The check uses grep, not config.pl, on the x509 headers - not where it should
be configured - config.h. grep syntax isn't very portable. Without config.pl
it's quite hard to do this check properly so removing this check.
The X509 test suite assumes that MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA is below the
hardcoded threshold 20 used in the long certificate chain generating script
tests/data_files/dir-max/long.sh. This commit adds a compile-time check for
that.
Some tests in ssl-opt.sh assumes the value 8 for the maximal number
MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA of intermediate CA's. This commit adds a check
before conducting the respective tests.
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
Inspired by test code provided by Nicholas Wilson in PR #351.
The test will fail if someone sets MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to a value larger than
18 (default is 8), which is hopefully unlikely and can easily be fixed by
running long.sh again with a larger value if it ever happens.
Current behaviour is suboptimal as flags are not set, but currently the goal
is only to document/test existing behaviour.
This commit adds four tests to tests/ssl-opt.sh:
(1) & (2): Check behaviour of optional/required verification when the
trusted CA chain is empty.
(3) & (4): Check behaviour of optional/required verification when the
client receives a server certificate with an unsupported curve.
By default, keep allowing SHA-1 in key exchange signatures. Disabling
it causes compatibility issues, especially with clients that use
TLS1.2 but don't send the signature_algorithms extension.
SHA-1 is forbidden in certificates by default, since it's vulnerable
to offline collision-based attacks.
There is now one test case to validate that SHA-1 is rejected in
certificates by default, and one test case to validate that SHA-1 is
supported if MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1 is #defined.
SHA-1 is now disabled by default in the X.509 layer. Explicitly enable
it in our tests for now. Updating all the test data to SHA-256 should
be done over time.
With SHA-1 deprecation, we need a few certificates using algorithms in
the default support list. Most tests still use SHA-1 though.
The generation process for the new certificates is recorded in the makefile.
Fixed a bug in ssl_srv.c when parsing TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the
ciphersuite list that caused it to miss it sometimes. Reported by Hugo
Leisink as issue #810. Fix initially by @andreasag01; this commit
isolates the bug fix and adds a non-regression test.
Modify tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl to ensure that:
* It can only be run from the mbed TLS root directory.
* An error code is returned to the environment when a potential error
in the source code is found.
The test case was generated by modifying our signature code so that it
produces a 7-byte long padding (which also means garbage at the end, so it is
essential to check that the error that is detected first is indeed the
padding rather than the final length check).
The modular inversion function hangs when provided with the modulus 1. This commit refuses this modulus with a BAD_INPUT error code. It also adds a test for this case.
Fix a buffer overflow when writting a string representation of an MPI
number to a buffer in hexadecimal. The problem occurs because hex
digits are written in pairs and this is not accounted for in the
calculation of the required buffer size when the number of digits is
odd.
The first three test cases from test_suites_pkparse.data failed because
the key file they read requires DES to be read. However, MBEDTLS_DES_C
was missing from the dependency list.
This curve has special arithmetic on 64 bit platforms and an untested
path lead to trying to free a buffer on the stack.
For the sake of completeness, a test case for a point with non-affine
coordinates has been added as well.
Fixes a regression introduced by an earlier commit that modified
x509_crt_verify_top() to ensure that valid certificates that are after past or
future valid in the chain are processed. However the change introduced a change
in behaviour that caused the verification flags MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED and
MBEDTLS_BADCERT_FUTURE to always be set whenever there is a failure in the
verification regardless of the cause.
The fix maintains both behaviours:
* Ensure that valid certificates after future and past are verified
* Ensure that the correct verification flags are set.
Modifies the function mbedtls_x509_crl_parse() to ensure that a CRL in PEM
format with trailing characters after the footer does not result in the
execution of an infinite loop.
Add a test to ssl-opt.sh to ensure that in DTLS a 6 byte record counter
is compared in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() instead of a 8 byte one as in
the TLS case. Because currently there are no testing facilities to check
that renegotiation routines are triggered after X number of input/output
messages, the test consists on setting a renegotiation period that
cannot be represented in 6 bytes, but whose least-significant byte is 2.
If the library behaves correctly, the renegotiation routines will be
executed after two exchanged.
