Conflict resolution:
* ChangeLog
* tests/data_files/Makefile: concurrent additions, order irrelevant
* tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf: concurrent additions, order irrelevant
* tests/scripts/all.sh: one comment change conflicted with a code
addition. In addition some of the additions in the
iotssl-1381-x509-verify-refactor-restricted branch need support for
keep-going mode, this will be added in a subsequent commit.
The 'critical' boolean can be set to false in two ways:
- by leaving it implicit (test data generated by openssl)
- by explicitly setting it to false (generated by hand)
This covers all lines added in the previous commit. Coverage was tested using:
make CFLAGS='--coverage -g3 -O0'
(cd tests && ./test_suite_x509parse)
make lcov
firefox Coverage/index.html # then visual check
Test data was generated by taking a copy of tests/data_files/crl-idp.pem,
encoding it as hex, and then manually changing the values of some bytes to
achieve the desired errors, using https://lapo.it/asn1js/ for help in locating
the desired bytes.
* development: (557 commits)
Add attribution for #1351 report
Adapt version_features.c
Note incompatibility of truncated HMAC extension in ChangeLog
Add LinkLibraryDependencies to VS2010 app template
Add ChangeLog entry for PR #1382
MD: Make deprecated functions not inline
Add ChangeLog entry for PR #1384
Have Visual Studio handle linking to mbedTLS.lib internally
Mention in ChangeLog that this fixes#1351
Add issue number to ChangeLog
Note in the changelog that this fixes an interoperability issue.
Style fix in ChangeLog
Add ChangeLog entries for PR #1168 and #1362
Add ChangeLog entry for PR #1165
ctr_drbg: Typo fix in the file description comment.
dhm: Fix typo in RFC 5114 constants
tests_suite_pkparse: new PKCS8-v2 keys with PRF != SHA1
data_files/pkcs8-v2: add keys generated with PRF != SHA1
tests/pkcs5/pbkdf2_hmac: extend array to accommodate longer results
tests/pkcs5/pbkdf2_hmac: add unit tests for additional SHA algorithms
...
For selection of test cases, see comments added in the commit.
It makes the most sense to test with chains using ECC only, so for the chain
of length 2 we use server10 -> int-ca3 -> int-ca2 and trust int-ca2 directly.
Note: server10.crt was created by copying server10_int3_int-ca2.crt and
manually truncating it to remove the intermediates. That base can now be used
to create derived certs (without or with a chain) in a programmatic way.
Our current behaviour is a bit inconsistent here:
- when the bad signature is made by a trusted CA, we stop here and don't
include the trusted CA in the chain (don't call vrfy on it)
- otherwise, we just add NOT_TRUSTED to the flags but keep building the chain
and call vrfy on the upper certs
This ensures that the callback can actually clear that flag, and that it is
seen by the callback at the right level. This flag is not set at the same
place than others, and this difference will get bigger in the upcoming
refactor, so let's ensure we don't break anything here.
When a trusted CA is rolling its root keys, it could happen that for some
users the list of trusted roots contains two versions of the same CA with the
same name but different keys. Currently this is supported but wasn't tested.
Note: the intermediate file test-ca-alt.csr is commited on purpose, as not
commiting intermediate files causes make to regenerate files that we don't
want it to touch.
As we accept EE certs that are explicitly trusted (in the list of trusted
roots) and usually look for parent by subject, and in the future we might want
to avoid checking the self-signature on trusted certs, there could a risk that we
incorrectly accept a cert that looks like a trusted root except it doesn't
have the same key. This test ensures this will never happen.
The tests cover chains of length 0, 1 and 2, with one error, located at any of
the available levels in the chain. This exercises all three call sites of
f_vrfy (two in verify_top, one in verify_child). Chains of greater length
would not cover any new code path or behaviour that I can see.
So far there was no test ensuring that the flags passed to the vrfy callback
are correct (ie the flags for the current certificate, not including those of
the parent).
Actual tests case making use of that test function will be added in the next
commit.
We have code to skip them but didn't have explicit tests ensuring they are
(the corresponding branch was never taken).
While at it, remove extra copy of the chain in server10*.crt, which was
duplicated for no reason.
This shows inconsistencies in how flags are handled when callback fails:
- sometimes the flags set by the callback are transmitted, sometimes not
- when the cert if not trusted, sometimes BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED is set,
sometimes not
This adds coverage for 9 lines and 9 branches. Now all lines related to
callback failure are covered.
Now all checks related to profile are covered in:
- verify_with_profile()
- verify_child()
- verify_top()
(that's 10 lines that were previously not covered)
Leaving aside profile enforcement in CRLs for now, as the focus is on
preparing to refactor cert verification.
Previously flags was left to whatever value it had before. It's cleaner to
make sure it has a definite value, and all bits set looks like the safest way
for when it went very wrong.
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
Inspired by test code provided by Nicholas Wilson in PR #351.
The test will fail if someone sets MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to a value larger than
18 (default is 8), which is hopefully unlikely and can easily be fixed by
running long.sh again with a larger value if it ever happens.
Current behaviour is suboptimal as flags are not set, but currently the goal
is only to document/test existing behaviour.
By default, keep allowing SHA-1 in key exchange signatures. Disabling
it causes compatibility issues, especially with clients that use
TLS1.2 but don't send the signature_algorithms extension.
SHA-1 is forbidden in certificates by default, since it's vulnerable
to offline collision-based attacks.
There is now one test case to validate that SHA-1 is rejected in
certificates by default, and one test case to validate that SHA-1 is
supported if MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1 is #defined.
SHA-1 is now disabled by default in the X.509 layer. Explicitly enable
it in our tests for now. Updating all the test data to SHA-256 should
be done over time.
Fixes a regression introduced by an earlier commit that modified
x509_crt_verify_top() to ensure that valid certificates that are after past or
future valid in the chain are processed. However the change introduced a change
in behaviour that caused the verification flags MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED and
MBEDTLS_BADCERT_FUTURE to always be set whenever there is a failure in the
verification regardless of the cause.
The fix maintains both behaviours:
* Ensure that valid certificates after future and past are verified
* Ensure that the correct verification flags are set.
The tests load certificate chains from files. The CA chains contain a
past or future certificate and an invalid certificate. The test then
checks that the flags set are MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED or
MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE.
* iotssl-515-max-pathlen:
Add Changelog entries for this branch
Fix a style issue
Fix whitespace at EOL issues
Use symbolic constants in test data
Fixed pathlen contraint enforcement.
Additional corner cases for testing pathlen constrains. Just in case.
Added test case for pathlen constrains in intermediate certificates
This helps in the case where an intermediate certificate is directly trusted.
In that case we want to ignore what comes after it in the chain, not only for
performance but also to avoid false negatives (eg an old root being no longer
trusted while the newer intermediate is directly trusted).
closes#220
As we're about to change the chain construction logic, we want to make sure
the callback will still be called exactly when it should, and not on the
(upcoming) ignored certs in the chain.
