If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
Inspired by test code provided by Nicholas Wilson in PR #351.
The test will fail if someone sets MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to a value larger than
18 (default is 8), which is hopefully unlikely and can easily be fixed by
running long.sh again with a larger value if it ever happens.
Current behaviour is suboptimal as flags are not set, but currently the goal
is only to document/test existing behaviour.
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
The previous version of `mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp` did not qualify the
pointers to the arrays to be compared as volatile, theoretically
opening the possibility for the compiler to notice that the loop
operation `diff |= A[i] ^ B[i]` is pointless if `diff = -1`. This
commit changes this. It also declares the stack variable `diff` as
volatile, to force read and write in every loop; omitting that, the
compiler would still be allowed to get away with reading `A[i]` and
`B[i]` but not doing the XOR and not updating `diff`.
This patch modifies the function mbedtls_gcm_self_test() function to
ensure that AES-GCM-192 tests are only run if the key size is supported
by the available implementation. This is useful when using
MBEDTLS_AES_ALT as some hardware crypto accelerators might not support
AES-192.
This patch modifies the function mbedtls_aes_selftest() function to
ensure that AES-192 tests are only run if the key size is supported by
the available implementation. This is useful when using MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
as some hardware crypto accelerators might not support AES-192.
* restricted/iotssl-1398:
Add ChangeLog entry
Ensure application data records are not kept when fully processed
Add hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer
Fix mbedtls_ssl_read
Simplify retaining of messages for future processing
This commit fixes the following case: If a client is both expecting a
SERVER_HELLO and has an application data record that's partially
processed in flight (that's the situation the client gets into after
receiving a ServerHelloRequest followed by ApplicationData), a
subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_read will set keep_current_message = 1
when seeing the unexpected application data, but not reset it to 0
after the application data has been processed. This commit fixes this.
It also documents and suggests how the problem might be solved in a
more structural way on the long run.