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Adapt ecp_gen_keypair() to Curve25519
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@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
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* FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf
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* RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants
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*
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* [M255] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf
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*
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* [2] CORON, Jean-Sébastien. Resistance against differential power analysis
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* for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and
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* Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302.
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@ -1534,7 +1536,7 @@ int ecp_check_pubkey( const ecp_group *grp, const ecp_point *pt )
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if( ecp_is_montgomery( grp ) )
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{
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/* Just check X is the correct number of bytes */
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/* [M255 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */
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if( mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
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@ -1587,7 +1589,7 @@ int ecp_check_privkey( const ecp_group *grp, const mpi *d )
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{
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if( ecp_is_montgomery( grp ) )
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{
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/* see the Curve25519 paper */
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/* see [M255] page 5 */
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if( mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 ||
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mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 ||
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mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 ||
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@ -1606,7 +1608,7 @@ int ecp_check_privkey( const ecp_group *grp, const mpi *d )
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}
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/*
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* Generate a keypair (SEC1 3.2.1)
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* Generate a keypair
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*/
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int ecp_gen_keypair( ecp_group *grp, mpi *d, ecp_point *Q,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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@ -1615,20 +1617,40 @@ int ecp_gen_keypair( ecp_group *grp, mpi *d, ecp_point *Q,
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int count = 0;
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size_t n_size = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8;
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/*
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* Generate d such that 1 <= n < N
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*/
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do
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if( ecp_is_montgomery( grp ) )
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{
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/* [M225] page 5 */
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size_t b;
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mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng );
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while( mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
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mpi_shift_r( d, 1 );
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/* Make sure the most significant bit is nbits */
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b = mpi_msb( d ) - 1; /* mpi_msb is one-based */
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if( b > grp->nbits )
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mpi_shift_r( d, b - grp->nbits );
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else
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mpi_set_bit( d, grp->nbits, 1 );
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if( count++ > 10 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
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/* Make sure the last three bits are unset */
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mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 );
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mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 );
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mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 );
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}
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else
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{
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/* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
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do
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{
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mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng );
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while( mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
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mpi_shift_r( d, 1 );
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if( count++ > 10 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
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}
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while( mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 );
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}
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while( mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 );
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return( ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, &grp->G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
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}
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@ -325,6 +325,10 @@ ECP gen keypair
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depends_on:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
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ecp_gen_keypair:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1
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ECP gen keypair
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depends_on:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED
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ecp_gen_keypair:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255
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ECP gen keypair wrapper
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depends_on:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
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ecp_gen_key:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1
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