Paul Bakker 956c9e063d Reduced the input / output overhead with 200+ bytes and covered corner ... case The actual input / output buffer overhead is only 301 instead of 512. This requires a proper check on the padding_idx to prevent out of bounds reads. Previously a remote party could potentially trigger an access error and thus stop the application when sending a malicious packet having MAX_CONTENT_LEN of data, 32 bytes of MAC and a decrypted padlen of . This would result in reading from in_ctr + 13 + 32 + MAX_CONTENT_LEN - 1 - 1 for 256 bytes (including fake padding check). Or 13 + 32 bytes over the buffer length. We now reset padding_idx to 0, if it's clear that it will never be a valid padding (padlen > msg_len || msg_len + padlen + 256 > buffer_len)		2013-12-30 15:00:51 +01:00
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polarssl	Reduced the input / output overhead with 200+ bytes and covered corner	2013-12-30 15:00:51 +01:00
.gitignore	Added proper gitignores for Linux CMake use	2012-11-18 22:56:39 +01:00
CMakeLists.txt	- Added option to prevent installation of header files	2011-12-11 11:25:30 +00:00