Clarify what MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH and
MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH mean. Add comments to highlight that
this indicates that a valid signature is present, unlike other error
codes. See
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/1149#discussion_r178130705
Conflict resolution:
* ChangeLog
* tests/data_files/Makefile: concurrent additions, order irrelevant
* tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf: concurrent additions, order irrelevant
* tests/scripts/all.sh: one comment change conflicted with a code
addition. In addition some of the additions in the
iotssl-1381-x509-verify-refactor-restricted branch need support for
keep-going mode, this will be added in a subsequent commit.
The fact that self-signed end-entity certs can be explicitly trusted by
putting them in the CA list even if they don't have the CA bit was not
documented though it's intentional, and tested by "Certificate verification #73
(selfsigned trusted without CA bit)" in test_suite_x509parse.data
It is unclear to me whether the restriction that explicitly trusted end-entity
certs must be self-signed is a good one. However, it seems intentional as it is
tested in tests #42 and #43, so I'm not touching it for now.
Currently only SHA1 is supported as PRF algorithm for PBKDF2
(PKCS#5 v2.0).
This means that keys encrypted and authenticated using
another algorithm of the SHA family cannot be decrypted.
This deficiency has become particularly incumbent now that
PKIs created with OpenSSL1.1 are encrypting keys using
hmacSHA256 by default (OpenSSL1.0 used PKCS#5 v1.0 by default
and even if v2 was forced, it would still use hmacSHA1).
Enable support for all the digest algorithms of the SHA
family for PKCS#5 v2.0.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use
constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding
dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests and
ciphers instead.
On x32, pointers are only 4-bytes wide and need to be loaded using the "movl"
instruction instead of "movq" to avoid loading garbage into the register.
The MULADDC routines for x86-64 are adjusted to work on x32 as well by getting
gcc to load all the registers for us in advance (and storing them later) by
using better register constraints. The b, c, D and S constraints correspond to
the rbx, rcx, rdi and rsi registers respectively.
* mbedtls-2.1:
selftest: fix build error in some configurations
Timing self test: shorten redundant tests
Timing self test: increased duration
Timing self test: increased tolerance
selftest: allow excluding a subset of the tests
selftest: allow running a subset of the tests
selftest: fixed an erroneous return code
selftest: refactor to separate the list of tests from the logic
Timing self test: print some diagnosis information
mbedtls_timing_get_timer: don't use uninitialized memory
timing interface documentation: minor clarifications
Timing: fix mbedtls_set_alarm(0) on Unix/POSIX
mbedtls_timing_get_timer with reset=1 is called both to initialize a
timer object and to reset an already-initialized object. In an
initial call, the content of the data structure is indeterminate, so
the code should not read from it. This could crash if signed overflows
trap, for example.
As a consequence, on reset, we can't return the previously elapsed
time as was previously done on Windows. Return 0 as was done on Unix.
* restricted/pr/412:
Correct record header size in case of TLS
Don't allocate space for DTLS header if DTLS is disabled
Improve debugging output
Adapt ChangeLog
Add run-time check for handshake message size in ssl_write_record
Add run-time check for record content size in ssl_encrypt_buf
Add compile-time checks for size of record content and payload
The previous commit reduced the internal header size to 5 bytes in case of
TLS. This is not a valid since in that situation Mbed TLS internally uses the
first 8 bytes of the message buffer for the implicit record sequence number.
In case truncated HMAC must be used but the Mbed TLS peer hasn't been updated
yet, one can use the compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT to
temporarily fall back to the old, non-compliant implementation of the truncated
HMAC extension.
