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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Simon Butcher	7776fc36d3	Fix for #279 macroisation of 'inline' keyword	2015-10-05 15:44:18 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	2d7083435d	Fix references to non-standard SIZE_T_MAX ... Turns out C99 doesn't define SIZE_T_MAX, so let's not use it.	2015-10-05 15:23:11 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	86ff4874a4	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/development' into development-restricted ... * origin/development: Fix yotta version dependencies again	2015-10-05 14:59:40 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	0ccd4537bd	Fix yotta version dependencies again	2015-10-05 14:50:41 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	899ac849d0	Merge branch 'development' into development-restricted ... * development: Upgrade yotta dependency versions Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc Add missing warning in doc	2015-10-05 14:47:43 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	2347bdd7b5	Upgrade yotta dependency versions	2015-10-05 14:39:01 +01:00
Simon Butcher	5ae7984dc2	Merge pull request #306 from ARMmbed/gh-288-missing-warning ... Add missing warning in doc	2015-10-05 13:51:10 +01:00
Simon Butcher	281bd6d98e	Merge pull request #307 from ARMmbed/gh-278-musl-socklen ... Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc	2015-10-05 13:49:26 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	0431735299	Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc ... fixes #278	2015-10-05 12:17:49 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	cb6af00e2a	Add missing warning in doc ... Found by Nicholas Wilson fixes #288	2015-10-05 12:12:39 +01:00
Simon Butcher	475cf0a98a	Merge fix of IOTSSL-496 - Potential heap overflow ... Fix for potential overflow in ssl_write_certificate_request()	2015-10-05 11:57:54 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	5a2e389811	Remove inline workaround when not useful ... This header doesn't have nay inline function any more	2015-10-05 11:55:39 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	0223ab9d38	Fix macroization of inline in C++ ... When compiling as C++, MSVC complains about our macroization of a keyword. Stop doing that as we know inline is always available in C++	2015-10-05 11:41:36 +01:00
Simon Butcher	fec73a8eec	Merge of fix for IOTSSL-481 - Double free ... Potential double free in mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()	2015-10-05 10:40:31 +01:00
Simon Butcher	c48b66bfb6	Changed attribution for Guido Vranken	2015-10-05 10:18:17 +01:00
Simon Butcher	6418ffaadb	Merge fix for IOTSSL-480 - base64 overflow issue	2015-10-05 09:54:11 +01:00
Simon Butcher	a45aa1399b	Merge of IOTSSL-476 - Random malloc in pem_read()	2015-10-05 00:26:36 +01:00
Simon Butcher	e7f96f22ee	Merge fix IOTSSL-475 Potential buffer overflow ... Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB()) could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the buffer in the subsequent for loop. Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system). Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with respect to future code changes.	2015-10-04 23:43:05 +01:00
Simon Butcher	d5ba4672b2	Merge fix for IOTSSL-474 PKCS12 Overflow ... Fix stack buffer overflow in PKCS12	2015-10-04 22:47:59 +01:00
Simon Butcher	5b8d1d65f7	Fix for IOTSSL-473 Double free error ... Fix potential double-free in mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(.)	2015-10-04 22:06:51 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	ef388f168d	Merge branch 'development' into development-restricted ... * development: Updated ChangeLog with credit Fix a fairly common typo in comments Make config check include for configs examples more consistent	2015-10-02 12:44:39 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	bc1babb387	Fix potential overflow in CertificateRequest	2015-10-02 11:20:28 +02:00
Simon Butcher	54eec9d1dd	Merge pull request #301 from Tilka/typo ... Fix a fairly common typo in comments	2015-10-01 02:07:24 +01:00
Simon Butcher	e56384c00c	Merge branch 'bachp-configs' into development	2015-10-01 02:02:09 +01:00
Simon Butcher	a12e3c00bf	Updated ChangeLog with credit	2015-10-01 01:59:33 +01:00
Simon Butcher	13d8762cfe	Merge branch 'configs' of bachp configs	2015-10-01 01:52:43 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	0aa45c209a	Fix potential overflow in base64_encode	2015-09-30 16:37:49 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	50a739f8c3	Add test for base64 output length	2015-09-30 16:31:10 +02:00
Simon Butcher	5624ec824e	Reordered TLS extension fields in client ... Session ticket placed at end	2015-09-29 01:06:06 +01:00
Simon Butcher	04799a4274	Fixed copy and paste error ... Accidental additional assignment in ssl_write_alpn_ext()	2015-09-29 00:31:09 +01:00
Simon Butcher	0fc94e9f83	Revised bounds checking on TLS extensions ... Revisions following review feedback	2015-09-28 20:52:04 +01:00
Simon Butcher	9f81231fb8	Revised hostname length check from review	2015-09-28 19:22:33 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	d02a1daca7	Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12	2015-09-28 19:47:50 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	24417f06fe	Fix potential double-free in mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()	2015-09-28 18:09:45 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	58fb49531d	Fix potential buffer overflow in mpi_read_string() ... Found by Guido Vranken. Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB()) could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the buffer in the subsequent for loop. Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system). Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with respect to future code changes.	2015-09-28 15:59:54 +02:00
Simon Butcher	ed9976634f	Added bounds checking for TLS extensions ... IOTSSL-478 - Added checks to prevent buffer overflows.	2015-09-28 02:14:30 +01:00
Simon Butcher	89f77623b8	Added max length checking of hostname	2015-09-27 22:50:49 +01:00
Tillmann Karras	588ad50c5a	Fix a fairly common typo in comments	2015-09-25 04:27:22 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	f592e8eaf6	Update yotta dependency version ... We've had a bit of a race between us adapting to changes in 0.3.x and the sockets author reverting those changes in the 0.3.x line and pushing them to 0.4.0. Let's use the newest and greatest sockets :)	2015-09-22 15:04:07 +02:00
Simon Butcher	8f98842e38	Refined credits in ChangeLog for fuzzing issue ... Changed GDS to Gotham Digital Science	2015-09-22 10:10:36 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	2f056a0aee	Try to run yotta update for yotta build test ... But accept failures in case we're offline	2015-09-18 14:37:54 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	ca4fb7154a	Fix mbed examples after minar upgrade	2015-09-18 14:36:57 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	8cea8ad8b8	Bump version to 2.1.1	2015-09-17 11:58:45 +02:00
Simon Butcher	22b294132d	Merge pull request #294 from ARMmbed/development-restricted ... Merge restricted topic branch	2015-09-16 23:59:52 +01:00
Simon Butcher	ac58c53ab1	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/development'	2015-09-16 23:25:25 +01:00
Simon Butcher	7dd82f8fd5	Merge branch 'development' with bugfix branch ... Conflicts: ChangeLog	2015-09-16 16:21:38 +01:00
Simon Butcher	9aa72188dd	Merge branch 'bugfix' into development	2015-09-16 16:19:45 +01:00
Simon Butcher	ea4b76d54a	Merge pull request #273 from ARMmbed/iotssl-411-port-reuse ... Iotssl 411 port reuse	2015-09-16 15:53:06 +01:00
Simon Butcher	5793e7ef01	Merge 'development' into iotssl-411-port-reuse ... Conflicts: ChangeLog	2015-09-16 15:25:53 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard	f7022d1131	Fix bug in server parsing point formats extension ... There is only one length byte but for some reason we skipped two, resulting in reading one byte past the end of the extension. Fortunately, even if that extension is at the very end of the ClientHello, it can't be at the end of the buffer since the ClientHello length is at most SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN and the buffer has some more room after that for MAC and so on. So there is no buffer overread. Possible consequences are: - nothing, if the next byte is 0x00, which is a comment first byte for other extensions, which is why the bug remained unnoticed - using a point format that was not offered by the peer if next byte is 0x01. In that case the peer will reject our ServerKeyExchange message and the handshake will fail. - thinking that we don't have a common point format even if we do, which will cause us to immediately abort the handshake. None of these are a security issue. The same bug was fixed client-side in fd35af15	2015-09-16 11:32:18 +02:00