Merge pull request #3481 from AndrzejKurek/fi_duplicate_buffers_2

Duplicate sensitive buffer and buffer length information

library/aes.c

@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
     unsigned int flow_ctrl = 0;
     volatile unsigned int i = 0;
     volatile int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *key_dup = key;
+    volatile unsigned int keybits_dup = keybits;
     uint32_t *RK;
     uint32_t offset = 0;
 
@@ -813,10 +815,14 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         || ( ctx->nr == 14 && i == 7 )
 #endif
     ) )
+    {
+        if( keybits_dup == keybits && key_dup == key )
         {
             return ret;
         }
+    }
 
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( RK, 0, ( keybits >> 5 ) * 4 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */
@@ -1063,6 +1069,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     aes_r_data_t *aes_data_table[2];    // pointers to real and fake data
     int round_ctrl_table_len = ctx->nr + 2 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS;
     volatile int flow_control;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
     // control bytes for AES calculation rounds,
     // reserve based on max rounds + dummy rounds + 2 (for initial key addition)
     uint8_t round_ctrl_table[( 14 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS + 2 )];
@@ -1163,9 +1171,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     if( flow_control == tindex + dummy_rounds + 8 )
     {
         /* Validate control path due possible fault injection */
+        if( output_dup == output && input_dup == input )
+        {
             return 0;
         }
+    }
 
+    // Clear the output in case of a FI
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 16 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -1342,6 +1355,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     aes_r_data_t *aes_data_table[2];    // pointers to real and fake data
     int round_ctrl_table_len = ctx->nr + 2 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS;
     volatile int flow_control;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
     // control bytes for AES calculation rounds,
     // reserve based on max rounds + dummy rounds + 2 (for initial key addition)
     uint8_t round_ctrl_table[( 14 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS + 2 )];
@@ -1442,9 +1457,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     if( flow_control == tindex + dummy_rounds + 8 )
     {
         /* Validate control path due possible fault injection */
+        if( output_dup == output && input_dup == input )
+        {
             return 0;
         }
+    }
 
+    // Clear the output in case of a FI
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 16 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 

library/ccm.c

@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+    volatile const unsigned char *key_dup = key;
+    volatile unsigned int keybits_dup = keybits;
 
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
@@ -99,9 +101,16 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
         return( ret );
     }
 
+    if( keybits_dup == keybits && key_dup == key )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
 
+    // In case of a FI - clear the context
+    mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
+
 /*
  * Free context
  */
@@ -165,6 +174,15 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
     unsigned char ctr[16];
     const unsigned char *src;
     unsigned char *dst;
+    volatile size_t length_dup = length;
+    volatile const unsigned char *iv_dup = iv;
+    volatile size_t iv_len_dup = iv_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *add_dup = add;
+    volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
+    volatile unsigned char *tag_dup = tag;
+    volatile size_t tag_len_dup = tag_len;
 
     /*
      * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
@@ -316,6 +334,16 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
     CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 );
     mbedtls_platform_memcpy( tag, y, tag_len );
 
+    if( length_dup != length || iv_dup != iv || iv_len_dup != iv_len ||
+        add_dup != add || add_len_dup != add_len || input_dup != input ||
+        output_dup != output || tag_dup != tag || tag_len_dup != tag_len)
+    {
+
+        // In case of a FI - clear the output
+        mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, length );
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
+
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -370,6 +398,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
     unsigned char check_tag[16];
     unsigned char i;
     int diff;
+    volatile size_t length_dup = length;
+    volatile const unsigned char *iv_dup = iv;
+    volatile size_t iv_len_dup = iv_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *add_dup = add;
+    volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
+    volatile const unsigned char *tag_dup = tag;
+    volatile size_t tag_len_dup = tag_len;
 
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
@@ -395,6 +432,13 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
     }
 
+    if( length_dup != length || iv_dup != iv || iv_len_dup != iv_len ||
+        add_dup != add || add_len_dup != add_len || input_dup != input ||
+        output_dup != output || tag_dup != tag || tag_len_dup != tag_len)
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
+
     return( ret );
 }
 

library/entropy.c

@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
                         size_t threshold, int strong )
 {
     int idx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source_dup = f_source;
+    volatile void *p_source_dup = p_source;
+    volatile size_t threshold_dup = threshold;
+    volatile int strong_dup = strong;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
@@ -170,6 +174,11 @@ exit:
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
 #endif
 
+    if( f_source_dup != f_source || p_source_dup != p_source ||
+        threshold_dup != threshold || strong_dup != strong )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -184,7 +193,8 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id
     size_t use_len = len;
     const unsigned char *p = data;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
-
+    volatile const unsigned char *data_dup = data;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
     if( use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE )
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR)
@@ -229,6 +239,10 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id
 cleanup:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
 
+    if( len_dup != len || data_dup != data )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -349,6 +363,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
     int count = 0, i, done;
     mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    volatile void *data_dup = data;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     if( len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
@@ -456,7 +473,10 @@ exit:
     if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
 #endif
-
+    if( data_dup != data || len_dup != len || output_dup != output )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 

library/hmac_drbg.c

@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
     volatile unsigned int flow_counter = 0;
     unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *additional_dup = additional;
+    volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
 
     for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ )
     {
@@ -142,10 +144,13 @@ exit:
         flow_counter = flow_counter - sep[0];
         // Double check flow_counter
         if ( ( flow_counter == 7 ) || ( flow_counter == 16 ) )
+        {
+            if( additional_dup == additional && add_len_dup == add_len )
             {
                 return ret;   // success, return 0 from ret
             }
         }
+    }
 
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
@@ -167,6 +172,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                                 const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *data_dup = data;
+    volatile size_t data_len_dup = data_len;
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
         return( ret );
@@ -183,7 +190,10 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 )
         return( ret );
-
+    if( data_dup != data || data_len_dup != data_len )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -200,6 +210,9 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
     size_t seedlen = 0;
     size_t total_entropy_len;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *additional_dup = additional;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
+    int reseed_counter_backup = -1;
 
     if( use_nonce == HMAC_NONCE_NO )
         total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len;
@@ -257,6 +270,7 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
         goto exit;
 
     /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */
+    reseed_counter_backup = ctx->reseed_counter;
     ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
 
 exit:
@@ -264,6 +278,15 @@ exit:
     /* 4. Done */
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen );
 
+    if( additional_dup != additional || len_dup != len )
+    {
+        /* Rollback the reseed_counter in case of FI */
+        if( reseed_counter_backup != -1 )
+            ctx->reseed_counter = reseed_counter_backup;
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
+
     if ( ret != 0 )
         return ret;
 
@@ -273,6 +296,9 @@ exit:
         return ret;
     }
 
+    /* Rollback the reseed_counter in case of FI */
+    if( reseed_counter_backup != -1 )
+        ctx->reseed_counter = reseed_counter_backup;
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -299,6 +325,11 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                     size_t len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    int (* volatile f_entropy_dup)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) = f_entropy;
+    volatile void *p_entropy_dup = p_entropy;
+    volatile const unsigned char *custom_dup = custom;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
+
     size_t md_size;
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
@@ -339,6 +370,11 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
         return( ret );
     }
 
+    if( f_entropy != f_entropy_dup || p_entropy != p_entropy_dup ||
+        custom_dup != custom || len_dup != len )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 

library/sha256.c

@@ -287,7 +287,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     {
         return( 0 );
     }
-
+    /* Free the ctx upon suspected FI */
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -310,7 +311,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     int ret;
     size_t fill;
     uint32_t left;
-
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile size_t ilen_dup = ilen;
+    size_t ilen_change;
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
 
@@ -352,9 +355,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
 
     /* Re-check ilen to protect from a FI attack */
     if( ilen < 64 )
+    {
+        /* Re-check that the calculated offsets are correct */
+        ilen_change = ilen_dup - ilen;
+        if( ( input_dup + ilen_change ) == input )
         {
             return( 0 );
         }
+    }
+    /* Free the ctx upon suspected FI */
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -451,6 +461,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    /* Free the ctx and clear output upon suspected FI */
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx );
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 32 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -472,8 +485,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
                         unsigned char output[32],
                         int is224 )
 {
-    int ret;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_sha256_context ctx;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile size_t ilen_dup = ilen;
 
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 );
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
@@ -493,8 +508,13 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
 exit:
     mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx );
 
+    if( input_dup == input && ilen_dup == ilen )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 32 );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input,

library/ssl_cli.c

@@ -2796,10 +2796,14 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     volatile int ret = 0;
     unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char *end;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
 
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
 
+    ((void) buf_dup);
+    ((void) buflen_dup);
     p   = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
     end = buf + buflen;
 
@@ -3100,7 +3104,7 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
         {
             mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
 
-            if( ret == 0 )
+            if( ret == 0 && buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
             {
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
                 /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
@@ -3583,7 +3587,10 @@ static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 {
     int ret;
     unsigned char *p, *end;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
     size_t n;
+
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
 
@@ -3866,8 +3873,13 @@ static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     }
 
     *olen = p - buf;
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
+    {
        return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {

library/ssl_srv.c

@@ -3269,14 +3269,20 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                            - sig_start );
     int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl,
                                          sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len );
+    volatile size_t *signature_len_dup = signature_len;
     if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
     {
         ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
         mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL );
     }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( signature_len_dup == signature_len )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) &&
           defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
 
@@ -3286,6 +3292,7 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                             size_t *signature_len )
 {
+    volatile size_t *signature_len_dup = signature_len;
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
 
@@ -3673,8 +3680,12 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
 
+    if( signature_len_dup == signature_len )
+    {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
  * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either
@@ -3821,6 +3832,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *
                                        const unsigned char *end )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    unsigned char ** volatile p_dup = p;
+    volatile const unsigned char *end_dup = end;
     size_t n;
 
     /*
@@ -3851,8 +3864,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( p_dup == p && end_dup == end )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
           MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
 
@@ -4218,6 +4236,8 @@ static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
     unsigned char *p, *end;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
 
     p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
     end = buf + buflen;
@@ -4412,9 +4432,12 @@ static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
     }
-
+    if( buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 /* Update the handshake state */
 static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )

library/ssl_tls.c

@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
                               size_t buflen )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
     mbedtls_record rec;
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen );
@@ -228,6 +230,10 @@ exit:
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
     }
 
+    if( buf_dup != buf || buflen_dup != buflen )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+    }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
     return( ret );
 }
@@ -282,6 +288,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                          unsigned char const *own_cid,
                          size_t own_cid_len )
 {
+    volatile unsigned char const *own_cid_dup = own_cid;
+    volatile size_t own_cid_len_dup = own_cid_len;
+
     if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
@@ -308,8 +317,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
      * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */
     ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len;
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( own_cid_dup == own_cid && own_cid_len_dup == own_cid_len )
+    {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                      int *enabled,
@@ -605,7 +619,13 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int ssl3_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
     mbedtls_sha1_context sha1;
     unsigned char padding[16];
     unsigned char sha1sum[20];
-    ((void)label);
+    volatile const unsigned char *secret_dup = secret;
+    volatile size_t slen_dup = slen;
+    volatile const char *label_dup = label;
+    volatile const unsigned char *random_dup = random;
+    volatile size_t rlen_dup = rlen;
+    volatile unsigned char *dstbuf_dup = dstbuf;
+    volatile size_t dlen_dup = dlen;
 
     mbedtls_md5_init(  &md5  );
     mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 );
@@ -650,8 +670,15 @@ exit:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padding, sizeof( padding ) );
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( secret_dup == secret && slen_dup == slen && label_dup == label &&
+        random_dup == random && rlen_dup == rlen && dstbuf_dup == dstbuf &&
+        dlen_dup == dlen )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
@@ -668,6 +695,13 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
     mbedtls_md_handle_t md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
     int ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *secret_dup = secret;
+    volatile size_t slen_dup = slen;
+    volatile const char *label_dup = label;
+    volatile const unsigned char *random_dup = random;
+    volatile size_t rlen_dup = rlen;
+    volatile unsigned char *dstbuf_dup = dstbuf;
+    volatile size_t dlen_dup = dlen;
 
     mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
 
@@ -754,8 +788,15 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( secret_dup == secret && slen_dup == slen && label_dup == label &&
+        random_dup == random && rlen_dup == rlen && dstbuf_dup == dstbuf &&
+        dlen_dup == dlen )
+    {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@@ -777,6 +818,13 @@ int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
     mbedtls_md_handle_t md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
     int ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *secret_dup = secret;
+    volatile size_t slen_dup = slen;
+    volatile const char *label_dup = label;
+    volatile const unsigned char *random_dup = random;
+    volatile size_t rlen_dup = rlen;
+    volatile unsigned char *dstbuf_dup = dstbuf;
+    volatile size_t dlen_dup = dlen;
 
     mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
 
@@ -836,8 +884,15 @@ int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
     (void)mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
     (void)mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( secret_dup == secret && slen_dup == slen && label_dup == label &&
+        random_dup == random && rlen_dup == rlen && dstbuf_dup == dstbuf &&
+        dlen_dup == dlen )
+    {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
 MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int tls_prf_sha256(
@@ -1828,6 +1883,7 @@ static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake,
                                const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     int ret;
+    volatile unsigned char *master_dup = master;
 
 /* #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) */
 /*     ssl = NULL; /\* make sure we don't use it except for debug and EMS *\/ */
@@ -1888,9 +1944,13 @@ static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake,
 
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster,
                               sizeof(handshake->premaster) );
-
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( master_dup == master )
+    {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
@@ -2406,23 +2466,33 @@ static int ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content,
     size_t pad = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY -
                    ( len + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY ) %
         MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY;
+    volatile unsigned char *content_dup = content;
+    volatile size_t *content_size_dup = content_size;
+    volatile size_t remaining_dup = remaining;
 
     /* Write real content type */
     if( remaining == 0 )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     content[ len ] = rec_type;
     len++;
     remaining--;
 
     if( remaining < pad )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     mbedtls_platform_memset( content + len, 0, pad );
     len += pad;
     remaining -= pad;
 
     *content_size = len;
+
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( content_dup == content && content_size_dup == content_size &&
+        ( remaining_dup - 1 - pad ) == remaining )
+    {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 /* This function parses a DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
  * See ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */
@@ -2566,6 +2636,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 
     if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
     {
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
         /*
          * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
          * See ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
@@ -2573,12 +2644,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
          * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
          * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
          */
-        if( ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext( data,
+        if( ( ret = ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext( data,
                                                    &rec->data_len,
                                                    post_avail,
-                        rec->type ) != 0 )
+                                                   rec->type ) ) != 0 )
         {
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+            return( ret );
         }
 
         rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID;
@@ -4816,6 +4887,7 @@ static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len )
     memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 );
 }
 
+#define BITMASK_CHECK_FAILED 0x75555555
 /*
  * Check that bitmask is full
  */
@@ -4825,11 +4897,11 @@ static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len )
 
     for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ )
         if( mask[i] != 0xFF )
-            return( -1 );
+            return( BITMASK_CHECK_FAILED );
 
     for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ )
         if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 )
-            return( -1 );
+            return( BITMASK_CHECK_FAILED );
 
     return( 0 );
 }
@@ -7057,6 +7129,7 @@ write_msg:
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+#define PEER_CRT_CHANGED 0x75555555
 static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          unsigned char *crt_buf,
                                          size_t crt_buf_len )
@@ -7064,14 +7137,15 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert;
 
     if( peer_crt == NULL )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     return( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
 }
 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+#define PEER_CRT_CHANGED 0x75555555
 static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          unsigned char *crt_buf,
                                          size_t crt_buf_len )
@@ -7089,16 +7163,16 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     if( peer_cert_digest == NULL ||
         digest_info == MBEDTLS_MD_INVALID_HANDLE )
     {
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
     }
 
     digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info );
     if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest );
     if( ret != 0 )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     return( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) );
 }
@@ -10878,6 +10952,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
 {
     int ret;
     size_t n;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -11191,8 +11267,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && len_dup == len )
+    {
         return( (int) n );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 /*
  * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max
@@ -11211,6 +11292,8 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 {
     int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl );
     const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     if( ret < 0 )
     {
@@ -11233,6 +11316,7 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS)
         {
             len = max_len;
+            len_dup = len;
         }
 #endif
     }
@@ -11268,9 +11352,13 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
             return( ret );
         }
     }
-
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && len_dup == len )
+    {
         return( (int) len );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 /*
  * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary.
@@ -11318,6 +11406,8 @@ static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
 {
     int ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) );
 
@@ -11349,8 +11439,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && len_dup == len )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 
 /*
  * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
@@ -12933,6 +13028,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 {
     int ret = 0;
     mbedtls_md_context_t ctx;
+    volatile unsigned char* hash_dup = hash;
+    volatile size_t *hashlen_dup = hashlen;
+    volatile unsigned char* data_dup = data;
+    volatile size_t data_len_dup = data_len;
+
     mbedtls_md_handle_t md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
     *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
 
@@ -12978,8 +13078,14 @@ exit:
         mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
 
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( hash_dup == hash && hashlen_dup == hashlen &&
+        data_dup == data && data_len_dup == data_len )
+    {
         return( ret );
     }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+}
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
           MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 

tinycrypt/ecc.c

@@ -1239,6 +1239,8 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
 	int ret = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
 	uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
+	volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
 
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(
 	_private,
@@ -1264,5 +1266,8 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(
 	public_key +
 	NUM_ECC_BYTES, NUM_ECC_BYTES, _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
+	if (private_key_dup != private_key || public_key_dup != public_key){
+		return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+	}
 	return ret;
 }

tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c

@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
 	uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
 	uECC_word_t tries;
+	volatile uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
+	volatile uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
 
 	for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
 		/* Generating _private uniformly at random: */
@@ -148,8 +150,13 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
 			/* erasing temporary buffer that stored secret: */
 			mbedtls_platform_memset(_private, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 
+			if (private_key == private_key_dup && public_key == public_key_dup) {
 				return UECC_SUCCESS;
 			}
+			/* Erase key in case of FI */
+			mbedtls_platform_memset(public_key, 0, 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+			return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+		}
   	}
 	return UECC_FAILURE;
 }
@@ -163,6 +170,9 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
 	wordcount_t num_words = NUM_ECC_WORDS;
 	wordcount_t num_bytes = NUM_ECC_BYTES;
 	int r = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+	volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *secret_dup = secret;
 
 	/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
@@ -180,6 +190,11 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
 
 	/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
 	mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
+	if (public_key_dup != public_key || private_key_dup != private_key || secret_dup != secret) {
+	    /* Erase secret in case of FI */
+	    mbedtls_platform_memset(secret, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+		return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+	}
 
 	return r;
 }

tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c

@@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 	uECC_word_t _random[2*NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t k[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t tries;
+	volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
+	volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
+	volatile uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
 
 	for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
 		/* Generating _random uniformly at random: */
@@ -161,9 +165,15 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 		r = uECC_sign_with_k(private_key, message_hash, hash_size, k, signature);
 		/* don't keep trying if a fault was detected */
 		if (r == UECC_FAULT_DETECTED) {
+		    mbedtls_platform_memset(signature, 0, 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 			return r;
 		}
 		if (r == UECC_SUCCESS) {
+			if (private_key_dup != private_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
+				hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature) {
+			    mbedtls_platform_memset(signature, 0, 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+				return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+			}
 			return UECC_SUCCESS;
 		}
 		/* else keep trying */
@@ -194,6 +204,10 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 	bitcount_t i;
 	bitcount_t flow_control;
 	volatile uECC_word_t diff;
+	volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
+	volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
+	volatile const uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
 
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
 	uECC_word_t r[NUM_ECC_WORDS], s[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -295,6 +309,10 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 		 * 1 (base value) + num_bits - 1 (from the loop) + 5 incrementations.
 		 */
 		if (diff == 0 && flow_control == (num_bits + 5)) {
+			if (public_key_dup != public_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
+				hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature) {
+				return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+			}
 			return UECC_SUCCESS;
 		}
 		else {