/* * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation * * Copyright (C) 2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved * * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) #include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else #define mbedtls_malloc malloc #define mbedtls_free free #endif #include /* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0; } /* * Initialze context */ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); #endif } /* * Setup context for actual use */ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, uint32_t lifetime ) { int ret; unsigned char buf[16]; ctx->f_rng = f_rng; ctx->p_rng = p_rng; ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->enc ); mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->dec ); if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, ctx->key_name, 16 ) != 0 ) || ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, ctx->mac_key, 16 ) != 0 ) || ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, buf, 16 ) != 0 ) ) { return( ret ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->enc, buf, 128 ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx->dec, buf, 128 ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( ctx ); return( ret ); } mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); return( 0 ); } /* * Serialize a session in the following format: * 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) * n . n+2 peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate) * n+3 . n+2+m peer cert ASN.1 */ static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; size_t left = buf_len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) size_t cert_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ if( left < sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); memcpy( p, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); left -= sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) cert_len = 0; else cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; if( left < 3 + cert_len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 16 & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 8 & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len & 0xFF ); if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); p += cert_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ *olen = p - buf; return( 0 ); } /* * Unserialise session, see ssl_save_session() */ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { const unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) size_t cert_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ if( p + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > end ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) if( p + 3 > end ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; p += 3; if( cert_len == 0 ) { session->peer_cert = NULL; } else { int ret; if( p + cert_len > end ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); session->peer_cert = mbedtls_malloc( sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED ); mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); session->peer_cert = NULL; return( ret ); } p += cert_len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ if( p != end ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); return( 0 ); } /* * Create session ticket, secured as recommended in RFC 5077 section 4: * * struct { * opaque key_name[16]; * opaque iv[16]; * opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>; * opaque mac[32]; * } ticket; * * (the internal state structure differs, however). */ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *ticket_lifetime ) { int ret; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; unsigned char *p = start; unsigned char *state; unsigned char iv[16]; size_t clear_len, enc_len, pad_len, i; *tlen = 0; if( ctx == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* We need at least 16 bytes for key_name, 16 for IV, 2 for len * 16 for padding, 32 for MAC, in addition to session itself, * that will be checked when writing it. */ if( end - start < 16 + 16 + 2 + 16 + 32 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); #endif *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; /* Write key name */ memcpy( p, ctx->key_name, 16 ); p += 16; /* Generate and write IV (with a copy for aes_crypt) */ if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, p, 16 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; memcpy( iv, p, 16 ); p += 16; /* Dump session state */ state = p + 2; if( ( ret = ssl_save_session( session, state, end - state, &clear_len ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } /* Apply PKCS padding */ pad_len = 16 - clear_len % 16; enc_len = clear_len + pad_len; for( i = clear_len; i < enc_len; i++ ) state[i] = (unsigned char) pad_len; /* Encrypt */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx->enc, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, enc_len, iv, state, state ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } /* Write length */ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( enc_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( enc_len ) & 0xFF ); p = state + enc_len; /* Compute and write MAC( key_name + iv + enc_state_len + enc_state ) */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), ctx->mac_key, 16, start, p - start, p ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } p += 32; *tlen = p - start; cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); #endif return( ret ); } /* * Load session ticket (see mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write for structure) */ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { int ret; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; unsigned char *key_name = buf; unsigned char *iv = buf + 16; unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 16; unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2; unsigned char *mac; unsigned char computed_mac[32]; size_t enc_len, clear_len, i; unsigned char pad_len, diff; if( len < 34 || ctx == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); #endif enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; mac = ticket + enc_len; if( len != enc_len + 66 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; } /* Check name, in constant time though it's not a big secret */ diff = 0; for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) diff |= key_name[i] ^ ctx->key_name[i]; /* don't return yet, check the MAC anyway */ /* Check mac, with constant-time buffer comparison */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), ctx->mac_key, 16, buf, len - 32, computed_mac ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) diff |= mac[i] ^ computed_mac[i]; /* Now return if ticket is not authentic, since we want to avoid * decrypting arbitrary attacker-chosen data */ if( diff != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; goto cleanup; } /* Decrypt */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx->dec, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, enc_len, iv, ticket, ticket ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } /* Check PKCS padding */ pad_len = ticket[enc_len - 1]; ret = 0; for( i = 2; i < pad_len; i++ ) if( ticket[enc_len - i] != pad_len ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; clear_len = enc_len - pad_len; /* Actually load session */ if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) /* Check if still valid */ if( ( time( NULL) - session->start ) > ctx->ticket_lifetime ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; goto cleanup; } #endif cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); #endif return( ret ); } /* * Free context */ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) { mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->enc ); mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->dec ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); #endif mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */