As noted in #557, several functions use 'index' resp. 'time'
as parameter names in their declaration and/or definition, causing name
conflicts with the functions in the C standard library of the same
name some compilers warn about.
This commit renames the arguments accordingly.
Document the preconditions on the input and output buffers for
the PKCS1 decryption functions
- mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt,
- mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt
- mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt
The previous version of `mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp` did not qualify the
pointers to the arrays to be compared as volatile, theoretically
opening the possibility for the compiler to notice that the loop
operation `diff |= A[i] ^ B[i]` is pointless if `diff = -1`. This
commit changes this. It also declares the stack variable `diff` as
volatile, to force read and write in every loop; omitting that, the
compiler would still be allowed to get away with reading `A[i]` and
`B[i]` but not doing the XOR and not updating `diff`.
* restricted/iotssl-1398_backport-2.1:
Add ChangeLog entry
Ensure application data records are not kept when fully processed
Add hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer
Fix mbedtls_ssl_read
Simplify retaining of messages for future processing
There are situations in which it is not clear what message to expect
next. For example, the message following the ServerHello might be
either a Certificate, a ServerKeyExchange or a CertificateRequest. We
deal with this situation in the following way: Initially, the message
processing function for one of the allowed message types is called,
which fetches and decodes a new message. If that message is not the
expected one, the function returns successfully (instead of throwing
an error as usual for unexpected messages), and the handshake
continues to the processing function for the next possible message. To
not have this function fetch a new message, a flag in the SSL context
structure is used to indicate that the last message was retained for
further processing, and if that's set, the following processing
function will not fetch a new record.
This commit simplifies the usage of this message-retaining parameter
by doing the check within the record-fetching routine instead of the
specific message-processing routines. The code gets cleaner this way
and allows retaining messages to be used in other situations as well
without much effort. This will be used in the next commits.
In the ecdsa.c sample application we don't use hashing, we use ecdsa
directly on a buffer containing plain text. Although the text explains
that it should be the message hash it still can be confusing.
Any misunderstandings here are potentially very dangerous, because ECDSA
truncates the message hash if necessary and this can lead to trivial
signature forgeries if the API is misused and the message is passed
directly to the function without hashing.
This commit adds a hash computation step to the ecdsa.c sample
application and clarification to the doxygen documentation of the
ECDSA functions involved.
By default, keep allowing SHA-1 in key exchange signatures. Disabling
it causes compatibility issues, especially with clients that use
TLS1.2 but don't send the signature_algorithms extension.
SHA-1 is forbidden in certificates by default, since it's vulnerable
to offline collision-based attacks.
There is now one test case to validate that SHA-1 is rejected in
certificates by default, and one test case to validate that SHA-1 is
supported if MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1 is #defined.
Default to forbidding the use of SHA-1 in TLS where it is unsafe: for
certificate signing, and as the signature hash algorithm for the TLS
1.2 handshake signature. SHA-1 remains allowed in HMAC-SHA-1 in the
XXX_SHA ciphersuites and in the PRF for TLS <= 1.1.
For easy backward compatibility for use in controlled environments,
turn on the MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1 compiled-time option.
* hanno/iotssl-1241-backport-2.1:
Improve documentation
Split long lines.
Remember suitable hash function for any signature algorithm.
Introduce macros and functions to characterize certain ciphersuites.
This commit changes `ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext` to remember
one suitable ( := supported by client and by our config ) hash
algorithm per signature algorithm.
It also modifies the ciphersuite checking function
`ssl_ciphersuite_match` to refuse a suite if there
is no suitable hash algorithm.
Finally, it adds the corresponding entry to the ChangeLog.
The routine `mbedtls_ssl_write_server_key_exchange` heavily depends on
what kind of cipher suite is active: some don't need a
ServerKeyExchange at all, some need (EC)DH parameters but no server
signature, some require both. Each time we want to restrict a certain
piece of code to some class of ciphersuites, it is guarded by a
lengthy concatentation of configuration checks determining whether at
least one of the relevant cipher suites is enabled in the config; on
the code level, it is guarded by the check whether one of these
cipher suites is the active one.
To ease readability of the code, this commit introduces several helper
macros and helper functions that can be used to determine whether a
certain class of ciphersuites (a) is active in the config, and
(b) contains the currently present ciphersuite.
When provided with an empty line, mpi_read_file causes a numeric
underflow resulting in a stack underflow. This commit fixes this and
adds some documentation to mpi_read_file.
The modular inversion function hangs when provided with the modulus 1. This commit refuses this modulus with a BAD_INPUT error code. It also adds a test for this case.
Fix an incorrect condition in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() that compared
64 bits of record counter instead of 48 bits as described in RFC 6347
Section 4.3.1. This would cause the function's return value to be
occasionally incorrect and the renegotiation routines to be triggered
at unexpected times.
Fixes many typos, and errors in comments.
* Clarifies many comments
* Grammar correction in config.pl help text
* Removed comment about MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE.
* Comment typo fix (Dont => Don't)
* Comment typo fix (assure => ensure)
* Comment typo fix (byes => bytes)
* Added citation for quoted standard
* Comment typo fix (one complement => 1's complement)
The is some debate about whether to prefer "one's complement", "ones'
complement", or "1's complement". The more recent RFCs related to TLS
(RFC 6347, RFC 4347, etc) use " 1's complement", so I followed that
convention.
* Added missing ")" in comment
* Comment alignment
* Incorrect comment after #endif
In a USENIX WOOT '16 paper the authors warn about a security risk
of random Initialisation Vectors (IV) repeating values.
The MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV feature is affected by this risk and
it isn't compliant with RFC5116. Furthermore, strictly speaking it
is a different cipher suite from the TLS (RFC5246) point of view.
Removing the MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV feature to resolve the above
problems.
Hanno Böck, Aaron Zauner, Sean Devlin, Juraj Somorovsky and Philipp
Jovanovic, "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attacks
on GCM in TLS", USENIX WOOT '16
Fix implementation and documentation missmatch for the function
arguments to mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Also, removed redundant if condition
that always evaluates to true.
