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Fix usage of randomized number in AES

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-Fix usage of randomized bits (do not reuse the bits)
-Update comments
This commit is contained in:
Arto Kinnunen 2020-01-20 11:46:34 +02:00
parent 311ab594d7
commit 17540ab74c
2 changed files with 33 additions and 14 deletions
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2
include/mbedtls/config.h
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@ -646,7 +646,7 @@
* -before the first AES calculation round
* -after the last AES calculation round
*
* Tradeoff: Uncommenting this macro does not increases ROM footprint.
* Tradeoff: Uncommenting this macro does not increase codesize.
* The performance loss is ~50% with 128 bit AES.
*
* This option is dependent of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT.

45
library/aes.c
View File

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ typedef struct {
} aes_r_data_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES)
/* Number of additional AES calculation rounds added for SCA CM */
/* Number of additional AES dummy rounds added for SCA countermeasures */
#define AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS 5
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES */
@ -512,8 +512,8 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void )
/**
* Randomize positions for AES SCA countermeasures if AES countermeasures are
* enabled. If countermeasures are not enabled then fill given table with real
* data values.
* enabled. If the countermeasures are not enabled then we fill the given table
* with only real AES rounds to be executed.
*
* Dummy rounds are added as follows:
* 1. One dummy round added to the initial round key addition (executed in
@ -533,13 +533,18 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void )
* Return Number of additional AES rounds
*
* Example of the control bytes:
* R = real data in actual AES calculation round
* Ri = Real data in initial round key addition phase
* F = fake data in actual AES calculation round
* Fi = fake data in initial round key addition phase
*
* 1. No countermeasures enabled and AES-128, only real data (R) used:
* | Ri | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R |
* |0x03|0x04|0x00|0x04|0x00|0x04|0x00|0x04|0x00|0x07|0x03|
*
* 2. Countermeasures enabled, 3 (F) dummy rounds in start and 1 at end:
* | Fi | Ri | F | F | F | R | R | ... | R | R | R | R | F |
* |0x10|0x03 |0x10|0x10|0x10|0x04|0x00| ... |0x04|0x00|0x04|0x03|0x07|
* | Fi | Ri | F | F | F | R | R | ... | R | R | R | R | F |
* |0x10|0x03|0x10|0x10|0x10|0x04|0x00| ... |0x04|0x00|0x04|0x03|0x07|
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES)
static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
@ -547,7 +552,7 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
int i = 0, j, is_even_pos, dummy_rounds, num;
mbedtls_platform_memset( tbl, 0, tbl_len );
// get random from 0xfff (each byte will be used separately)
// get random from 0x0fff (each f will be used separately)
num = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 0x1000 );
// Randomize execution order of initial round key addition
@ -561,11 +566,11 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
}
// Randomize number of dummy AES rounds
dummy_rounds = AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS - ( ( num >> 8 ) & 0x01 );
dummy_rounds = AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS - ( ( num & 0x0010 ) >> 4 );
tbl_len = tbl_len - (AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS - dummy_rounds);
// randomize positions for the dummy rounds
num = ( num & 0x00f ) % ( dummy_rounds + 1 );
num = ( num & 0x000f ) % ( dummy_rounds + 1 );
// add dummy rounds after initial round key addition (if needed)
for ( ; i < num + 2; i++ )
@ -604,7 +609,7 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
return( dummy_rounds );
}
#endif /*MBEDTLS_AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SCA_COUNTERMEASURES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES)
@ -1072,9 +1077,13 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
round_ctrl_table_len );
flow_control = dummy_rounds;
// SCA countermeasure, safely clear the aes_data_real.xy_values
mbedtls_platform_memset( aes_data_real.xy_values, 0, 16 );
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
// SCA countermeasure, randomize secret data location by initializing it in
// a random order and writing randomized fake data between the real data
// writes.
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
i = offset;
do
{
@ -1138,9 +1147,12 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
tindex++;
} while( stop_mark == 0 );
// SCA countermeasure, safely clear the output
mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 16 );
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
// SCA countermeasure, randomize secret data location by writing to it in
// a random order.
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
i = offset;
do
{
@ -1332,9 +1344,13 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
round_ctrl_table_len );
flow_control = dummy_rounds;
// SCA countermeasure, safely clear the aes_data_real.xy_values
mbedtls_platform_memset( aes_data_real.xy_values, 0, 16 );
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
// SCA countermeasure, randomize secret data location by initializing it in
// a random order and writing randomized fake data between the real data
// writes.
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
i = offset;
do
{
@ -1398,9 +1414,12 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
tindex++;
} while( stop_mark == 0 );
// SCA countermeasure, safely clear the output
mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 16 );
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
// SCA countermeasure, randomize secret data location by writing to it in
// a random order.
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 4 );
i = offset;
do
{