- Use switch case instead of loop to generate faster code
- Add #if defined to address compiler error
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
Problem
-------
mbedtls_strerror is a utility function which converts an mbedTLS error code
into a human readable string. It requires the caller to allocate a buffer every
time an error code needs to be converted to a string. It is an overkill and a
waste of RAM for resource constrained microcontrollers - where the most common
use case is to use these strings for logging.
Solution
--------
The proposed commit adds two functions:
* const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code );
* const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code );
The above two functions convert the high level and low level parts of an mbedTLS
error code to human readable strings. They return a const pointer to an
unmodifiable string which is not supposed to be modified by the caller and only
to be used for logging purposes. The caller no longer needs to allocate a
buffer.
Backward Compatibility
----------------------
The proposed change is completely backward compatible as it does not change
the existing mbedtls_strerror function and ensures that it continues to behave
the same way.
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
This commit introduces two changes:
- Add in_msg and out_msg calculations for buffer upsizing. This was previously
considered as unnecessary, but renegotiation using certain ciphersuites needs
this.
- Improving the way out_msg and in_msg pointers are calculated, so that even
if no resizing is introduced, the pointers remain the same;
New tests added:
- various renegotiation schemes with a range of MFL's and ciphersuites;
- an ssl-opt.sh test exercising two things that were problematic: renegotiation
with TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 and a server MFL that's smaller
than the one negotiated by the client.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Since the server might want to have a different maximum fragment length
for the outgoing messages than the negotiated one - introduce a new way of
computing it. This commit also adds additional ssl-opt.sh tests ensuring
that the maximum fragment lengths are set as expected.
mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() is now a deprecated function,
being an alias to mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(). The behaviour
of this function is the same as before.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
t is never used uninitialized, since the first loop iteration reads 0
bytes of it and then writes hash_len bytes, and subsequent iterations
read and write hash_len bytes. However this is somewhat fragile, and
it would be legitimate for a static analyzer to be unsure.
Initialize t explicitly, to make the code clearer and more robust, at
negligible cost.
Reported by Vasily Evseenko in
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/2942
with a slightly different fix.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The current logging was sub-standard, in particular there was no trace
whatsoever of the HelloVerifyRequest being sent. Now it's being logged with
the usual levels: 4 for full content, 2 return of f_send, 1 decision about
sending it (or taking other branches in the same function) because that's the
same level as state changes in the handshake, and also same as the "possible
client reconnect" message" to which it's the logical continuation (what are we
doing about it?).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
In x509.c, the self-test code is dependent on MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and
MBEDTLS_SHA256_C being enabled. At some point in the recent past that dependency
was on MBEDTLS_SHA1_C but changed to SHA256, but the comment wasn't updated.
This commit updates the comment.
Signed-off-by: Simon Butcher <simon.butcher@arm.com>
Section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347 describes how to handle the case of a DTLS client
establishing a new connection using the same UDP quartet as an already active
connection, which we implement under the compile option
MBEDTLS_SSL_DLTS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE. Relevant excerpts:
[the server] MUST NOT destroy the existing
association until the client has demonstrated reachability either by
completing a cookie exchange or by completing a complete handshake
including delivering a verifiable Finished message.
[...]
The reachability requirement prevents
off-path/blind attackers from destroying associations merely by
sending forged ClientHellos.
Our code chooses to use a cookie exchange for establishing reachability, but
unfortunately that check was effectively removed in a recent refactoring,
which changed what value ssl_handle_possible_reconnect() needs to return in
order for ssl_get_next_record() (introduced in that refactoring) to take the
proper action. Unfortunately, in addition to changing the value, the
refactoring also changed a return statement to an assignment to the ret
variable, causing the function to reach the code for a valid cookie, which
immediately destroys the existing association, effectively bypassing the
cookie verification.
This commit fixes that by immediately returning after sending a
HelloVerifyRequest when a ClientHello without a valid cookie is found. It also
updates the description of the function to reflect the new return value
convention (the refactoring updated the code but not the documentation).
The commit that changed the return value convention (and introduced the bug)
is 2fddd3765e, whose commit message explains the
change.
Note: this bug also indirectly caused the ssl-opt.sh test case "DTLS client
reconnect from same port: reconnect" to occasionally fail due to a race
condition between the reception of the ClientHello carrying a valid cookie and
the closure of the connection by the server after noticing the ClientHello
didn't carry a valid cookie after it incorrectly destroyed the previous
connection, that could cause that ClientHello to be invisible to the server
(if that message reaches the server just before it does `net_close()`). A
welcome side effect of this commit is to remove that race condition, as the
new connection will immediately start with a ClientHello carrying a valid
cookie in the SSL input buffer, so the server will not call `net_close()` and
not risk discarding a better ClientHello that arrived in the meantime.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
See the comments in the code for how an attack would go, and the ChangeLog
entry for an impact assessment. (For ECDSA, leaking a few bits of the scalar
over several signatures translates to full private key recovery using a
lattice attack.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This change was first introduced in 8af3923 - see this commit for more background.
After the removal of crypto directory, there are no targets that require a
crypto library with the directory prefix, so there's also no need for the priority
dependency to be declared. This commit removes it.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE to mark code that is only exported for
test purposes. Since this is for internal library
use only, define it in a header in library/. Since there is no
suitable header, create one.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
When this option is enabled, the product includes additional
interfaces that enable additional tests. This option should not be
enabled in production, but is included in the "full" build to enable
the extra tests.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Merge the latest state of the target branch (mbedtls/development) into the
pull request to merge mbed-crypto into mbedtls.
Conflicts:
* ChangeLog: add/add conflict. Resolve by using the usual section order.
Rename identifiers containing double-underscore (`__`) to avoid `__`.
The reason to avoid double-underscore is that all identifiers
containing double-underscore are reserved in C++. Rename all such
identifiers that appear in any public header, including ssl_internal.h
which is in principle private but in practice is installed with the
public headers.
This commit makes check-names.sh pass.
```
perl -i -pe 's/\bMBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE\b/MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED/g; s/\bMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_(_\w+)_(_\w+)\b/MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE${1}${2}/g' include/mbedtls/*.h library/*.c programs/*/*.c scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt tests/suites/*.function
```
Remove code guarded by `USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE`. It's dead now that
crypto can no longer be a submodule.
In `library/Makefile`:
* Replace `$(CRYPTO_INCLUDE)` with the single include directory
`-I../include`.
* Remove references to `$(OBJS_CRYPTO)` when it's in addition to the
local objects (`*.o`) since `$(OBJS_CRYPTO)` is now a subset of the
local objects.
* Merge modules that were duplicated between the mbedtls and the
mbed-crypto repositories back into the single list for `OBJS_CRYPTO`.
Merge `unremove-non-crypto` into `mbedtls/development`. The branch
`unremove-non-crypto` was obtained by starting from `mbed-crypto/development`,
then reverting many commits that removed X.509 and TLS functionality when Mbed
Crypto forked from Mbed TLS (the “unremoval”), then make a few tweaks to
facilitate the merge.
The unremoval step restored old versions of some tls files. If a file doesn't
exist in mbed-crypto, check out the mbedtls version, regardless of what
happened during the unremoval of tls files in the crypto tree. Also
unconditionally take the mbedtls version of a few files where the
modifications are completely project-specific and are not relevant in
mbed-crypto:
* `.github/issue_template.md`: completely different. We may want to reconcile
them independently as a follow-up.
* `.travis.yml`: would only be reverted to an earlier tls version.
* `README.md`: completely different. We may want to reconcile them
independently as a follow-up.
* `doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h`: the changes in crypto were minimal and not
relevant except as a stopgap as mbed-crypto did not have its own product
versioning in the Doxygen documentation.
* `tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile`: completely different.
* `tests/data_files/Makefile`: there were no changes in mbed-crypto,
but the unremoval step restored an old version.
Shell script for everything to do after the merge apart from the conflict
resolution:
```
tls_files=($(comm -23 <(git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD) <(git ls-tree -r --name-only $(git merge-base upstream-crypto/development MERGE_HEAD))))
tls_files+=($tls_files .github/issue_template.md .travis.yml README.md doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile tests/data_files/Makefile)
git checkout --theirs HEAD -- $tls_files
git add -- $tls_files
```
Resolve the remaining conflicts:
* `library/CMakeLists.txt`:
* Keep the TLS definition of `src_crypto`
* `USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY`: keep all three libraries, with both
`include` and `crypto/include` in `target_include_directories`, all with
version `2.21.0`.
* `programs/Makefile`:
* Reconcile the APPS lists (add/add from a differently-formatted common
ancestor): insert the `psa/*` from crypto into the tls list.
* Keep the `fuzz` target defined only in tls version.
* Keep the recipe (only in tls version) cleaning `ssl_pthread_server`
stuff for the `clean` target.
* `scripts/config.py`:
* `include_in_full`: add/add conflict. Keep both.
* `tests/scripts/all.sh`:
* `component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan`: partially old
version in crypto. Take the tls version.
* `component_test_malloc_0_null` and more: take
`component_test_malloc_0_null` from crypto (with `config.py` rather than
`config.pl`, and with `$ASAN_FLAGS` rather than an explicit list), but
add the call to `ssl-opt.sh` from tls. Take the other components from
crypto.
With this commit, building and running the unit tests with both `make ` and
`cmake` work in the default configuration on Linux. Other platforms, build
systems and configurations are likely not to work, and there is some
regression in test coverage.
There is some loss of functionality because the unremoval step restored older
versions of tls content. This commit contains the latest tls version of
tls-only files, but some changes from the tls side in files that existed on
both sides have regressed. Most problematic changes are hunks that remove some
tls-specific feature and contain either a C preprocessor symbol identifying a
tls-specific module or option, or the name of a tls-specific file. Hunks
that remove a tls-specific preprocessor symbol can be identified with the
regular expression `^-.*MBEDTLS_(ERR_)?(PKCS11|X509|NET|SSL)_`.
Subsequent commits will revert a few parts of the patch from this merge commit
in order to restore the tls functionality that it removes, ensure that the
test coverage includes what was covered in either branch, and fix test
failures.
This reverts commit d832f187f7.
Conflicts:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY: there has been a change immediately before
where it was removed. Just re-add what was removed.
* tests/CMakeLists.txt:
* USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY: there has been a change immediately before
where it was removed. Just re-add what was removed.
This reverts commit d874a1fd14.
Conflicts:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT: there has been a change immediately after
where it was removed. Just re-add what was removed.
* tests/CMakeLists.txt:
* ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT: there has been a change immediately after
where it was removed. Just re-add what was removed.
This reverts commit 8298d70bee.
Conflicts:
* library/Makefile: removal of SOEXT_X509 and SOEXT_TLS vs change of
value of SOEXT_CRYPTO. Keep all, with the new value of SOEXT_CRYPTO.
This reverts commit 1c66e48670.
Conflicts:
* include/mbedtls/check_config.h:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3: there has been an addition (of
MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) at the place where it was removed. Re-add it
after (alphabetical order).
* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES: there has been an addition (of
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) at the place where it was removed.
Re-add it after (alphabetical order).
* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES: there has been an addition (of
MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) at the place where it was removed. Re-add it
after (alphabetical order).
* include/mbedtls/config.h:
* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES: there has been an addition (of
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) at the place where it was removed.
Re-add it after (alphabetical order).
* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES: there has been an addition (of
MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) at the place where it was removed. Re-add it
after (alphabetical order).
* library/version_features.c: re-generate by running
scripts/generate_features.pl.
* programs/test/query_config.c: re-generate by running
scripts/generate_query_config.pl.
* scripts/config.pl: this file has been replaced by config.py. Port
the reversed changes to config.py:
* Revert removing three symbols from the list of symbols to
exclude from full.
* Revert removing one symbol (MBEDTLS_NET_C) from the list of symbols
to exclude from baremetal.
* scripts/footprint.sh:
* Re-add the line to unset MBEDTLS_NET_C, but with config.py instead of
config.pl.
* tests/scripts/all.sh:
* component_test_no_platform: re-add the line to unset MBEDTLS_NET_C, but
with config.py instead of config.pl.
* component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc,
component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_udbl_division,
component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication,
component_build_armcc: these components now use the baremetal
configuration, so they do not need to turn off MBEDTLS_NET_C explicitly.
This reverts commit bb1f701212.
* include/mbedtls/check_config.h:
* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT: there has been an addition (of
MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) at the place where it was removed.
Re-add it before MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 to keep it grouped
with MBEDTLS_RSA_C.
Conflicts:
* scripts/config.pl: this file has been replaced by config.py. Port
the reversed changes to config.py:
* Revert removing three symbols from the list of symbols to
exclude from full.
Although the 'flags' variable is not checked or used after a call to
mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage, it might be in the future. With this fix, after
each iteration, the flags will apply only to the most recent certificate, not
to any of the previous ones checked. This fix also stops any reads and
writes via a '|=' from/to an uninitialized variable happening.
This commit fixes#2444.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Add a conditional buffer resizing feature. Introduce tests exercising
it in various setups (serialization, renegotiation, mfl manipulations).
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Some code paths want to access members of the mbedtls_rsa_context structure.
We can only do that when using our own implementation, as otherwise we don't
know anything about that structure.
When parsing a PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey structure, all parameters are always
present. After importing them, we need to call rsa_complete() for the sake of
alternative implementations. That function interprets zero as a signal for
"this parameter was not provided". As that's never the case, we mustn't pass
any zero value to that function, so we need to explicitly check for it.
This commit is the final step in separating the functionality of
what was originally ssl_tls.c into both ssl_tls.c and ssl_msg.c.
So far, ssl_msg.c has been created as an identical copy of ssl_tls.c.
For each block of code in these files, this commit removes it from
precisely one of the two files, depending on where the respective
functionality belongs.
The splitting separates the following functionalities:
1) An implementation of the TLS and DTLS messaging layer, that is,
the record layer as well as the DTLS retransmission state machine.
This is now contained in ssl_msg.c
2) Handshake parsing and writing functions shared between client and
server (functions specific to either client or server are implemented
in ssl_cli.c and ssl_srv.c, respectively).
This is remains in ssl_tls.c.
This commit adds the newly created copy ssl_msg.c of ssl_tls.c
to the build system but guards its content by an `#if 0 ... #endif`
preprocessor guard in order to avoid compilation failures resulting
from code duplication. This guard will be removed once the contents
of ssl_tls.c and ssl_msg.c have been made disjoint.
This commit is the first in a series of commits aiming to split
the content of ssl_tls.c in two files ssl_tls.c and ssl_msg.c.
As a first step, this commit replaces ssl_tls.c by two identical
copies ssl_tls_old.c and ssl_msg.c. Even though the file
ssl_tls_old.c will subsequently be renamed back into ssl_tls.c,
this approach retains the git history in both files.
This reverts commit c0c92fea3d, reversing
changes made to bfc73bcfd2.
stat() will never return S_IFLNK as the file type, as stat() explicitly
follows symlinks.
Fixes#3005.
Files deleted by us: keep them deleted.
```
git rm $(git status -s | sed -n 's/^DU //p')
```
Individual files with conflicts:
* `README.md`: keep the crypto version.
* `doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h`: keep the crypto version (with an obsolete Mbed Crypto version number).
* `include/mbedtls/error.h`:
* `ERROR`: similar additions made through parallel commits, with only whitespace differences. Align with the tls version.
* `library/CMakeLists.txt`: keep the crypto version.
* `library/Makefile`: keep the crypto version.
* `scripts/generate_errors.pl`: keep the crypto version (the relevant changes were made through parallel commits).
* `tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py`:
* `Results`: keep the crypto version, which has both the new argument to the constructor (added in crypto only) and the class docstring (added through parallel commits).
* `tests/suites/helpers.function`:
* `ARRAY_LENGTH`, `ASSERT_ALLOC`: additions in the same location. Keep both, in indifferent order.
* `tests/suites/target_test.function`:
* `receive_uint32`: keep the crypto version which has an additional bug fix. The tls changes made in tls are irrelevant after this bug fix.
* `visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj`: run `scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl`.
Review of non-conflicting changes:
* `all.sh`: 1 change.
* zlib test components: don't add them.
* `include/CMakeLists.txt`: 1 change.
* `target_include_directories`: doesn't work as is (different target name). Don't take the change.
* All other non-conflicting changes: take them.
Adapt to the change of encoding of elliptic curve key types in PSA
crypto. Before, an EC key type encoded the TLS curve identifier. Now
the EC key type only includes an ad hoc curve family identifier, and
determining the exact curve requires both the key type and size. This
commit moves from the old encoding and old definitions from
crypto/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h to the new encoding and definitions
from the immediately preceding crypto submodule update.
If psa_key_agreement_ecdh fails, there may be output that leaks
sensitive information in the output buffer. Zeroize it.
If this is due to an underlying failure in the ECDH implementation, it
is currently not an issue since both the traditional Mbed TLS/Crypto
implementation and Everest only write to the output buffer once every
intermediate step has succeeded, but zeroizing is more robust. If this
is because the recently added key size check fails, a leak could be a
serious issue.
All key types now have an encoding on 32 bits where the bottom 16 bits
are zero. Change to using 16 bits only.
Keep 32 bits for key types in storage, but move the significant
half-word from the top to the bottom.
Likewise, change EC curve and DH group families from 32 bits out of
which the top 8 and bottom 16 bits are zero, to 8 bits only.
Reorder psa_core_key_attributes_t to avoid padding.
Remove the values of curve encodings that are based on the TLS registry
and include the curve size, keeping only the new encoding that merely
encodes a curve family in 8 bits.
Keep the old constant names as aliases for the new values and
deprecate the old names.
Define constants for ECC curve families and DH group families. These
constants have 0x0000 in the lower 16 bits of the key type.
Support these constants in the implementation and in the PSA metadata
tests.
Switch the slot management and secure element driver HAL tests to the
new curve encodings. This requires SE driver code to become slightly
more clever when figuring out the bit-size of an imported EC key since
it now needs to take the data size into account.
Switch some documentation to the new encodings.
Remove the macro PSA_ECC_CURVE_BITS which can no longer be implemented.
Change the representation of psa_ecc_curve_t and psa_dh_group_t from
the IETF 16-bit encoding to a custom 24-bit encoding where the upper 8
bits represent a curve family and the lower 16 bits are the key size
in bits. Families are based on naming and mathematical similarity,
with sufficiently precise families that no two curves in a family have
the same bit size (for example SECP-R1 and SECP-R2 are two different
families).
As a consequence, the lower 16 bits of a key type value are always
either the key size or 0.
Internally, use the corresponding function from psa_crypto.c instead.
Externally, this function is not used in Mbed TLS and is documented as
"may change at any time".
Don't rely on the bit size encoded in the PSA curve identifier, in
preparation for removing that.
For some inputs, the error code on EC key creation changes from
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT to PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or vice versa.
There will be further such changes in subsequent commits.
When mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path() checks each object in the supplied path, it only processes regular files. This change makes it also accept a symlink to a file. Fixes#3005.
This was observed to be a problem on Fedora/CentOS/RHEL systems, where the ca-bundle in the default location is actually a symlink.
ssl_decompress_buf() was operating on data from the ssl context, but called at
a point where this data is actually in the rec structure. Call it later so
that the data is back to the ssl structure.
Otherwise these values are recomputed in mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt, which
currently suffers from side channel issues in the computation of QP (see
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055). By loading the pre-computed values not
only is the side channel avoided, but runtime overhead of loading RSA keys
is reduced.
Discussion in https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/347
If Y was constructed through functions in this module, then Y->n == 0
iff Y->p == NULL. However we do not prevent filling mpi structures
manually, and zero may be represented with n=0 and p a valid pointer.
Most of the code can cope with such a representation, but for the
source of mbedtls_mpi_copy, this would cause an integer underflow.
Changing the test for zero from Y->p==NULL to Y->n==0 causes this case
to work at no extra cost.
If psa_mac_finish_internal fails (which can only happen due to bad
parameters or hardware problem), the error code was converted to
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE if the uninitialized stack variable
actual_mac happened to contain the expected MAC. This is a minor bug
but it may be possible to leverage it as part of a longer attack path
in some scenarios.
Reported externally. Found by static analysis.
The library style is to start with the includes corresponding to the
current module and then the rest in alphabetical order. Some modules
have several header files (eg. ssl_internal.h).
The recently added error.h includes did not respect this convention and
this commit restores it. In some cases this is not possible just by
moving the error.h declarations. This commit fixes the pre-existing
order in these instances too.
Now that the Error module has error codes as well and is processed by
the generate_errors script like any other module, we don't need to
include the header manually.
One of the error codes was already reserved, this commit just makes it
explicit. The other one is a new error code for initializing return
values in the library: `MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED` should
not be returned by the library. If it is returned, then it is surely a
bug in the library or somebody is tampering with the device.
One of the error codes was already reserved, this commit just makes it
explicit. The other one is a new error code for initializing return
values in the library: `MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED` should
not be returned by the library. If it is returned, then it is surely a
bug in the library or somebody is tampering with the device.
The functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() and
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() could return 0 if an AES function
failed. This could only happen with alternative AES
implementations (the built-in implementation of the AES functions
involved never fail), typically due to a failure in a hardware
accelerator.
Bug reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer
Lauri, Sectra.
Rename some macros and functions related to signature which are
changing as part of the addition of psa_sign_message and
psa_verify_message.
perl -i -pe '%t = (
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN => PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY => PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE => PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE => PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE,
psa_asymmetric_sign => psa_sign_hash,
psa_asymmetric_verify => psa_verify_hash,
); s/\b(@{[join("|", keys %t)]})\b/$t{$1}/ge' $(git ls-files . ':!:**/crypto_compat.h')
* origin/pr/2854:
Shorter version of mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure
Resolve#2801 - remove repetitive assignment to ssl->in_msg (the first value was never used)
Resolve#2800 - move declaration to avoid unused variable warning in case MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS was undefined
Resolve#2717 - remove erroneous sizeof (the operator was applied to constant integer number)
In the CTR_DRBG module, add selftest data for when
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled.
I generated the test data by running our own code. This is ok because
we have other tests that ensure that the algorithm is implemented
correctly.
This makes programs/self/selftest pass when
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled.
First deal with deleted files.
* Files deleted by us: keep them deleted.
* Files deleted by them, whether modified by us or not: keep our version.
```
git rm $(git status -s | sed -n 's/^DU //p')
git reset -- $(git status -s | sed -n 's/^D //p')
git checkout -- $(git status -s | sed -n 's/^ D //p')
git add -- $(git status -s | sed -n 's/^UD //p')
```
Individual files with conflicts:
* `3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c`: spurious conflict because git mistakenly identified this file as a rename. Keep our version.
* `README.md`: conflict due to their change in a paragraph that doesn't exist in our version. Keep our version of this paragraph.
* `docs/architecture/Makefile`: near-identical additions. Adapt the definition of `all_markdown` and include the clean target.
* `doxygen/input/docs_mainpage.h`: conflict in the version number. Keep our version number.
* `include/mbedtls/config.h`: two delete/modify conflicts. Keep the removed chunks out.
* `library/CMakeLists.txt`: discard all their changes as they are not relevant.
* `library/Makefile`:
* Discard the added chunk about the crypto submodule starting with `INCLUDING_FROM_MBEDTLS:=1`.
* delete/modify: keep the removed chunk out.
* library build: This is almost delete/modify. Their changes are mostly not applicable. Do keep the `libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT): | libmbedcrypto.a` order dependency.
* `.c.o`: `-o` was added on both sides but in a different place. Change to their place.
* `library/error.c`: to be regenerated.
* `library/version_features.c`: to be regenerated.
* `programs/Makefile`: Most of the changes are not relevant. The one relevant change is in the `clean` target for Windows; adapt it by removing `/S` from our version.
* `programs/test/query_config.c`: to be regenerated.
* `scripts/config.py`: added in parallel on both sides. Keep our version.
* `scripts/footprint.sh`: parallel changes. Keep our version.
* `scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl`: one delete/modify conflict. Keep the removed chunks out.
* `tests/Makefile`: discard all of their changes.
* `tests/scripts/all.sh`:
* `pre_initialize_variables` add `append_outcome`: add it.
* `pre_initialize_variables` add `ASAN_CFLAGS`: already there, keep our version.
* `pre_parse_command_line` add `--no-append-outcome`: add it.
* `pre_parse_command_line` add `--outcome-file`: add it.
* `pre_print_configuration`: add `MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE`.
* Several changes in SSL-specific components: keep our version without them.
* Several changes where `config.pl` was changed to `config.py` and there was an adjacent difference: keep our version.
* Changes regarding the inclusion of `MBEDTLS_MEMORY_xxx`: ignore them here, they will be normalized in a subsequent commit.
* `component_test_full_cmake_gcc_asan`: add it without the TLS tests.
* `component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan`: keep the fixed `msg`, discard other changes.
* `component_test_memory_buffer_allocator_backtrace`, `component_test_memory_buffer_allocator`: add them without the TLS tests.
* `component_test_m32_everest`: added in parallel on both sides. Keep our version.
* `tests/scripts/check-names.sh`, `tests/scripts/list-enum-consts.pl`, `tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh`, ``tests/scripts/list-macros.sh`: discard all of their changes.
* `tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl`: the change in the conflict is not relevant, so keep our version there.
* `visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj`: to be regenerated.
Regenerate files:
```
scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl
git add visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj
scripts/generate_errors.pl
git add library/error.c
scripts/generate_features.pl
git add library/version_features.c
scripts/generate_query_config.pl
git add programs/test/query_config.c
```
Rejected changes in non-conflicting files:
* `CMakeLists.txt`: discard their addition which has already been side-ported.
* `doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile`: keep the version number change. Discard the changes related to `../crypto` paths.
Keep the following changes after examination:
* `.travis.yml`: all of their changes are relevant.
* `include/mbedtls/error.h`: do keep their changes. Even though Crypto doesn't use TLS errors, it must not encroach on TLS's allocated numbers.
* `tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py`: keep the code dealing with `ssl-opt.sh`. It works correctly when the file is not present.
Using 4096 bytes of stack for the temporary buffer used for holding a
throw-away DER-formatted CSR limits the portability of generating
certificate signing requests to only devices with lots of stack space.
To increase portability, use the mbedtls_pem_write_buffer() in-place
capability instead, using the same buffer for input and output. This
works since the DER encoding for some given data is always smaller than
that same data PEM-encoded.
PEM format is desirable to use even on stack-constrained devices as the
format is easy to work with (for example, copy-pasting from a tiny
device's serial console output, for CSRs generated on tiny devices
without the private key leaving said tiny device).
mbedtls_pk_sign does not take the size of its output buffer as a
parameter. We guarantee that MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is enough.
For RSA and ECDSA signatures made in software, this is ensured by the
way MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is defined at compile time. For
signatures made through RSA-alt and PSA, this is not guaranteed
robustly at compile time, but we can test it at runtime, so do that.
This issue has been reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai,
Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and
Dave Tian (Purdue University).
In AES encrypt and decrypt some variables were left on the stack. The value
of these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best
practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like
Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function.
When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private
value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written
as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak
about 1 bit of information on average, and could cause the value to be
1 byte too large for the output buffer.
In the case of *ret we might need to preserve a 0 value throughout the
loop and therefore we need an extra condition to protect it from being
overwritten.
The value of done is always 1 after *ret has been set and does not need
to be protected from overwriting. Therefore in this case the extra
condition can be removed.
The code relied on the assumptions that CHAR_BIT is 8 and that unsigned
does not have padding bits.
In the Bignum module we already assume that the sign of an MPI is either
-1 or 1. Using this, we eliminate the above mentioned dependency.
The signature of mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi_ct() meant to support using it in
place of mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(). This meant full comparison functionality
and a signed result.
To make the function more universal and friendly to constant time
coding, we change the result type to unsigned. Theoretically, we could
encode the comparison result in an unsigned value, but it would be less
intuitive.
Therefore we won't be able to represent the result as unsigned anymore
and the functionality will be constrained to checking if the first
operand is less than the second. This is sufficient to support the
current use case and to check any relationship between MPIs.
The only drawback is that we need to call the function twice when
checking for equality, but this can be optimised later if an when it is
needed.
Multiplication is known to have measurable timing variations based on
the operands. For example it typically is much faster if one of the
operands is zero. Remove them from constant time code.
1. variable name accoriding to the Mbed TLS coding style;
2. add a comment explaining safety of the optimization;
3. safer T2 initialization and memory zeroing on the function exit;
Record checking fails if mbedtls_ssl_check_record() is called with
external buffer. Received record sequence number is available in the
incoming record but it is not available in the ssl contexts `in_ctr`-
variable that is used when decoding the sequence number.
To fix the problem, temporarily update ssl context `in_ctr` to
point to the received record header and restore value later.
We want to explicitly disallow creating new transactions when a
transaction is already in progress. However, we were incorrectly
checking for the existence of the injected entropy file before
continuing with creating a transaction. This meant we could have a
transaction already in progress and would be able to still create a new
transaction. It also meant we couldn't start a new transaction if any
entropy had been injected. Check the transaction file instead of the
injected entropy file in order to prevent multiple concurrent
transactions.
Change the default entropy nonce length to be nonzero in some cases.
Specifically, the default nonce length is now set in such a way that
the entropy input during the initial seeding always contains enough
entropy to achieve the maximum possible security strength per
NIST SP 800-90A given the key size and entropy length.
If MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is kept to its default value,
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() now grabs extra entropy for a nonce if
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled and either
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C is
disabled. If MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled, or if
the entropy module uses SHA-512, then the default value of
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN does not require a second call to the
entropy function to achieve the maximum security strength.
This choice of default nonce size guarantees NIST compliance with the
maximum security strength while keeping backward compatibility and
performance high: in configurations that do not require grabbing more
entropy, the code will not grab more entropy than before.
Add a new function mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() which configures
the DRBG instance to call f_entropy a second time during the initial
seeding to grab a nonce.
The default nonce length is 0, so there is no behavior change unless
the user calls the new function.
Add a new function mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() which configures
the DRBG instance to call f_entropy a second time during the initial
seeding to grab a nonce.
The default nonce length is 0, so there is no behavior change unless
the user calls the new function.
The blinding applied to the scalar before modular inversion is
inadequate. Bignum is not constant time/constant trace, side channel
attacks can retrieve the blinded value, factor it (it is smaller than
RSA keys and not guaranteed to have only large prime factors). Then the
key can be recovered by brute force.
Reducing the blinded value makes factoring useless because the adversary
can only recover pk*t+z*N instead of pk*t.
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
This removes the need for the test-only function
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(). Just call
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() followed by
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), it works now.
Move the definitions of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len() and
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to after they are used. This makes the code
easier to read and to maintain.
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
Fix a signed int overflow in mbedtls_asn1_get_int() for numbers
between INT_MAX+1 and UINT_MAX (typically 0x80000000..0xffffffff).
This was undefined behavior which in practice would typically have
resulted in an incorrect value, but which may plausibly also have
caused the postcondition (*p == initial<*p> + len) to be violated.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
mbedtls_entropy_func returns up to MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes.
This is the output of a hash function and does not indicate how many
bytes of entropy went into the hash computation.
Enforce that mbedtls_entropy_func gathers a total of
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes or more from strong sources. Weak
sources don't count for this calculation. This is complementary to the
per-source threshold mechanism.
In particular, we define system sources with a threshold of 32. But
when using SHA-512 for the entropy accumulator,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE = 64, so users can expect 64 bytes' worth
of entropy. Before, you only got 64 bytes of entropy if there were two
sources. Now you get 64 bytes of entropy even with a single source
with a threshold of 32.
This caused problems when running multiple jobs at once, since
there was no target matching libmbedcrypto.so with the path
prefix. It only worked if it was built first, since such file was found.
Additionally, building of libmbedcrypto.so now waits for the static .a version.
Previously, recipes for both libmbedcrypto.a and libmbedcrypto.so could run
independently when running parallel jobs, which resulted in the .o files
being built twice. It could sometimes be a problem, since linking would start
when building one of the object files was still in progress (the previous one
existed). This in turn resulted in reading (and trying to link) a malformed file.
The "|" character is followed by "order-only-prerequisites", and in this case,
makes linking of the shared version of the library wait for the .a file.
Since it's guaranteed to be always built in the "all" target, it's fine to do that.
All of the .o files are only built once thanks to this change.
Add a parameter to the p_validate_slot_number method to allow the
driver to modify the persistent data.
With the current structure of the core, the persistent data is already
updated. All it took was adding a way to modify it.
When registering a key in a secure element, go through the transaction
mechanism. This makes the code simpler, at the expense of a few extra
storage operations. Given that registering a key is typically very
rare over the lifetime of a device, this is an acceptable loss.
Drivers must now have a p_validate_slot_number method, otherwise
registering a key is not possible. This reduces the risk that due to a
mistake during the integration of a device, an application might claim
a slot in a way that is not supported by the driver.
In ssl_parse_hello_verify_request, we read 3 bytes (version and cookie
length) without checking that there are that many bytes left in
ssl->in_msg. This could potentially read from memory outside of the
ssl->receive buffer (which would be a remotely exploitable
crash).
In ssl_parse_hello_verify_request, we print cookie_len bytes without
checking that there are that many bytes left in ssl->in_msg. This
could potentially log data outside the received message (not a big
deal) and could potentially read from memory outside of the receive
buffer (which would be a remotely exploitable crash).
If none of the inputs to a key derivation is a
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET passed with
psa_key_derivation_input_key(), forbid
psa_key_derivation_output_key(). It usually doesn't make sense to
derive a key object if the secret isn't itself a proper key.
Allow a direct input as the SECRET input step in a key derivation, in
addition to allowing DERIVE keys. This makes it easier for
applications to run a key derivation where the "secret" input is
obtained from somewhere else. This makes it possible for the "secret"
input to be empty (keys cannot be empty), which some protocols do (for
example the IV derivation in EAP-TLS).
Conversely, allow a RAW_DATA key as the INFO/LABEL/SALT/SEED input to a key
derivation, in addition to allowing direct inputs. This doesn't
improve security, but removes a step when a personalization parameter
is stored in the key store, and allows this personalization parameter
to remain opaque.
Add test cases that explore step/key-type-and-keyhood combinations.
In TLS, the master secret is always a key. But EAP-TLS uses the TLS
PRF to derive an IV with an empty string for the "secret" input. The
code always stored the secret into a key slot before calling the TLS
PRF, but this doesn't work when the secret is empty, since PSA Crypto
no longer supports empty keys. Add a special case for an empty secret.
