/* * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) * * Copyright (C) 2014, Brainspark B.V. * * This file is part of PolarSSL (http://www.polarssl.org) * Lead Maintainer: Paul Bakker * * All rights reserved. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. */ /* * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). */ #include "polarssl/config.h" #if defined(POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C) #include "polarssl/hmac_drbg.h" /* * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) */ void hmac_drbg_update( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) { size_t md_len = ctx->md_ctx.md_info->size; unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; unsigned char sep[1]; for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) { /* Step 1 or 4 */ md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->K, md_len ); md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, sep, 1 ); if( rounds == 2 ) md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, additional, add_len ); md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->K ); /* Step 2 or 5 */ md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->K, md_len ); md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ); } } /* * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) */ int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const md_info_t * md_info, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) { int ret; memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) ); if( ( ret = md_init_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_info->size ); /* ctx->K is already 0 */ hmac_drbg_update( ctx, data, data_len ); return( 0 ); } /* * HMAC_DRBG reseeding (10.1.2.4) */ int hmac_drbg_reseed( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) { unsigned char seed[HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; size_t seedlen; if( ctx->entropy_len + len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); memset( seed, 0, HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); /* 1a. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ if( ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) != 0 ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); seedlen = ctx->entropy_len; /* 1b. Append additional data if any */ if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) { memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); seedlen += len; } /* 2. Update state */ hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen ); /* 3. Reset reseed_counter (TODO) */ /* 4. Done */ return( 0 ); } /* * HMAC_DRBG initialisation */ int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const md_info_t * md_info, int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_entropy, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) { int ret; size_t entropy_len; memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) ); if( ( ret = md_init_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); /* Set initial working state */ memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_info->size ); /* ctx->K is already 0 */ ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; /* * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. * * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) */ entropy_len = md_info->size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ md_info->size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ /* * For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce * (Again, matches test vectors.) */ ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len * 3 / 2; if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len; return( 0 ); } /* * Set entropy length grabbed for reseeds */ void hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) { ctx->entropy_len = len; } /* * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data (10.1.2.5) */ int hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) { hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; size_t md_len = md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); size_t left = out_len; unsigned char *out = output; /* 1. Check reseed counter (TODO) */ /* 2. Use additional data if any */ if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len ); /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ while( left != 0 ) { size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->K, md_len ); md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ); memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len ); out += use_len; left -= use_len; } /* 6. Update */ hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len ); /* 7. Update reseed counter (TODO) */ /* 8. Done */ return( 0 ); } /* * HMAC_DRBG random function */ int hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) { return( hmac_drbg_random_with_add( p_rng, output, out_len, NULL, 0 ) ); } /* * Free an HMAC_DRBG context */ void hmac_drbg_free( hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) { if( ctx == NULL ) return; md_free_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) ); } #if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST) #include /* * Checkup routine */ int hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) { if( verbose != 0 ) printf( "\n" ); return( 0 ); } #endif /* POLARSSL_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C */