The fact that self-signed end-entity certs can be explicitly trusted by
putting them in the CA list even if they don't have the CA bit was not
documented though it's intentional, and tested by "Certificate verification #73
(selfsigned trusted without CA bit)" in test_suite_x509parse.data
It is unclear to me whether the restriction that explicitly trusted end-entity
certs must be self-signed is a good one. However, it seems intentional as it is
tested in tests #42 and #43, so I'm not touching it for now.
Currently only SHA1 is supported as PRF algorithm for PBKDF2
(PKCS#5 v2.0).
This means that keys encrypted and authenticated using
another algorithm of the SHA family cannot be decrypted.
This deficiency has become particularly incumbent now that
PKIs created with OpenSSL1.1 are encrypting keys using
hmacSHA256 by default (OpenSSL1.0 used PKCS#5 v1.0 by default
and even if v2 was forced, it would still use hmacSHA1).
Enable support for all the digest algorithms of the SHA
family for PKCS#5 v2.0.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use
constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding
dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests and
ciphers instead.
On x32, pointers are only 4-bytes wide and need to be loaded using the "movl"
instruction instead of "movq" to avoid loading garbage into the register.
The MULADDC routines for x86-64 are adjusted to work on x32 as well by getting
gcc to load all the registers for us in advance (and storing them later) by
using better register constraints. The b, c, D and S constraints correspond to
the rbx, rcx, rdi and rsi registers respectively.
* mbedtls-2.1:
selftest: fix build error in some configurations
Timing self test: shorten redundant tests
Timing self test: increased duration
Timing self test: increased tolerance
selftest: allow excluding a subset of the tests
selftest: allow running a subset of the tests
selftest: fixed an erroneous return code
selftest: refactor to separate the list of tests from the logic
Timing self test: print some diagnosis information
mbedtls_timing_get_timer: don't use uninitialized memory
timing interface documentation: minor clarifications
Timing: fix mbedtls_set_alarm(0) on Unix/POSIX
mbedtls_timing_get_timer with reset=1 is called both to initialize a
timer object and to reset an already-initialized object. In an
initial call, the content of the data structure is indeterminate, so
the code should not read from it. This could crash if signed overflows
trap, for example.
As a consequence, on reset, we can't return the previously elapsed
time as was previously done on Windows. Return 0 as was done on Unix.
* restricted/pr/412:
Correct record header size in case of TLS
Don't allocate space for DTLS header if DTLS is disabled
Improve debugging output
Adapt ChangeLog
Add run-time check for handshake message size in ssl_write_record
Add run-time check for record content size in ssl_encrypt_buf
Add compile-time checks for size of record content and payload
The previous commit reduced the internal header size to 5 bytes in case of
TLS. This is not a valid since in that situation Mbed TLS internally uses the
first 8 bytes of the message buffer for the implicit record sequence number.
In case truncated HMAC must be used but the Mbed TLS peer hasn't been updated
yet, one can use the compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT to
temporarily fall back to the old, non-compliant implementation of the truncated
HMAC extension.
As noted in #557, several functions use 'index' resp. 'time'
as parameter names in their declaration and/or definition, causing name
conflicts with the functions in the C standard library of the same
name some compilers warn about.
This commit renames the arguments accordingly.
Document the preconditions on the input and output buffers for
the PKCS1 decryption functions
- mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt,
- mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt
- mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt
The previous version of `mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp` did not qualify the
pointers to the arrays to be compared as volatile, theoretically
opening the possibility for the compiler to notice that the loop
operation `diff |= A[i] ^ B[i]` is pointless if `diff = -1`. This
commit changes this. It also declares the stack variable `diff` as
volatile, to force read and write in every loop; omitting that, the
compiler would still be allowed to get away with reading `A[i]` and
`B[i]` but not doing the XOR and not updating `diff`.
* restricted/iotssl-1398_backport-2.1:
Add ChangeLog entry
Ensure application data records are not kept when fully processed
Add hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer
Fix mbedtls_ssl_read
Simplify retaining of messages for future processing
There are situations in which it is not clear what message to expect
next. For example, the message following the ServerHello might be
either a Certificate, a ServerKeyExchange or a CertificateRequest. We
deal with this situation in the following way: Initially, the message
processing function for one of the allowed message types is called,
which fetches and decodes a new message. If that message is not the
expected one, the function returns successfully (instead of throwing
an error as usual for unexpected messages), and the handshake
continues to the processing function for the next possible message. To
not have this function fetch a new message, a flag in the SSL context
structure is used to indicate that the last message was retained for
further processing, and if that's set, the following processing
function will not fetch a new record.
This commit simplifies the usage of this message-retaining parameter
by doing the check within the record-fetching routine instead of the
specific message-processing routines. The code gets cleaner this way
and allows retaining messages to be used in other situations as well
without much effort. This will be used in the next commits.
In the ecdsa.c sample application we don't use hashing, we use ecdsa
directly on a buffer containing plain text. Although the text explains
that it should be the message hash it still can be confusing.
Any misunderstandings here are potentially very dangerous, because ECDSA
truncates the message hash if necessary and this can lead to trivial
signature forgeries if the API is misused and the message is passed
directly to the function without hashing.
This commit adds a hash computation step to the ecdsa.c sample
application and clarification to the doxygen documentation of the
ECDSA functions involved.
By default, keep allowing SHA-1 in key exchange signatures. Disabling
it causes compatibility issues, especially with clients that use
TLS1.2 but don't send the signature_algorithms extension.
SHA-1 is forbidden in certificates by default, since it's vulnerable
to offline collision-based attacks.
There is now one test case to validate that SHA-1 is rejected in
certificates by default, and one test case to validate that SHA-1 is
supported if MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1 is #defined.
Default to forbidding the use of SHA-1 in TLS where it is unsafe: for
certificate signing, and as the signature hash algorithm for the TLS
1.2 handshake signature. SHA-1 remains allowed in HMAC-SHA-1 in the
XXX_SHA ciphersuites and in the PRF for TLS <= 1.1.
For easy backward compatibility for use in controlled environments,
turn on the MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1 compiled-time option.
* hanno/iotssl-1241-backport-2.1:
Improve documentation
Split long lines.
Remember suitable hash function for any signature algorithm.
Introduce macros and functions to characterize certain ciphersuites.
Note that the configuration structure must remain accessible. The
previous wording could have been taken as implying that it's ok to
change the structure but changes wouldn't be taken into account.
Also note that calling this function twice is not supported (it would
at least be a memory leak).
This commit changes `ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext` to remember
one suitable ( := supported by client and by our config ) hash
algorithm per signature algorithm.
It also modifies the ciphersuite checking function
`ssl_ciphersuite_match` to refuse a suite if there
is no suitable hash algorithm.
Finally, it adds the corresponding entry to the ChangeLog.
The routine `mbedtls_ssl_write_server_key_exchange` heavily depends on
what kind of cipher suite is active: some don't need a
ServerKeyExchange at all, some need (EC)DH parameters but no server
signature, some require both. Each time we want to restrict a certain
piece of code to some class of ciphersuites, it is guarded by a
lengthy concatentation of configuration checks determining whether at
least one of the relevant cipher suites is enabled in the config; on
the code level, it is guarded by the check whether one of these
cipher suites is the active one.
To ease readability of the code, this commit introduces several helper
macros and helper functions that can be used to determine whether a
certain class of ciphersuites (a) is active in the config, and
(b) contains the currently present ciphersuite.
When provided with an empty line, mpi_read_file causes a numeric
underflow resulting in a stack underflow. This commit fixes this and
adds some documentation to mpi_read_file.
The modular inversion function hangs when provided with the modulus 1. This commit refuses this modulus with a BAD_INPUT error code. It also adds a test for this case.
Fix an incorrect condition in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() that compared
64 bits of record counter instead of 48 bits as described in RFC 6347
Section 4.3.1. This would cause the function's return value to be
occasionally incorrect and the renegotiation routines to be triggered
at unexpected times.
Fixes many typos, and errors in comments.
* Clarifies many comments
* Grammar correction in config.pl help text
* Removed comment about MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE.
* Comment typo fix (Dont => Don't)
* Comment typo fix (assure => ensure)
* Comment typo fix (byes => bytes)
* Added citation for quoted standard
* Comment typo fix (one complement => 1's complement)
The is some debate about whether to prefer "one's complement", "ones'
complement", or "1's complement". The more recent RFCs related to TLS
(RFC 6347, RFC 4347, etc) use " 1's complement", so I followed that
convention.
* Added missing ")" in comment
* Comment alignment
* Incorrect comment after #endif
In a USENIX WOOT '16 paper the authors warn about a security risk
of random Initialisation Vectors (IV) repeating values.
The MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV feature is affected by this risk and
it isn't compliant with RFC5116. Furthermore, strictly speaking it
is a different cipher suite from the TLS (RFC5246) point of view.
Removing the MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV feature to resolve the above
problems.
Hanno Böck, Aaron Zauner, Sean Devlin, Juraj Somorovsky and Philipp
Jovanovic, "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attacks
on GCM in TLS", USENIX WOOT '16
Fix implementation and documentation missmatch for the function
arguments to mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Also, removed redundant if condition
that always evaluates to true.
When we use the same documentation for a list of #defines, we used to use a
generic name in the \def command. Use the first name of the list instead so
that doxygen stops complaining, and mention the generic name in the longer
description.
This is not entirely satisfactory as the full list of macros will not be
included in the generated doc, but it's still an improvement as at least the
first macro is documented now, with a hint that there are others.
When the peer retransmits a flight with many record in the same datagram, and
we already saw one of the records in that datagram, we used to drop the whole
datagram, resulting in interoperability failure (spurious handshake timeouts,
due to ignoring record retransmitted by the peer) with some implementations
(issues with Chrome were reported).
So in those cases, we want to only drop the current record, and look at the
following records (if any) in the same datagram. OTOH, this is not something
we always want to do, as sometime the header of the current record is not
reliable enough.
This commit introduces a new return code for ssl_parse_header() that allows to
distinguish if we should drop only the current record or the whole datagram,
and uses it in mbedtls_ssl_read_record()
fixes#345
fixes#310
Actually all key exchanges that use a certificate use signatures too, and
there is no key exchange that uses signatures but no cert, so merge those two
flags.
Conflicts:
ChangeLog
