(1) Add missing error condition
(2) Specify allowance and effect of of NULL hostname parameter
(3) Describe effect of function on failure
Also, adapt ChangeLog.
Document the preconditions on the input and output buffers for
the PKCS1 decryption functions
- rsa_pkcs1_decrypt
- rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt
- rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
Modify the function x509_csr_parse_der() so that it checks the parsed
CSR version integer before it increments the value. This prevents a
potential signed integer overflow, as these have undefined behaviour in
the C standard.
Fix a resource leak on windows platform, in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path,
in case a failure. when an error occurs, goto cleanup, and free the
resource, instead of returning error code immediately.
* restricted/iotssl-1398_backport-1.3:
Add ChangeLog entry
Ensure application data records are not kept when fully processed
Add hard assertion to ssl_read_record
Fix mbedtls_ssl_read
Simplify retaining of messages for future processing
In the ecdsa.c sample application we don't use hashing, we use ecdsa
directly on a buffer containing plain text. Although the text explains
that it should be the message hash it still can be confusing.
Any misunderstandings here are potentially very dangerous, because ECDSA
truncates the message hash if necessary and this can lead to trivial
signature forgeries if the API is misused and the message is passed
directly to the function without hashing.
This commit adds a hash computation step to the ecdsa.c sample
application and clarification to the doxygen documentation of the
ECDSA functions involved.
This commit changes the behaviour of mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate
to make the two authentication modes SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED and
SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL be in the following relationship:
Mode == SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
<=> Mode == SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL + check verify result
Also, it changes the behaviour to perform the certificate chain
verification even if the trusted CA chain is empty. Previously, the
function failed in this case, even when using optional verification,
which was brought up in #864.
This commit changes `ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext` to remember
one suitable ( := supported by client and by our config ) hash
algorithm per signature algorithm.
It also modifies the ciphersuite checking function
`ssl_ciphersuite_match` to refuse a suite if there
is no suitable hash algorithm.
Finally, it adds the corresponding entry to the ChangeLog.
The RSA private key functions rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt and
rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt put sensitive data (decryption results) on the
stack. Wipe it before returning.
Thanks to Laurent Simon for reporting this issue.
When provided with an empty line, mpi_read_file causes a numeric
underflow resulting in a stack underflow. This commit fixes this and
adds some documentation to mpi_read_file.
The test case was generated by modifying our signature code so that it
produces a 7-byte long padding (which also means garbage at the end, so it is
essential to check that the error that is detected first is indeed the
padding rather than the final length check).
