In BER encoding, any boolean with a non-zero value is considered as
TRUE. However, DER encoding require a value of 255 (0xFF) for TRUE.
This commit makes `mbedtls_asn1_write_bool` function uses `255` instead
of `1` for BOOLEAN values.
With this fix, boolean values are now reconized by OS X keychain (tested
on OS X 10.11).
Fixes#318.
Not a security issue as here we know the buffer is large enough (unless
something else if badly wrong in the code), and the value cast to int is less
than 2^16 (again, unless issues elsewhere).
Still changing to a more correct check as a matter of principle
backport of bc5e508
If len is large enough, when cast to an int it will be negative and then the
test if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) will not behave as expected.
Ref: IOTSSL-518
backport of 261faed725
* mbedtls-1.3:
Fix spurious #endif from previous cherry-pick
Fix macroization of inline in C++
Add missing warning in doc
Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc
Found by Guido Vranken.
Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB())
could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the
buffer in the subsequent for loop.
Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than
SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system).
Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to
CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with
respect to future code changes.
There is only one length byte but for some reason we skipped two, resulting in
reading one byte past the end of the extension. Fortunately, even if that
extension is at the very end of the ClientHello, it can't be at the end of the
buffer since the ClientHello length is at most SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN and the
buffer has some more room after that for MAC and so on. So there is no
buffer overread.
Possible consequences are:
- nothing, if the next byte is 0x00, which is a comment first byte for other
extensions, which is why the bug remained unnoticed
- using a point format that was not offered by the peer if next byte is 0x01.
In that case the peer will reject our ServerKeyExchange message and the
handshake will fail.
- thinking that we don't have a common point format even if we do, which will
cause us to immediately abort the handshake.
None of these are a security issue.
The same bug was fixed client-side in fd35af15
Backport of f7022d1
This helps in the case where an intermediate certificate is directly trusted.
In that case we want to ignore what comes after it in the chain, not only for
performance but also to avoid false negatives (eg an old root being no longer
trusted while the newer intermediate is directly trusted).
see #220
backport of fdbdd72
This causes a compile-time error:
platform.c(157): error: #147: declaration is incompatible with "void (*polarssl_exit)(int)" (declared at line 179 of "platform.h")
If the top certificate occurs twice in trust_ca (for example) it would
not be good for the second instance to be checked with check_path_cnt
reduced twice!
library/dhm.c: accept (and ignore) optional privateValueLength for
PKCS#3 DH parameters.
PKCS#3 defines the ASN.1 encoding of a DH parameter set like this:
----------------
DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
prime INTEGER, -- p
base INTEGER, -- g
privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL }
The fields of type DHParameter have the following meanings:
o prime is the prime p.
o base is the base g.
o privateValueLength is the optional private-value
length l.
----------------
See: ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/ascii/pkcs-3.asc
This optional parameter was added in PKCS#3 version 1.4, released
November 1, 1993.
dhm.c currently doesn't cope well with PKCS#3 files that have this
optional final parameter included. i see errors like:
------------
dhm_parse_dhmfile returned -0x33E6
Last error was: -0x33E6 - DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly : ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected lengt
------------
You can generate PKCS#3 files with this final parameter with recent
versions of certtool from GnuTLS:
certtool --generate-dh-params > dh.pem
The race was due to mpi_exp_mod storing a Montgomery coefficient in the
context (RM, RP, RQ).
The fix was verified with -fsanitize-thread using ssl_pthread_server and two
concurrent clients.
A more fine-grained fix should be possible, locking just enough time to check
if those values are OK and set them if not, rather than locking for the whole
mpi_exp_mod() operation, but it will be for later.
CFLAGS are reserved for external interaction via make variable, the
following should work:
$ make CFLAGS="-O3"
$ CFLAGS="-O3" make
1. Move internal flags to LOCAL_CFLAGS
2. Respect external CFLAGS
3. CFLAGS should be last compiler flags.
4. Default CFLAGS is -O optimization, remove OFLAGS.
5. Add WARNING_CFLAGS to control warning setting and enable to remove
if compiler does not support flags.
Signed-off-by: Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com>
LDFLAGS are reserved for external interaction via make variable, the
following should work:
$ make LDFLAGS="-L/xxx"
$ LDFLAGS="-L/xxx" make
1. Move internal flags to LOCAL_LDFLAGS
2. Respect external LDFLAGS
3. LDFLAGS should be last linkage flags.
Signed-off-by: Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com>
* rasp/mem-leak:
Fix another potential memory leak found by find-mem-leak.cocci.
Add a rule for another type of memory leak to find-mem-leak.cocci.
Fix a potential memory leak found by find-mem-leak.cocci.
Add a semantic patch to find potential memory leaks.
Fix whitespace of 369e6c20.
Apply the semantic patch rm-malloc-cast.cocci.
Add a semantic patch to remove casts of malloc.
Conflicts:
programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
