The tests are supposed to be failing now (in all.sh component
test_memsan_constant_flow), but they don't as apparently MemSan doesn't
complain when the src argument of memcpy() is uninitialized, see
https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1296
The next commit will add an option to test constant flow with valgrind, which
will hopefully correctly flag the current non-constant-flow implementation.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The dummy implementation is not constant-flow at all for now, it's just
here as a starting point and a support for developing the tests and putting
the infrastructure in place.
Depending on the implementation strategy, there might be various corner cases
depending on where the lengths fall relative to block boundaries. So it seems
safer to just test all possible lengths in a given range than to use only a
few randomly-chosen values.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Started as copies of the AES block, then:
- for ARIA, just s/AES/ARIA/
- for Camellia, just s/AES/Camellia/
- for 3DES, s/AES/3DES/ then s/3DES_128_CBC/DES_EDE3_CBC/ then manually
subtract 8 to all plaintext lengths that were > 8. This accounts for the
fact that the block size of DES is 8 not 16.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
All started from a copy of the SHA256 block and modified as follows:
- for MD5, just s/SHA256/MD5/
- for SHA384, adapt the dependency line then s/SHA256/SHA384
- for SHA1, s/SHA256/SHA1/ then manually adapt the plaintext length for the
cases with "!trunc, B-1" and "!trunc, B", as the MAC length (20) is not a
multiple of the block size (16) for this hash
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
- plaintext length = 0 or 1
- plaintext length + MAC length = -1 or 0 mod block_size
(using the minimum plaintext length that works)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Compared to the previous approach of having the bad padding provided as input
to the testing function, this allows to test more kinds of incorrect data,
with less test cases in the .data file and more important no manually-generated
non-trivial data in the test case parameters, making it much easier to
complete the testing matrix.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Add the min/max version negotiation tests from ssl-opt.sh as unit
tests for the sake of utility and easier running of tests during
development
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
This commit introduces two changes:
- Add in_msg and out_msg calculations for buffer upsizing. This was previously
considered as unnecessary, but renegotiation using certain ciphersuites needs
this.
- Improving the way out_msg and in_msg pointers are calculated, so that even
if no resizing is introduced, the pointers remain the same;
New tests added:
- various renegotiation schemes with a range of MFL's and ciphersuites;
- an ssl-opt.sh test exercising two things that were problematic: renegotiation
with TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 and a server MFL that's smaller
than the one negotiated by the client.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Merge the latest state of the target branch (mbedtls/development) into the
pull request to merge mbed-crypto into mbedtls.
Conflicts:
* ChangeLog: add/add conflict. Resolve by using the usual section order.
Add dependencies on !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 to X.509 and SSL unit
tests that use SHA-384 (identified based on having a description that
contains "SHA384" or "SHA-384").
Counting of the fragments has been shifted from the writing section to
the reading. This is more reliable because one reading is made for one
fragment and during one write the library can internally divide data
into two fragments
Signed-off-by: Piotr Nowicki <piotr.nowicki@arm.com>
Add a conditional buffer resizing feature. Introduce tests exercising
it in various setups (serialization, renegotiation, mfl manipulations).
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
For this test it is good to have a handshake messages length as big as
possible, so for the server the certificate verification mode is
changed from default NONE to REQUIRED. It requires the client to send
certificate date to the server during handshake
Signed-off-by: Piotr Nowicki <piotr.nowicki@arm.com>
Create and provide a structure with default options so that the caller won't have
to pass all of the parameters each time the handshake is called. In the future
this can be improved so that the options are passed as a string, just like in
ssl-opt.sh.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Previously mocked non-blocking read/write was returning 0 when buffer was empty/full. That was causing ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF error in tests which was using these mocked callbacks. Beside that non-blocking read/write was returning ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/_WRITE depending on block pattern set by test design. Such behavior forced to redesign of these functions so that they could be used in other tests
In a unit test we want to avoid accessing the network. To test the
handshake in the unit test suite we need to implement a connection
between the server and the client. This socket implementation uses
two ring buffers to mock the transport layer.
In a unit test we want to avoid accessing the network. To test the
handshake in the unit test suite we need to implement a connection
between the server and the client. This ring buffer implementation will
serve as the said connection.
We have explicit recommendations to use US spelling for technical writing, so
let's apply this to code as well for uniformity. (My fingers tend to prefer UK
spelling, so this needs to be fixed in many places.)
sed -i 's/\([Ss]eriali\)s/\1z/g' **/*.[ch] **/*.function **/*.data ChangeLog
This test works regardless of the serialisation format and embedded pointers
in it, contrary to the load-save test, though it requires more maintenance of
the test code (sync the member list with the struct definition).
This uncovered a bug that led to a double-free (in practice, in general could
be free() on any invalid value): initially the session structure is loaded
with `memcpy()` which copies the previous values of pointers peer_cert and
ticket to heap-allocated buffers (or any other value if the input is
attacker-controlled). Now if we exit before we got a chance to replace those
invalid values with valid ones (for example because the input buffer is too
small, or because the second malloc() failed), then the next call to
session_free() is going to call free() on invalid pointers.
This bug is fixed in this commit by always setting the pointers to NULL right
after they've been read from the serialised state, so that the invalid values
can never be used.
(An alternative would be to NULL-ify them when writing, which was rejected
mostly because we need to do it when reading anyway (as the consequences of
free(invalid) are too severe to take any risk), so doing it when writing as
well is redundant and a waste of code size.)
Also, while thinking about what happens in case of errors, it became apparent
to me that it was bad practice to leave the session structure in an
half-initialised state and rely on the caller to call session_free(), so this
commit also ensures we always clear the structure when loading failed.
