Document how mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data allocates val.p in the new
or modified entry.
Change the behavior to be more regular, always setting the new length
to val_len. This does not affect the previous documented behavior
since this aspect was not documented. This does not affect current
usage in Mbed TLS's X.509 module where calls with the same OID always
use the same size for the associated value.
* crypto/development: (77 commits)
all.sh: disable MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC in cmake asan build
Unify gcc and clang cmake flags to test with UBsan
Add an input check in psa_its_set
Remove storage errors from psa_generate_random
Update getting_started.md
Update based on Jaeden's comments.
Update getting_started.md
Fix return code warnings
Update getting_started.md
Fix warnings
Add PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE to psa_cipher_generate_iv
Remove errorneous insert
Add STORAGE_FAILURE everywhere + add missing codes
Add storage failure to psa_mac_verify_finish
Add storage failure to psa_mac_sign_finish
Add PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE to psa_aead_*_setup functions
Added PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE to functions with operations
Added extra bad state case to psa_hash_setup
Add missing return codes to psa_generate_key
Add PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL to psa_mac_compute
...
We were still reusing the internal HMAC-DRBG of the deterministic ECDSA
for blinding. This meant that with cryptographically low likelyhood the
result was not the same signature as the one the deterministic ECDSA
algorithm has to produce (however it is still a valid ECDSA signature).
To correct this we seed a second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed to restore
correct behavior. We also apply a label to avoid reusing the bits of the
ephemeral key for a different purpose and reduce the chance that they
leak.
This workaround can't be implemented in the restartable case without
penalising the case where external RNG is available or completely
defeating the purpose of the restartable feature, therefore in this case
the small chance of incorrect behavior remains.
The current interface does not allow passing an RNG, which is needed for
blinding. Using the scheme's internal HMAC-DRBG results the same
blinding values for the same key and message, diminishing the
effectiveness of the countermeasure. A new function
`mbedtls_ecdsa_det_ext` is available to address this problem.
`mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det` reuses the internal HMAC-DRBG instance to
implement blinding. The advantage of this is that the algorithm is
deterministic too, not just the resulting signature. The drawback is
that the blinding is always the same for the same key and message.
This diminishes the efficiency of blinding and leaks information about
the private key.
A function that takes external randomness fixes this weakness.
* crypto/development: (863 commits)
crypto_platform: Fix typo
des: Reduce number of self-test iterations
Fix -O0 build for Aarch64 bignum multiplication.
Make GNUC-compatible compilers use the right mbedtls_t_udbl again on Aarch64 builds.
Add optimized bignum multiplication for Aarch64.
Enable 64-bit limbs for all Aarch64 builds.
HMAC DRBG: Split entropy-gathering requests to reduce request sizes
psa: Use application key ID where necessary
psa: Adapt set_key_id() for when owner is included
psa: Add PSA_KEY_ID_INIT
psa: Don't duplicate policy initializer
crypto_extra: Use const seed for entropy injection
getting_started: Update for PSA Crypto API 1.0b3
Editorial fixes.
Cross reference 'key handles' from INVALID_HANDLE
Update documentation for psa_destroy_key
Update documentation for psa_close_key
Update psa_open_key documentation
Remove duplicated information in psa_open_key
Initialize key bits to max size + 1 in psa_import_key
...
According to SP800-90A, the DRBG seeding process should use a nonce
of length `security_strength / 2` bits as part of the DRBG seed. It
further notes that this nonce may be drawn from the same source of
entropy that is used for the first `security_strength` bits of the
DRBG seed. The present HMAC DRBG implementation does that, requesting
`security_strength * 3 / 2` bits of entropy from the configured entropy
source in total to form the initial part of the DRBG seed.
However, some entropy sources may have thresholds in terms of how much
entropy they can provide in a single call to their entropy gathering
function which may be exceeded by the present HMAC DRBG implementation
even if the threshold is not smaller than `security_strength` bits.
Specifically, this is the case for our own entropy module implementation
which only allows requesting at most 32 Bytes of entropy at a time
in configurations disabling SHA-512, and this leads to runtime failure
of HMAC DRBG when used with Mbed Crypto' own entropy callbacks in such
configurations.
This commit fixes this by splitting the seed entropy acquisition into
two calls, one requesting `security_strength` bits first, and another
one requesting `security_strength / 2` bits for the nonce.
Fixes#237.
Avoid compiler errors when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_FILE_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
is set by using the application ID type.
[Error] psa_crypto_slot_management.c@175,9: used type 'psa_key_id_t' (aka 'psa_key_file_id_t') where arithmetic or pointer type is required
In psa_import_key, the key bits value was uninitialized before
calling the secure element driver import function. There is a
potential issue if the driver returns PSA_SUCCESS without setting
the key bits. This shouldn't happen, but shouldn't be discounted
either, so we initialize the key bits to an invalid issue.
