add missing warning in doc
Remove inline workaround when not useful
Fix macroization of inline in C++
Changed attribution for Guido Vranken
Merge of IOTSSL-476 - Random malloc in pem_read()
Fix for IOTSSL-473 Double free error
Fix potential overflow in CertificateRequest
...
Conflicts:
include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
library/ssl_cli.c
This extension is quite costly to generate, and we don't want to re-do it
again when the server performs a DTLS HelloVerify. So, cache the result the
first time and re-use if/when we build a new ClientHello.
Note: re-send due to timeouts are different, as the whole message is cached
already, so they don't need any special support.
This is more consistent, as it doesn't make any sense for a user to be able to
set up an EC J-PAKE password with TLS if the corresponding key exchange is
disabled.
Arguably this is what we should de for other key exchanges as well instead of
depending on ECDH_C etc, but this is an independent issue, so let's just do
the right thing with the new key exchange and fix the other ones later. (This
is a marginal issue anyway, since people who disable all ECDH key exchange are
likely to also disable ECDH_C in order to minimize footprint.)
When we don't have a password, we want to skip the costly process of
generating the extension. So for consistency don't offer the ciphersuite
without the extension.
The Thread spec says we need those for EC J-PAKE too.
However, we won't be using the information, so we can skip the parsing
functions in an EC J-PAKE only config; keep the writing functions in order to
comply with the spec.
Initially thought it would be per-connection, but since max_version is in conf
too, and you need to lower that for a fallback connection, the fallback flag
should be in the same place
A simple series of sed invocations.
This is the first step, purely internal changes. The conf substructure is not
ready to be shared between contexts yet.
Note from future self: actually md_init_ctx will be re-introduced with the
same signature later, and a new function with the additional argument will be
added.
- more freedom for us to change it in the future
- enforces hygiene
- performance impact of making accessors no longer inline should really be
negligible
* mbedtls-1.3:
Rename website and repository
Move private macro from header to C file
Add some missing 'static' on a few objects
Fix whitespace issues
Minor portability fix in benchmark
* development: (100 commits)
Update Changelog for the mem-measure branch
Fix issues introduced when rebasing
Fix compile error in memory_buffer_alloc_selftest
Code cosmetics
Add curve25519 to ecc-heap.sh
Add curve25519 to the benchmark program
Fix compile issue when buffer_alloc not available
New script ecc-heap.sh
Fix unused variable issue in some configs
Rm usunused member in private struct
Add heap usage for PK in benchmark
Use memory_buffer_alloc() in benchmark if available
Only define mode_func if mode is enabled (CBC etc)
PKCS8 encrypted key depend on PKCS5 or PKCS12
Disable SRV_C for client measurement
Output stack+heap usage with massif
Enable NIST_OPTIM by default for config-suite-b
Refactor memory.sh
Adapt memory.sh to config-suite-b
Adapt mini-client for config-suite-b.h
...
Conflicts:
ChangeLog
include/polarssl/net.h
library/Makefile
library/error.c
library/ssl_tls.c
programs/Makefile
programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
tests/Makefile
* development: (46 commits)
Fix url again
Fix small bug in base64_encode()
Fix depend that was checked but not documented
Fix dependency that was not checked
Minor gitginore fixes
Move some ignore patterns to subdirectories
Ignore CMake/MSVC-related build files.
Re-categorize changelog entry
Fix misattribution
Minor nits with stdout/stderr.
Add cmake compatibility targets
Add script for polarssl symlink creation
Fix more stdio inclusion issues
Add debug info for cert/suite selection
Fix possible portability issue
Fix bug in ssl_get_verify_result()
aescrypt2.c local char array not initial
Update Changelog
Fix mips64 bignum implementation
Fix usage string of ssl_client2
...
Conflicts:
include/polarssl/ssl.h
library/CMakeLists.txt
library/Makefile
programs/Makefile
programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
visualc/VS2010/PolarSSL.sln
visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
visualc/VS6/mbedtls.dsp
visualc/VS6/mbedtls.dsw
* development:
Update copyright
Fix issue in compat.sh
Rename doxyfile
Rename to mbed TLS in tests/
Rename to mbed TLS in examples
Remove old test certificates.
Rename to mbed TLS in the documentation/comments
Change name to mbed TLS in the copyright notice
Conflicts:
doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
include/polarssl/version.h
tests/compat.sh
