Additional work done as part of merge:
- Run ./tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh and check in the
resulting changes to programs/ssl/query_config.c
In places where we detect a context is in a bad state and there is no
sensitive data to clear, simply return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE and don't
abort on behalf of the application. The application will choose what to
do when it gets a bad state error.
The motivation for this change is that an application should decide what
to do when it misuses the API and encounters a PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
error. The library should not attempt to abort on behalf of the
application, as that may not be the correct thing to do in all
circumstances.
Calling psa_*_setup() twice on a MAC, cipher, or hash context should
result in a PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE error because the operation has already
been set up.
Fixes#10
Extend hash bad order test in line with the new bad order tests for MAC
and cipher, covering more cases and making comments and test layout
consistent.
Ensure that when doing hash operations out of order, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
is returned as documented in crypto.h and the PSA Crypto specification.
Switch to the terminology "key file identifier", as has been done in
the code.
The owner uid is now in the upper 32 bits of the key file identifier,
which facilitates namespacing.
When building for the PSA crypto service (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE)),
define psa_key_owner_id_t as int32_t, which is how a PSA platform
encodes partition identity. Note that this only takes effect when the
build option MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_FILE_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is active.
Support this configuration in the ITS backend.
Declare the owner as psa_key_owner_id_t, of which an implementation
must be provided separately.
Make this a configuration option
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_FILE_ID_ENCODES_OWNER, to make the conditional
compilation flow easier to follow. Declare it in config.h to
pacify check_names.sh.
Support for a specific implementation of psa_key_owner_id_t in storage
backends will come in a subsequent commit.
Differentiate between _key identifiers_, which are always `uint32_t`,
and _key file identifiers_, which are platform-dependent. Normally,
the two are the same.
In `psa/crypto_platform.h`, define `psa_app_key_id_t` (which is always
32 bits, the standard key identifier type) and
`psa_key_file_id_t` (which will be different in some service builds).
A subsequent commit will introduce a platform where the two are different.
It would make sense for the function declarations in `psa/crypto.h` to
use `psa_key_file_id_t`. However this file is currently part of the
PSA Crypto API specification, so it must stick to the standard type
`psa_key_id_t`. Hence, as long as the specification and Mbed Crypto
are not separate, use the implementation-specific file
`psa/crypto_platform.h` to define `psa_key_id_t` as `psa_key_file_id_t`.
In the library, systematically use `psa_key_file_id_t`.
perl -i -pe 's/psa_key_id_t/psa_key_file_id_t/g' library/*.[hc]
PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER was actually one plus the maximum
key identifier. Change it to be the maximum value, and change the code
that uses it accordingly.
There is no semantic change here (the maximum value hasn't changed).
This commit only makes the implementation clearer.
In multipart cipher tests, test that each step of psa_cipher_update
produces output of the expected length. The length is hard-coded in
the test data since it depends on the mode.
The length of the output of psa_cipher_finish is effectively tested
because it's the total output length minus the length produced by the
update steps.
Test data obtained with Python+PyCrypto:
AES.new(key, mode=AES.MODE_CTR, counter=Crypto.Util.Counter.new(128, initial_value=0x2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a)).encrypt(plaintext.decode('hex')).encode('hex')
The output length can be equal to the input length.
This wasn't noticed at runtime because we happened to only test with
CBC with the first chunk being a partial block.
Some calls to psa_cipher_finish or psa_cipher_update append to a
buffer. Several of these calls were not calculating the offset into
the buffer or the remaining buffer size correctly.
This did not lead to buffer overflows before because the buffer sizes
were sufficiently large for our test inputs. This did not lead to
incorrect output when the test was designed to append but actually
wrote too early because all the existing test cases either have no
output from finish (stream cipher) or have no output from update (CBC,
with less than one block of input).
The test function pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt gets its fake-random input
for padding from a test parameter. In one test case, the parameter was
too short, causing a fallback to rand(). The reference output depends
on this random input, so the test data was correct only for a platform
with one particular rand() implementation. Supply sufficient
fake-random input so that rand() isn't called.
