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54526c3c89
mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 7a346b866c Replace memset() with mbedtls_platform_memset() 
Steps:

1. sed -i 's/\bmemset(\([^)]\)/mbedtls_platform_memset(\1/g' library/*.c tinycrypt/*.c include/mbedtls/*.h scripts/data_files/*.fmt

2. Manually edit library/platform_util.c to revert to memset() in the
implementations of mbedtls_platform_memset() and mbedtls_platform_memcpy()

3. egrep -n '\<memset\>' library/*.c include/mbedtls/*.h tinycrypt/*.c
The remaining occurrences are in three categories:
    a. From point 2 above.
    b. In comments.
    c. In the initialisation of memset_func, to be changed in a future commit.
2019-10-22 10:03:07 +02:00

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/*
* SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions
*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *info,
size_t ilen )
{
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint( ssl->conf ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id );
if( ( ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ilen ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( ssl->cli_id, info, ilen );
ssl->cli_id_len = ilen;
return( 0 );
}
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
void *p_cookie )
{
conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write;
conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check;
conf->p_cookie = p_cookie;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len;
const unsigned char *p;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) );
if( len < 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
servername_list_size = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( buf );
if( servername_list_size + 2 != len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
p = buf + 2;
while( servername_list_size > 2 )
{
hostname_len = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &p[1] );
if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME )
{
ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni,
ssl, p + 3, hostname_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
return( 0 );
}
servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3;
p += hostname_len + 3;
}
if( servername_list_size != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
/*
* Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension:
*
* Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension
* to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange
* message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows.
*
* We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate
* chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair.
* This needs to be done at a later stage.
*
*/
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t sig_alg_list_size;
const unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur;
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur;
if ( len < 2 ) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
sig_alg_list_size = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( buf );
if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len ||
sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according
* to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices
* to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm.
*
* This will change when we also consider certificate signatures,
* in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash
* pair list from the extension.
*/
for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 )
{
/* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */
if( ( sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( p[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext"
" unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1] ) );
continue;
}
/* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */
md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] );
if( md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
" unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0] ) );
continue;
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_cur ) == 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
" match sig %d and hash %d",
sig_cur, md_cur ) );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: "
"hash alg %d not supported", md_cur ) );
}
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
unsigned char const **list_start, size_t *list_len )
{
size_t list_size;
const unsigned char *p;
if ( len < 2 ) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
list_size = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( buf );
if( list_size + 2 != len ||
list_size % 2 != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
p = buf + 2;
/* Remember list for later. */
*list_start = p;
*list_len = list_size / 2;
while( list_size > 0 )
{
uint16_t const peer_tls_id = (uint16_t)
mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( p );
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID( own_tls_id )
if( own_tls_id == peer_tls_id &&
ssl->handshake->curve_tls_id == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->curve_tls_id = own_tls_id;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID
list_size -= 2;
p += 2;
}
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t list_size;
const unsigned char *p;
if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
list_size = buf[0];
p = buf + 1;
while( list_size > 0 )
{
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EC_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EC_PF_COMPRESSED )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0];
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
return( 0 );
}
list_size--;
p++;
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( ret );
}
/* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0];
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t peer_cid_len;
/* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/*
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
*
* struct {
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
* } ConnectionId;
*/
if( len < 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
peer_cid_len = *buf++;
len--;
if( len != peer_cid_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */
if( ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
/* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default
* value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" ) );
return( 0 );
}
if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED )
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED &&
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ssl_session session;
mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session );
if( ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL ||
ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL )
{
return( 0 );
}
/* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", len ) );
if( len == 0 )
return( 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket rejected: renegotiating" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/*
* Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed.
*/
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse( ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session,
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is not authentic" ) );
else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is expired" ) );
else
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
* inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
*/
session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len );
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate );
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
/* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from ticket" ) );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
/* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len;
const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end;
const char **ours;
/* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
return( 0 );
/*
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
*
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*/
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
if( len < 4 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
list_len = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be ( buf );
if( list_len != len - 2 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/*
* Validate peer's list (lengths)
*/
start = buf + 2;
end = buf + len;
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
{
cur_len = *theirs++;
/* Current identifier must fit in list */
if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
if( cur_len == 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
}
/*
* Use our order of preference
*/
for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
{
ours_len = strlen( *ours );
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
{
cur_len = *theirs++;
if( cur_len == ours_len &&
memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours;
return( 0 );
}
}
}
/* If we get there, no match was found */
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
/*
* Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
static int ssl_check_key_curve( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
unsigned char const *acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
size_t ec_tls_ids_len )
{
uint16_t tls_id;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
((void) pk);
tls_id = 23; /* TLS ID for Secp256r1. */
#else
mbedtls_ecp_curve_info const *info;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;
info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
if( info == NULL )
return( -1 );
tls_id = info->tls_id;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
if( acceptable_ec_tls_ids == NULL )
return( -1 );
while( ec_tls_ids_len-- != 0 )
{
uint16_t const cur_tls_id = (uint16_t)
mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( acceptable_ec_tls_ids );
if( cur_tls_id == tls_id )
return( 0 );
acceptable_ec_tls_ids += 2;
}
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
/*
* Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite,
* return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
*/
static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info,
unsigned char const *acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
size_t ec_tls_ids_len )
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
uint32_t flags;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL )
list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert;
else
#endif
list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) );
if( list == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) );
return( -1 );
}
for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
int match = 1;
mbedtls_pk_context *pk;
/* WARNING: With the current X.509 caching architecture, this MUST
* happen outside of the PK acquire/release block, because it moves
* the cached PK context. In a threading-enabled build, this would
* rightfully fail, but lead to a use-after-free otherwise. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
cur->cert );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
/* ASYNC_PRIVATE may use a NULL entry for the opaque private key, so
* we have to use the public key context to infer the capabilities
* of the key. */
{
int ret;
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( cur->cert, &pk );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#else
/* Outside of ASYNC_PRIVATE, use private key context directly
* instead of querying for the public key context from the
* certificate, so save a few bytes of code. */
pk = cur->key;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) );
match = 0;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA &&
ssl_check_key_curve( pk,
acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
ec_tls_ids_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: elliptic curve" ) );
match = 0;
}
#else
((void) acceptable_ec_tls_ids);
((void) ec_tls_ids_len);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( cur->cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( match == 0 )
continue;
/*
* This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on
* keyUsage or other extensions.
*
* It also allows the user to provision different certificates for
* different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing
* and decrypting with the same RSA key.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: "
"(extended) key usage extension" ) );
continue;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
/*
* Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still
* present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only
* one we got that satisfies the other conditions.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) )
{
mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md;
{
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame const *frame;
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_acquire( cur->cert, &frame );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
sig_md = frame->sig_md;
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_release( cur->cert );
}
if( sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 )
{
if( fallback == NULL )
fallback = cur;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate not preferred: "
"sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client" ) );
continue;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
/* If we get there, we got a winner */
break;
}
if( cur == NULL )
cur = fallback;
/* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */
if( cur != NULL )
{
ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "selected certificate chain, certificate",
ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert );
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/*
* Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc
* Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches.
*/
static int ssl_ciphersuite_is_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t suite_info,
unsigned char const *acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
size_t ec_tls_ids_len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_name( suite_info ) ) );
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( suite_info ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) ) ||
mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( suite_info ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: version" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_flags( suite_info ) &
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) )
{
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED &&
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_cipher( suite_info ) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: rc4" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( suite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake "
"not configured or ext missing" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( suite_info ) &&
ssl->handshake->curve_tls_id == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: "
"no common elliptic curve" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
/* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
* have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
/* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
* a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info );
if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
"for signature algorithm %d", sig_type ) );
return( 0 );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
* certificate/key of a particular type:
* - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or
* - try the next ciphersuite if we don't
* This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list.
*/
if( ssl_pick_cert( ssl, suite_info,
acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
ec_tls_ids_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: "
"no suitable certificate" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#else
((void) acceptable_ec_tls_ids);
((void) ec_tls_ids_len);
#endif
return( 1 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO)
static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret, got_common_suite;
unsigned int i, j;
size_t n;
unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello v2" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
buf = ssl->in_hdr;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, 5 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message type: %d",
buf[2] ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message len.: %d",
( ( buf[0] & 0x7F ) << 8 ) | buf[1] ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]",
buf[3], buf[4] ) );
/*
* SSLv2 Client Hello
*
* Record layer:
* 0 . 1 message length
*
* SSL layer:
* 2 . 2 message type
* 3 . 4 protocol version
*/
if( buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ||
buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
n = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( buf );
if( n < 17 || n > 512 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER)
ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER)
ssl->minor_ver =
( buf[4] <= mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) )
? buf[4] : mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf );
#endif
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum"
" [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]",
mbedtls_ssl_get_major_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3];
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4];
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 2 + n ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
return( ret );
}
mbedtls_ssl_update_checksum( ssl, buf + 2, n );
buf = ssl->in_msg;
n = ssl->in_left - 5;
/*
* 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length
* 2 . 3 session id length
* 4 . 5 challenge length
* 6 . .. ciphersuitelist
* .. . .. session id
* .. . .. challenge
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, n );
ciph_len = (unsigned int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &buf[0] );
sess_len = (unsigned int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &buf[2] );
chal_len = (unsigned int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &buf[4] );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %d, sess_len: %d, chal_len: %d",
ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) );
/*
* Make sure each parameter length is valid
*/
if( ciph_len < 3 || ( ciph_len % 3 ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
if( sess_len > 32 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
if( chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
if( n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist",
buf + 6, ciph_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id",
buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, challenge",
buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len );
p = buf + 6 + ciph_len;
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len;
mbedtls_platform_memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0,
sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) );
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
p += sess_len;
mbedtls_platform_memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 );
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len );
/*
* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
*/
for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 )
{
if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV "
"during renegotiation" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 )
{
if( p[0] == 0 &&
p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) &&
p[2] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) );
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
break;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */
got_common_suite = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE)
for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl, \
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ), \
cur_info )
{
#else
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl, \
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ), \
cur_info )
{
for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 )
{
#endif
const int ciphersuite_id =
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( cur_info );
if( p[0] != 0 ||
p[1] != ( ( ciphersuite_id >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ||
p[2] != ( ( ciphersuite_id ) & 0xFF ) )
{
continue;
}
got_common_suite = 1;
if( ssl_ciphersuite_is_match( ssl, cur_info, NULL, 0 ) )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
ciphersuite_info = cur_info;
#endif
goto have_ciphersuite_v2;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE)
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
}
#else
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
#endif
if( got_common_suite )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, "
"but none of them usable" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN );
}
have_ciphersuite_v2:
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite =
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info );
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) ) ) );
/*
* SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks
*/
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->in_left = 0;
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello v2" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */
/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during
ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is
not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */
static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret, got_common_suite;
size_t i, j;
size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset;
size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len;
#endif
unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
int extended_ms_seen = 0;
#endif
int handshake_failure = 0;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info;
#endif
int major, minor;
unsigned char const *acceptable_ec_tls_ids = NULL;
size_t ec_tls_ids_len = 0;
/* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present,
* we need to fall back to the default values for allowed
* signature-hash pairs. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
read_record_header:
#endif
/*
* If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(),
* otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2
* ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 )
{
/* No alert on a read error. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
return( ret );
}
buf = ssl->in_hdr;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 )
{
return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) );
}
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) );
/*
* SSLv3/TLS Client Hello
*
* Record layer:
* 0 . 0 message type
* 1 . 2 protocol version
* 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number
* 3 . 4 message length
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message type: %d",
buf[0] ) );
if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message len.: %d",
(int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( ssl->in_len ) ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]",
buf[1], buf[2] ) );
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 );
/* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically
* "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the
* value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here
* is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */
if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence
* number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
/* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */
if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record, discarding" ) );
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_left = 0;
goto read_record_header;
}
/* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */
mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
msg_len = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( ssl->in_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
/* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
msg_len = ssl->in_hslen;
}
else
#endif
{
if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
return( ret );
}
/* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
{
ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_ELSE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS)
{
ssl->in_left = 0;
}
#endif
}
buf = ssl->in_msg;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, msg_len );
mbedtls_ssl_update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len );
/*
* Handshake layer:
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message seqence number
* 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset
* 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length
*/
if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) );
if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d",
(int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint24_be( &buf[1]) ) );
/* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
if( buf[1] != 0 ||
msg_len != ( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) +
mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &buf[2]) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
{
/*
* Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes,
* check sequence number on renego.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
/* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */
unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int)
mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &ssl->in_msg[4] );
if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: "
"%d (expected %d)", cli_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++;
}
else
#endif
{
unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int)
mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &ssl->in_msg[4] );
ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq;
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1;
}
/*
* For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure
* fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 ||
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
/*
* ClientHello layer:
* 0 . 1 protocol version
* 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time)
* 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte)
* 35 . 34+x session id
* 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
* 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie
* .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes)
* .. . .. ciphersuite list
* .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte)
* .. . .. compression alg. list
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional)
* .. . .. extensions (optional)
*/
/*
* Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
* read at least up to session id length without worrying.
*/
if( msg_len < 38 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/*
* Check and save the protocol version
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, version", buf, 2 );
{
int minor_ver, major_ver;
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport,
buf );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = major_ver;
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = minor_ver;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt( major_ver,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ) ||
mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt( minor_ver,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum"
" [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]",
major_ver, minor_ver,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
major_ver,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ) )
{
major_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf );
minor_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf );
}
else if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
minor_ver,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) )
{
minor_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER)
ssl->major_ver = major_ver;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER)
ssl->minor_ver = minor_ver;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER */
}
/*
* Save client random (inc. Unix time)
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 );
/*
* Check the session ID length and save session ID
*/
sess_len = buf[34];
if( sess_len > sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ||
sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len );
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len;
mbedtls_platform_memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0,
sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) );
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35,
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
/*
* Check the cookie length and content
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
{
cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len;
cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset];
if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie",
buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL &&
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie,
buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len,
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification failed" ) );
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification passed" ) );
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
{
/* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */
if( cookie_len != 0 )
{
/* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) );
}
/*
* Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later)
*/
ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_ELSE
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS)
{
ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS */
ciph_len = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &buf[ciph_offset + 0] );
if( ciph_len < 2 ||
ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */
( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist",
buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len );
/*
* Check the compression algorithms length and pick one
*/
comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len;
comp_len = buf[comp_offset];
if( comp_len < 1 ||
comp_len > 16 ||
comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression",
buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
for( i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i )
{
if( buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE;
break;
}
}
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
/* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( ( mbedtls_ssl_get_major_ver( ssl ) != 3 ) ||
( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != 0 ) )
{
#endif
/*
* Check the extension length
*/
ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len;
if( msg_len > ext_offset )
{
if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ext_len = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &buf[ext_offset + 0] );
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
}
else
ext_len = 0;
ext = buf + ext_offset + 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len );
while( ext_len != 0 )
{
unsigned int ext_id;
unsigned int ext_size;
if ( ext_len < 4 ) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ext_id = (unsigned int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( ext );
ext_size = (unsigned int)mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &ext[2] );
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
switch( ext_id )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) );
if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL )
break;
ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
#endif
ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported elliptic curves extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( ssl, ext + 4,
ext_size,
&acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
&ec_tls_ids_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported point formats extension" ) );
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT;
ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max fragment length extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated hmac extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended master secret extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
extended_ms_seen = 1;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session ticket extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)",
ext_id ) );
}
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
ext += 4 + ext_size;
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 )
{
if( p[0] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) &&
p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) );
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
break;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
/*
* Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client
* hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations.
*/
if( sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0 )
{
mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_default ) != 0 )
md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
/*
* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
*/
for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 )
{
if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV "
"during renegotiation" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
#endif
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
}
}
/*
* Renegotiation security checks
*/
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf )
== MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/*
* Check if extended master secret is being enforced
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
{
if( extended_ms_seen )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCED)
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCED */
}
else if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems_enforced( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_ENABLED )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Peer not offering extended master "
"secret, while it is enforced") );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/*
* Search for a matching ciphersuite
* (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions
* and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.)
*/
got_common_suite = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE)
for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl, \
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ), \
cur_info )
{
#else
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl, \
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ), \
cur_info )
{
for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 )
{
#endif
const int ciphersuite_id =
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( cur_info );
if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuite_id >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ||
p[1] != ( ( ciphersuite_id ) & 0xFF ) )
{
continue;
}
got_common_suite = 1;
if( ssl_ciphersuite_is_match( ssl, cur_info,
acceptable_ec_tls_ids,
ec_tls_ids_len ) != 0 )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
ciphersuite_info = cur_info;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
goto have_ciphersuite;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE)
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
}
#else
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
#endif
if( got_common_suite )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, "
"but none of them usable" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN );
}
have_ciphersuite:
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite =
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info );
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) ) ) );
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
/* Debugging-only output for testsuite */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake ) );
if( sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
{
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
sig_alg );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d",
mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ) ) );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm "
"%d - should not happen", sig_alg ) );
}
}
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t ext_len;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
/* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if
* the client hasn't offered it. */
if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
return;
/* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
* which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) );
/*
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
*
* struct {
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
* } ConnectionId;
*/
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID );
ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, ext_len );
*p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
*olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t suite =
MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITE_INVALID_HANDLE;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
/*
* RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension
* from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption
* with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an
* encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client."
*/
suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) );
if( suite == MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITE_INVALID_HANDLE )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_cipher( suite ) );
if( cipher == NULL ||
cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_get_extended_ms( ssl->handshake )
== MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret "
"extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1 ) & 0xFF;
*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF;
memcpy( p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
p += ssl->verify_data_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
p += ssl->verify_data_len;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x01;
*p++ = 0x00;
}
*olen = p - buf;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code;
*olen = 5;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
((void) ssl);
if( ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts &
MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT ) == 0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 2;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_EC_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
*olen = 6;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t kkpp_len;
*olen = 0;
/* Skip costly computation if not needed */
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange(
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake ) ) !=
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
if( end - p < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP );
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
return;
}
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, kkpp_len );
*olen = kkpp_len + 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN )
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
/*
* 0 . 1 ext identifier
* 2 . 3 ext length
* 4 . 5 protocol list length
* 6 . 6 protocol name length
* 7 . 7+n protocol name
*/
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( &buf[0], MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN );
*olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen );
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( &buf[2], ( *olen - 4 ) );
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( &buf[4], ( *olen - 6 ) );
buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 7 ) ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4;
unsigned char *cookie_len_byte;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello verify request" ) );
/*
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
* } HelloVerifyRequest;
*/
/* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated
* version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( mbedtls_ssl_get_major_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
ssl->conf->transport, p );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
p += 2;
/* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inconsistent cookie callbacks" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* Skip length byte until we know the length */
cookie_len_byte = p++;
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie,
&p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN,
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cookie_write", ret );
return( ret );
}
*cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)( p - ( cookie_len_byte + 1 ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte );
ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t;
#endif
int ret;
int ciphersuite;
size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
}
/*
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 5 protocol version
* 6 . 9 UNIX time()
* 10 . 37 random bytes
*/
buf = ssl->out_msg;
p = buf + 4;
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( mbedtls_ssl_get_major_ver( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
ssl->conf->transport, p );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]",
buf[4], buf[5] ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint32_be( p, (uint32_t) t );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
p += 4;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
p += 28;
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_CACHE)
/*
* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init().
* It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext().
* If not, try looking up session ID in our cache.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) == 0 &&
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != 0 &&
ssl->conf->f_get_cache != NULL &&
ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session_negotiate ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_CACHE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION)
if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) == 1 )
{
/*
* Resuming a session
*/
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION */
{
/*
* New session, create a new session id,
* unless we're about to issue a session ticket
*/
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0;
mbedtls_platform_memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
{
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), ssl->session_negotiate->id, n ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
}
}
/*
* 38 . 38 session id length
* 39 . 38+n session id
* 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite
* 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg.
* 42+n . 43+n extensions length
* 44+n . 43+n+m extensions
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) ? "a" : "no" ) );
ciphersuite = mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate );
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, ciphersuite );
*p++ = (unsigned char)(
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_compression( ssl->session_negotiate ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ciphersuite ) ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_compression( ssl->session_negotiate ) ) );
/* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( ( mbedtls_ssl_get_major_ver( ssl ) != 3 ) || ( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != 0 ) )
{
#endif
/*
* First write extensions, then the total length
*/
ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if ( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) ) ) )
{
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) );
if( ext_len > 0 )
{
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, ext_len );
p += ext_len;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
}
#endif
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) );
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
unsigned char *buf, *p;
const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
int authmode;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET )
authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
else
#endif
authmode = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_authmode( ssl->conf );
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ||
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 4 cert type count
* 5 .. m-1 cert types
* m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
* m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
* n .. n+1 length of all DNs
* n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1
* n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1
* ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc.
*/
buf = ssl->out_msg;
p = buf + 4;
/*
* Supported certificate types
*
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType;
*/
ct_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN;
#endif
p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++;
p += ct_len;
sa_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2)
*
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
*
* struct {
* HashAlgorithm hash;
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
*
* enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm;
* enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm;
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
/*
* Supported signature algorithms
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS( hash )
if( 0
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
|| hash == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
|| hash == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256
#endif
)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
p[2 + sa_len++] = hash;
p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
p[2 + sa_len++] = hash;
p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA;
#endif
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, sa_len );
sa_len += 2;
p += sa_len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/*
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
*/
p += 2;
total_dn_size = 0;
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_cert_req_ca_list( ssl->conf )
== MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
else
#endif
crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
while( crt != NULL && crt->raw.p != NULL )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame const *frame;
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_acquire( crt, &frame );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
dn_size = frame->subject_raw.len;
if( end < p ||
(size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size ||
(size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_release( crt );
break;
}
p = mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( p, dn_size );
memcpy( p, frame->subject_raw.p, dn_size );
p += dn_size;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size );
total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size;
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame_release( crt );
crt = crt->next;
}
}
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( &ssl->out_msg[4 + ct_len + sa_len],
total_dn_size );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_uecc_keypair *own_key =
mbedtls_pk_uecc( *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecdh_privkey,
own_key->private_key,
sizeof( ssl->handshake->ecdh_privkey ) );
return( 0 );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
mbedtls_pk_ec( *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ),
MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t *signature_len )
{
/* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
* signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
* after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
* ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
* ssl->out_msglen. */
unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2;
size_t sig_max_len = ( ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
- sig_start );
int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl,
sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
{
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) &&
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including
* calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the
* signature and sending the message. */
static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t *signature_len )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
const struct uECC_Curve_t * uecc_curve = uECC_secp256r1();
#endif
(void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
(void) signature_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */
/*
*
* Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite.
*
*/
/*
* - ECJPAKE key exchanges
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->out_msglen += len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
/*
* For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support
* identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature,
* we use empty support identity hints here.
**/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
/*
* - DHE key exchanges
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no DH parameters set" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
/*
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
*
* struct {
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
* } ServerDHParams;
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
&ssl->conf->dhm_P,
&ssl->conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params(
&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
#endif
ssl->out_msglen += len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED */
/*
* - ECDHE key exchanges
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
/*
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
*
* struct {
* ECParameters curve_params;
* ECPoint public;
* } ServerECDHParams;
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
{
static const unsigned char ecdh_param_hdr[] = {
MBEDTLS_SSL_EC_TLS_NAMED_CURVE,
0 /* high bits of secp256r1 TLS ID */,
23 /* low bits of secp256r1 TLS ID */,
2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES + 1,
0x04 /* Uncompressed */
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
#endif
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
ecdh_param_hdr, sizeof( ecdh_param_hdr ) );
ssl->out_msglen += sizeof( ecdh_param_hdr );
if( !uECC_make_key( &ssl->out_msg[ ssl->out_msglen ],
ssl->handshake->ecdh_privkey,
uecc_curve ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Key creation failed" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->out_msglen += 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES;
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
{
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve =
mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( ssl->handshake->curve_tls_id );
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
if( curve == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", curve->name ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
curve->grp_id ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(
&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len,
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
#endif
ssl->out_msglen += len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED */
/*
*
* Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the
* exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here.
*
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed;
size_t hashlen = 0;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
int ret;
/*
* 2.1: Choose hash algorithm:
* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
* to choose appropriate hash.
* B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1
* (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4)
* C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3)
*/
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg =
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
/* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
* (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */
if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ||
( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
sig_alg ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
/* (... because we choose a cipher suite
* only if there is a matching hash.) */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
/* B: Default hash SHA1 */
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
{
/* C: MD5 + SHA1 */
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %d for signing", md_alg ) );
/*
* 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash,
dig_signed,
dig_signed_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
dig_signed,
dig_signed_len,
md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
/*
* 2.3: Compute and add the signature
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
/*
* For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm
* explicitly through a prefix to the signature.
*
* struct {
* HashAlgorithm hash;
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
*
* struct {
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } DigitallySigned;
*
*/
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] =
mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg );
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] =
mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_alg );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL )
{
ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start( ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ),
md_alg, hash, hashlen );
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
/* act as if f_async_sign was null */
break;
case 0:
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
return( ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, signature_len ) );
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_sign_start", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
* signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
* after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
* ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
* ssl->out_msglen. */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
md_alg, hash, hashlen,
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2,
signature_len,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
* that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either
* way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state
* machine. */
static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t signature_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED)
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED)
/* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange
* is not needed. */
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
/* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters
* from certificate at this point. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */
/* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use
* ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
/* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing
* signature operation, resume signing. */
if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming signature operation" ) );
ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) &&
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
{
/* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */
ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len );
}
if( ret != 0 )
{
/* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen
* to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message,
* out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be
* preserved. */
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange (pending)" ) );
else
ssl->out_msglen = 0;
return( ret );
}
/* If there is a signature, write its length.
* ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature
* itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( signature_len != 0 )
{
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( &ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen],
signature_len );
ssl->out_msglen += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature",
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
signature_len );
/* Skip over the already-written signature */
ssl->out_msglen += signature_len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
/* Add header and send. */
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) );
ssl->out_msglen = 4;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t n;
/*
* Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
*/
if( *p + 2 > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
n = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be ( *p );
*p += 2;
if( *p + n > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
}
*p += n;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *peer_pms,
size_t *peer_pmslen,
size_t peer_pmssize )
{
int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl,
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
{
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *p,
const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *peer_pms,
size_t *peer_pmslen,
size_t peer_pmssize )
{
int ret;
size_t len = (size_t)( end - p ); /* Cast is safe because p <= end. */
mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
/* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing
* decryption operation, resume signing. */
if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming decryption operation" ) );
return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl,
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
/*
* Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
{
if( len < 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
len -= 2;
if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ||
*p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
#endif
/*
* Decrypt the premaster secret
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL )
{
ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start( ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ),
p, len );
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
/* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */
break;
case 0:
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl,
peer_pms,
peer_pmslen,
peer_pmssize ) );
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( private_key, p, len,
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
return( ret );
}
static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *p,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t pms_offset )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
unsigned char ver[2];
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
unsigned char mask;
size_t i, peer_pmslen;
unsigned int diff;
/* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than
* 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't
* matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to
* peer_pmslen being less than 48, and we only care whether diff is 0.
* But do initialize peer_pms for robustness anyway. This also makes
* memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, even
* if it's an unsigned char). */
peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0;
ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end,
peer_pms,
&peer_pmslen,
sizeof( peer_pms ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
return( ret );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport, ver );
/* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
* padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
* attacks. */
diff = (unsigned int) ret;
diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
#endif
mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) );
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
/*
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
* bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
* To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must
* not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was
* successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret,
* regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not.
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
/* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal
* anything about the RSA decryption. */
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( diff != 0 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
#endif
if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset ||
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
/* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
* data-dependent branches. */
for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = 0;
size_t n;
if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Receive client pre-shared key identity name
*/
if( end - *p < 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
n = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( *p );
*p += 2;
if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
{
if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}
else
{
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}
}
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY );
}
*p += n;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: Client Key Exchange
*
*/
/*
* Overview
*/
/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions. */
static int ssl_process_in_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
/* Update the handshake state */
static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/*
* Implementation
*/
static int ssl_process_in_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> process client key exchange" ) );
/* The ClientKeyExchange message is never skipped. */
/* Reading step */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl,
1 /* update checksum */ ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( ssl, ssl->in_msg,
ssl->in_hslen ) );
/* Update state */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_client_key_exchange_postprocess( ssl ) );
cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= process client key exchange" ) );
return( ret );
}
/* Warning: Despite accepting a length argument, this function is currently
* still lacking some bounds checks and assumes that `buf` has length
* `MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN`. Eventually, it should be rewritten to work
* with any buffer + length pair, returning MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
* on insufficient parsing space. */
static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
unsigned char *p, *end;
p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = buf + buflen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( p != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
((void) ret);
if( mbedtls_ssl_ecdh_read_peerkey( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
p, end - p) ) != 0 )
{
((void) ret);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( p != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
{
/* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to
* decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip
* directly to resuming this operation. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "PSK identity already parsed" ) );
/* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms
* won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */
p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( p != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ecdh_read_peerkey( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
p, end - p ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 0 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
return( 0 );
}
/* Update the handshake state */
static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_build_pms( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_build_pms", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
return( 0 );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t i, sig_len;
unsigned char hash[48];
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
size_t hashlen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
#endif
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
/* Skip if we haven't received a certificate from the client.
* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is set, this can be
* inferred from the setting of mbedtls_ssl_session::peer_cert.
* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is not set, it is tracked in a
* specific variable. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
if( ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey )
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
&peer_pk );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( peer_pk == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
/* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ );
if( 0 != ret )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record" ), ret );
goto exit;
}
ssl->state++;
/* Process the message contents */
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
/*
* struct {
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } DigitallySigned;
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
hashlen = 36;
/* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
{
hash_start += 16;
hashlen -= 16;
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
/*
* Hash
*/
md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->in_msg[i] );
if(
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 &&
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 &&
#endif
1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
" for verify message" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
i++;
/*
* Signature
*/
if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) )
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
" for verify message" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
/*
* Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
*/
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
i++;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
sig_len = mbedtls_platform_get_uint16_be( &ssl->in_msg[i] );
i += 2;
if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
goto exit;
}
/* Calculate hash and verify signature */
{
size_t dummy_hlen;
mbedtls_ssl_calc_verify(
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
md_alg, ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk,
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) );
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t tlen;
uint32_t lifetime;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write new session ticket" ) );
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
/*
* struct {
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
* } NewSessionTicket;
*
* 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified)
* 8 . 9 ticket_len (n)
* 10 . 9+n ticket content
*/
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write( ssl->conf->p_ticket,
ssl->session_negotiate,
ssl->out_msg + 10,
ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
&tlen, &lifetime ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret );
tlen = 0;
}
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint32_be( &ssl->out_msg[4], lifetime );
(void)mbedtls_platform_put_uint16_be( &ssl->out_msg[8], tlen );
ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen;
/*
* Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and
* ChangeCipherSpec share the same state.
*/
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write new session ticket" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
/*
* SSL handshake -- server side -- single step
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server state: %d", ssl->state ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
switch( ssl->state )
{
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
break;
/*
* <== ClientHello
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
ret = ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl );
break;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
#endif
/*
* ==> ServerHello
* Certificate
* ( ServerKeyExchange )
* ( CertificateRequest )
* ServerHelloDone
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
ret = ssl_write_server_hello( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
ret = ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl );
break;
/*
* <== ( Certificate/Alert )
* ClientKeyExchange
* ( CertificateVerify )
* ChangeCipherSpec
* Finished
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ret = ssl_process_in_client_key_exchange( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
break;
/*
* ==> ( NewSessionTicket )
* ChangeCipherSpec
* Finished
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket( ssl );
else
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
break;
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
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