* development-restricted: (578 commits)
Update library version number to 2.13.1
Don't define _POSIX_C_SOURCE in header file
Don't declare and define gmtime()-mutex on Windows platforms
Correct preprocessor guards determining use of gmtime()
Correct documentation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
Correct typo in documentation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
Correct POSIX version check to determine presence of gmtime_r()
Improve documentation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
platform_utils.{c/h} -> platform_util.{c/h}
Don't include platform_time.h if !MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
Improve wording of documentation of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT
Fix typo in documentation of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT
Replace 'thread safe' by 'thread-safe' in the documentation
Improve documentation of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
ChangeLog: Add missing renamings gmtime -> gmtime_r
Improve documentation of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
Minor documentation improvements
Style: Add missing period in documentation in threading.h
Rename mbedtls_platform_gmtime() to mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
Guard decl and use of gmtime mutex by HAVE_TIME_DATE and !GMTIME_ALT
...
Previous commits attempted to use `gmtime_s()` for IAR systems; however,
this attempt depends on the use of C11 extensions which lead to incompatibility
with other pieces of the library, such as the use of `memset()` which is
being deprecated in favor of `memset_s()` in C11.
a compile time print was added warning in case of 128bit ctr_drbg keys.
This was don't to avoid an actual warning in these cases
(making build with warnings as errors possible).
Additional warnings on the Changelog/headers were set to use the same phrasing
phrasing was approved by Gilles and Janos.
the change is designed to make configuring 128bit keys for ctr_drbg more similar to other configuration options. Tests have been updated accordingly.
also clarified test naming.
This commit introduces a compile time constant MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING
to mbedtls/config.h which allows the user to control the cumulative size of
all heap buffer allocated for the purpose of reassembling and buffering
handshake messages.
It is put to use by introducing a new field `total_bytes_buffered` to
the buffering substructure of `mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params` that keeps
track of the total size of heap allocated buffers for the purpose of
reassembly and buffering at any time. It is increased whenever a handshake
message is buffered or prepared for reassembly, and decreased when a
buffered or fully reassembled message is copied into the input buffer
and passed to the handshake logic layer.
This commit does not yet include future epoch record buffering into
account; this will be done in a subsequent commit.
Also, it is now conceivable that the reassembly of the next expected
handshake message fails because too much buffering space has already
been used up for future messages. This case currently leads to an
error, but instead, the stack should get rid of buffered messages
to be able to buffer the next one. This will need to be implemented
in one of the next commits.
This setting belongs to the individual connection, not to a configuration
shared by many connections. (If a default value is desired, that can be handled
by the application code that calls mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().)
There are at least two ways in which this matters:
- per-connection settings can be adjusted if MTU estimates become available
during the lifetime of the connection
- it is at least conceivable that a server might recognize restricted clients
based on range of IPs and immediately set a lower MTU for them. This is much
easier to do with a per-connection setting than by maintaining multiple
near-duplicated ssl_config objects that differ only by the MTU setting.
This commit implements the buffering of a record from the next epoch.
- The buffering substructure of mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
gets another field to hold a raw record (incl. header) from
a future epoch.
- If ssl_parse_record_header() sees a record from the next epoch,
it signals that it might be suitable for buffering by returning
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE.
- If ssl_get_next_record() finds this error code, it passes control
to ssl_buffer_future_record() which may or may not decide to buffer
the record; it does so if
- a handshake is in progress,
- the record is a handshake record
- no record has already been buffered.
If these conditions are met, the record is backed up in the
aforementioned buffering substructure.
- If the current datagram is fully processed, ssl_load_buffered_record()
is called to check if a record has been buffered, and if yes,
if by now the its epoch is the current one; if yes, it copies
the record into the (empty! otherwise, ssl_load_buffered_record()
wouldn't have been called) input buffer.
This commit returns the error code MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE
for proper handshake fragments, forwarding their treatment to
the buffering function ssl_buffer_message(); currently, though,
this function does not yet buffer or reassembly HS messages, so:
! This commit temporarily disables support for handshake reassembly !
This commit introduces, but does not yet put to use, a sub-structure
of mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::buffering that will be used for the
buffering and/or reassembly of handshake messages with handshake
sequence numbers that are greater or equal to the next expected
sequence number.
This commit introduces a sub-structure `buffering` within
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params that shall contain all data
related to the reassembly and/or buffering of handshake
messages.
Currently, only buffering of CCS messages is implemented,
so the only member of this struct is the previously introduced
`seen_ccs` field.
This commit implements support for remembering out-of-order
CCS messages. Specifically, a flag is set whenever a CCS message
is read which remains until the end of a flight, and when a
CCS message is expected and a CCS message has been seen in the
current flight, a synthesized CCS record is created.
This function was previously global because it was
used directly within ssl_parse_certificate_verify()
in library/ssl_srv.c. The previous commit removed
this dependency, replacing the call by a call to
the global parent function mbedtls_ssl_read_record().
This renders mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer() internal
and therefore allows to make it static, and accordingly
rename it as ssl_read_record_layer().
Previously, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() always updated the handshake
checksum in case a handshake record was received. While desirable
most of the time, for the CertificateVerify message the checksum
update must only happen after the message has been fully processed,
because the validation requires the handshake digest up to but
excluding the CertificateVerify itself. As a remedy, the bulk
of mbedtls_ssl_read_record() was previously duplicated within
ssl_parse_certificate_verify(), hardening maintenance in case
mbedtls_ssl_read_record() is subject to changes.
This commit adds a boolean parameter to mbedtls_ssl_read_record()
indicating whether the checksum should be updated in case of a
handshake message or not. This allows using it also for
ssl_parse_certificate_verify(), manually updating the checksum
after the message has been processed.
This commit adds a public function
`mbedtls_ssl_conf_datagram_packing()`
that allows to allow / forbid the packing of multiple
records within a single datagram.
This commit finally enables datagram packing by modifying the
record preparation function ssl_write_record() to not always
calling mbedtls_ssl_flush_output().
This commit is another step towards supporting the packing of
multiple records within a single datagram.
Previously, the incremental outgoing record sequence number was
statically stored within the record buffer, at its final place
within the record header. This slightly increased efficiency
as it was not necessary to copy the sequence number when writing
outgoing records.
When allowing multiple records within a single datagram, it is
necessary to allow the position of the current record within the
datagram buffer to be flexible; in particular, there is no static
address for the record sequence number field within the record header.
This commit introduces an additional field `cur_out_ctr` within
the main SSL context structure `mbedtls_ssl_context` to keep track
of the outgoing record sequence number independent of the buffer used
for the current record / datagram. Whenever a new record is written,
this sequence number is copied to the the address `out_ctr` of the
sequence number header field within the current outgoing record.
This will allow fragmentation to always happen in the same place, always from
a buffer distinct from ssl->out_msg, and with the same way of resuming after
returning WANT_WRITE
The standard HKDF security guarantees only hold if `mbedtls_hkdf()` is
used or if `mbedtls_hkdf_extract()` and `mbedtls_hkdf_expand()` are
called in succession carefully and an equivalent way.
Making `mbedtls_hkdf_extract()` and `mbedtls_hkdf_expand()` static would
prevent any misuse, but doing so would require the TLS 1.3 stack to
break abstraction and bypass the module API.
To reduce the risk of misuse we add warnings to the function
descriptions.
When MBEDTLS_ARC4_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER were disabled, the stream
cipher function wasn't being include in the cipher struct, yet Chacha20 requires
it.
