The 3-key and 2-key Triple DES PBE functions have been replaced with a
single pkcs12_pbe() function that handles both situations (and more).
In addition this allows for some PASSWORD_MISMATCH checking
POLARSSL_ERR_X509_PASSWORD_MISMATCH is returned instead of
POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH and
POLARSSL_ERR_X509_PASSWORD_REQUIRED instead of
POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED
Rationale: For PKCS#8 encrypted keys the same are returned
The error code POLARSSL_ERR_X509_PASSWORD_MISMATCH is now properly
returned in case of an encryption failure in the padding. The
POLARSSL_ERR_X509_PASSWORD_REQUIRED error code is only returned for PEM
formatted private keys as for DER formatted ones it is impossible to
distinguish if a DER blob is PKCS#8 encrypted or not.
All symmetric cipher algorithms and hash algorithms now include support
for a POLARSSL_XXX_ALT flag that prevents the definition of the
algorithm context structure and all 'core' functions.
PKCS#8 encrypted key file support has been added to x509parse_key() with
support for some PCKS#12 PBE functions (pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4,
pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC and pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC)
Split up x509parse_key() into a (PEM) handler function and specific
DER parser functions for the PKCS#1 (x509parse_key_pkcs1_der()) and
unencrypted PKCS#8 (x509parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der()) private
key formats.
Because of new pem_read_buffer() handling of when it writes use_len,
x509parse_crt() is able to better handle situations where a PEM blob
results in an error but the other blobs can still be parsed.
After header and footer are read, pem_read_buffer() is able to determine
the length of input data used. This allows calling functions to skip
this PEM bit if an error occurs during its parsing.
Rationale: The HAVEGE random generator has too many caveats to be a
standard generator that people rely on. The HAVEGE random generator is not
suitable for virtualized environments. In addition the HAVEGE random
generator is dependent on timing and specific processor traits that
cannot be guaranteed by default on compile time.
Our advice: only use HAVEGE as an additional random source for your
entropy pool, never as your primary source.
Removed unused variable 'v'
orig_len and orig_add_len are now uint64_t to support larger than 2^29
data sizes
(cherry picked from commit 0ecdb23eed)
Conflicts:
library/gcm.c
The ciphersuites parameter in the ssl_session structure changed from
'int *' to 'int **' and is now malloced in ssl_init() and freed in
ssl_free().
The new function ssl_set_ciphersuite_for_version() sets specific entries
inside this array. ssl_set_ciphersuite() sets all entries to the same
value.
The real peer certificate is copied into a x509_buf in the
ssl_cache_entry and reinstated upon cache retrieval. The information
about the rest of the certificate chain is lost in the process.
As the handshake (and certificate verification) has already been
performed, no issue is foreseen.
If the define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is enabled,
the SSL Server module can handle the old SSLv2 Client Hello messages.
It has been updated to deny SSLv2 Client Hello messages during
renegotiation.
Split rsa_pkcs1_encrypt() into rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt() and
rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt()
Split rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() into rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt() and
rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt()
Split rsa_pkcs1_sign() into rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() and
rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign()
Split rsa_pkcs1_verify() into rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() and
rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify()
The original functions exist as generic wrappers to these functions.
New padding checking is unbiased on correct or incorrect padding and
has no branch prediction timing differences.
The additional MAC checks further straighten out the timing differences.
