This is the beginning of a series of commits refactoring the chain
building/verification functions in order to:
- make it simpler to understand and work with
- prepare integration of restartable ECC
Our current behaviour is a bit inconsistent here:
- when the bad signature is made by a trusted CA, we stop here and don't
include the trusted CA in the chain (don't call vrfy on it)
- otherwise, we just add NOT_TRUSTED to the flags but keep building the chain
and call vrfy on the upper certs
This ensures that the callback can actually clear that flag, and that it is
seen by the callback at the right level. This flag is not set at the same
place than others, and this difference will get bigger in the upcoming
refactor, so let's ensure we don't break anything here.
When a trusted CA is rolling its root keys, it could happen that for some
users the list of trusted roots contains two versions of the same CA with the
same name but different keys. Currently this is supported but wasn't tested.
Note: the intermediate file test-ca-alt.csr is commited on purpose, as not
commiting intermediate files causes make to regenerate files that we don't
want it to touch.
As we accept EE certs that are explicitly trusted (in the list of trusted
roots) and usually look for parent by subject, and in the future we might want
to avoid checking the self-signature on trusted certs, there could a risk that we
incorrectly accept a cert that looks like a trusted root except it doesn't
have the same key. This test ensures this will never happen.
The tests cover chains of length 0, 1 and 2, with one error, located at any of
the available levels in the chain. This exercises all three call sites of
f_vrfy (two in verify_top, one in verify_child). Chains of greater length
would not cover any new code path or behaviour that I can see.
So far there was no test ensuring that the flags passed to the vrfy callback
are correct (ie the flags for the current certificate, not including those of
the parent).
Actual tests case making use of that test function will be added in the next
commit.
md() already checks for md_info == NULL. Also, in the future it might also
return other errors (eg hardware errors if acceleration is used), so it make
more sense to check its return value than to check for NULL ourselves and then
assume no other error can occur.
Also, currently, md_info == NULL can never happen except if the MD and OID modules
get out of sync, or if the user messes with members of the x509_crt structure
directly.
This commit does not change the current behaviour, which is to treat MD errors
the same way as a bad signature or no trusted root.
The fact that self-signed end-entity certs can be explicitly trusted by
putting them in the CA list even if they don't have the CA bit was not
documented though it's intentional, and tested by "Certificate verification #73
(selfsigned trusted without CA bit)" in test_suite_x509parse.data
It is unclear to me whether the restriction that explicitly trusted end-entity
certs must be self-signed is a good one. However, it seems intentional as it is
tested in tests #42 and #43, so I'm not touching it for now.
With cmake, CFLAGS has to be set when invoking cmake, not make (which totally
ignores the value of CFLAGS when it runs and only keeps the one from cmake).
Also, in that case the flags were either redundant (-Werror etc) or wrong
(-std=c99 -pedantic) as some parts of the library will not build with
-pedantic (see the other -pedantic tests, which are correct, for what needs to
be disabled).
This is step 1 of a plan to get rid once and for all of missing depends_on in
the X509 test suite (step 2 will be RSA/ECDSA, and step 0 was curves.pl).
We have code to skip them but didn't have explicit tests ensuring they are
(the corresponding branch was never taken).
While at it, remove extra copy of the chain in server10*.crt, which was
duplicated for no reason.
This shows inconsistencies in how flags are handled when callback fails:
- sometimes the flags set by the callback are transmitted, sometimes not
- when the cert if not trusted, sometimes BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED is set,
sometimes not
This adds coverage for 9 lines and 9 branches. Now all lines related to
callback failure are covered.
Now all checks related to profile are covered in:
- verify_with_profile()
- verify_child()
- verify_top()
(that's 10 lines that were previously not covered)
Leaving aside profile enforcement in CRLs for now, as the focus is on
preparing to refactor cert verification.
Previously flags was left to whatever value it had before. It's cleaner to
make sure it has a definite value, and all bits set looks like the safest way
for when it went very wrong.
The change in the truncated HMAC extension aligns Mbed TLS with the
standard, but breaks interoperability with previous versions. Indicate
this in the ChangeLog, as well as how to restore the old behavior.
