This commit finishes the removal of support for direct access to key
slots in psa_crypto.c.
This marks the end of the necessary phase of the transition to key
handles. The code should subsequently be refactored to move key slot
management from psa_crypto.c to psa_crypto_slot_management.c.
Switch from the direct use of slot numbers to handles allocated by
psa_allocate_key.
The general principle for each function is:
* Change `psa_key_slot_t slot` to `psa_key_handle_t handle` or
`psa_key_id_t key_id` depending on whether it's used as a handle to
an open slot or as a persistent name for a key.
* Call psa_create_key() before using a slot, instead of calling
psa_set_key_lifetime to make a slot persistent.
Remove the unit test persistent_key_is_configurable which is no longer
relevant.
Switch from the direct use of slot numbers to handles allocated by
psa_allocate_key.
This commit does not affect persistent key tests except for the one
test function in test_suite_psa_crypto that uses persistent keys
(persistent_key_load_key_from_storage).
The general principle for each function is:
* Change `psa_key_slot_t slot` to `psa_key_handle_t handle`.
* Call psa_allocate_key() before setting the policy of the slot,
or before creating key material in functions that don't set a policy.
* Some PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT errors become PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
because there is now a distinction between not having a valid
handle, and having a valid handle to a slot that doesn't contain key
material.
* In tests that use symmetric keys, calculate the max_bits parameters
of psa_allocate_key() from the key data size. In tests where the key
may be asymmetric, call an auxiliary macro KEY_BITS_FROM_DATA which
returns an overapproximation. There's no good way to find a good
value for max_bits with the API, I think the API should be tweaked.
Implement psa_allocate_key, psa_open_key, psa_create_key,
psa_close_key.
Add support for keys designated to handles to psa_get_key_slot, and
thereby to the whole API.
Allocated and non-allocated keys can coexist. This is a temporary
stage in order to transition from the use of direct slot numbers to
allocated handles only. Once all the tests and sample programs have
been migrated to use handles, the implementation will be simplified
and made more robust with support for handles only.
Previously, one could change the definition of AES_VALIDATE_RET() to return
some other code than MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, and the test suite
wouldn't notice. Now this modification would make the suite fail as expected.
The test framework for validation of parameters depends on the macro
MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() being set to its default value when building the
library. So far the test framework attempted to define this macro but this was
the wrong place - this definition wouldn't be picked by the library.
Instead, a different approach is taken: skip those tests when the macro is
defined in config.h, as in that case we have no way to know if it will indeed
end up calling mbedtls_param_failed() as we need it to.
This commit was tested by manually ensuring that aes_invalid_params:
- passes (and is not skipped) in the default configuration
- is skipped when MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() is defined in config.h
The previous prototype gave warnings are the strings produced by #cond and
__FILE__ are const, so we shouldn't implicitly cast them to non-const.
While at it modifying most example programs:
- include the header that has the function declaration, so that the definition
can be checked to match by the compiler
- fix whitespace
- make it work even if PLATFORM_C is not defined:
- CHECK_PARAMS is not documented as depending on PLATFORM_C and there is
no reason why it should
- so, remove the corresponding #if defined in each program...
- and add missing #defines for mbedtls_exit when needed
The result has been tested (make all test with -Werror) with the following
configurations:
- full with CHECK_PARAMS with PLATFORM_C
- full with CHECK_PARAMS without PLATFORM_C
- full without CHECK_PARAMS without PLATFORM_C
- full without CHECK_PARAMS with PLATFORM_C
Additionally, it has been manually tested that adding
mbedtls_aes_init( NULL );
near the normal call to mbedtls_aes_init() in programs/aes/aescrypt2.c has the
expected effect when running the program.
It was inconsistent between files: sometimes 3 arguments, sometimes one.
Align to 1 argument for the macro and 3 for the function, because:
- we don't need 3 arguments for the macro, it can add __FILE__ and __LINE__
in its expansion, while the function needs them as parameters to be correct;
- people who re-defined the macro should have flexibility, and 3 arguments
can give the impression they they don't have as much as they actually do;
- the design document has the macro with 1 argument, so let's stick to that.
Change the use of setjmp and longjmp in signalling parameter validation failures
when using the MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS config.h option. This change allows
all calls which might result in a call to the parameter validation failure
handler to always be caught, even without use of the new macros, by placing a
setjmp() in the outer function which calls the test function, which the handler
can jump to.
This has several benefits:
* it allows us to remove the clang compiler warning (-Wclobbered) caused
by local auto variables being in the same function as the call to setjmp.
* removes the need to wrap all function calls in the test functions with the
TEST_ASSERT() macro. Now all parameter validation function calls should be
caught.
The tests for the ECDH key exchange that use the context accessed it
directly. This can't work with the new context, where we can't make any
assumptions about the implementation of the context. This commit works
around this problem and comes with the cost of allocating an extra
structures on the stack when executing the test.
One of the tests is testing an older interface for the sake of backward
compatibility. The new ECDH context is not backward compatible and this
test doesn't make any sense for it, therefore we skip this test in
non-legacy mode.
Programs must not include mbedtls/platform.h if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is
not defined. Test suites don't need to include mbedtls/platform.h
because helpers.function takes care of it.
This commit also removes a stray `;` which is technically not standard C.
The recently added `mbedtls_ecdh_setup()` function is not used in the
tests yet. This commit adapts the tests to the new workflow.
Having done that, the old lifecycle is not tested anymore, so we add a
new test to ensure backward compatibility.
Add missing compilation guards that broke the build if either GCM or
CCM was not defined.
Add missing guards on test cases that require GCM or CBC.
The build and tests now pass for any subset of {MBEDTLS_CCM_C,
MBEDTLS_GCM_C}. There are still unused variables warnings if neither
is defined.
Since the AD too long is a limitation on Mbed TLS,
HW accelerators may support this. Run the test for AD too long,
only if `MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT` is not defined.
Addresses comment in #1996.
Write an all-bits-zero NV seed file for the tests. Without this, if
the seed file is not present when this test suite is executed, the
PSA module initialization will fail, causing most test cases to fail.
Also write an all-bits-zero NV seed file at the end. The test cases in
this test suite mess with the file, but subsequent test suites may
need it.
When testing with custom entropy sources, if MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
is enabled at compile time but the NV seed source is not used at
runtime, mbedtls_entropy_func makes a second pass anyway. Cope with
this in the test code by telling the entropy module not to make this
second pass.
Add a function to configure entropy sources. For testing only.
Use it to test that the library initialization fails properly if there is no
entropy source.
It's better for names in the API to describe the "what" (opaque keys) rather
than the "how" (using PSA), at least since we don't intend to have multiple
function doing the same "what" in different ways in the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately the can_do wrapper does not receive the key context as an
argument, so it cannot check psa_get_key_information(). Later we might want to
change our internal structures to fix this, but for now we'll just restrict
opaque PSA keys to be ECDSA keypairs, as this is the only thing we need for
now. It also simplifies testing a bit (no need to test each key type).
While at it, clarify who's responsible for destroying the underlying key. That
can't be us because some keys cannot be destroyed and we wouldn't know. So
let's leave that up to the caller.
The test suites `test_suite_gcm.aes{128,192,256}_en.data` contains
numerous NIST test vectors for AES-*-GCM against which the GCM
API mbedtls_gcm_xxx() is tested.
However, one level higher at the cipher API, no tests exist which
exercise mbedtls_cipher_auth_{encrypt/decrypt}() for GCM ciphers,
although test_suite_cipher.function contains the test auth_crypt_tv
which does precisely that and is already used e.g. in
test_suite_cipher.ccm.
This commit replicates the test vectors from
test_suite_gcm.aes{128,192,256}_en.data in test_suite_cipher.gcm.data
and adds a run of auth_crypt_tv for each of them.
The conversion was mainly done through the sed command line
```
s/gcm_decrypt_and_verify:\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):
\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\)/auth_crypt_tv:
\1:\2:\4:\5:\3:\7:\8:\9/
```
Allow mbedtls_psa_crypto_free to be called twice, or without a prior
call to psa_crypto_init. Keep track of the initialization state more
precisely in psa_crypto_init so that mbedtls_psa_crypto_free knows
what to do.
It's better for names in the API to describe the "what" (opaque keys) rather
than the "how" (using PSA), at least since we don't intend to have multiple
function doing the same "what" in different ways in the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately the can_do wrapper does not receive the key context as an
argument, so it cannot check psa_get_key_information(). Later we might want to
change our internal structures to fix this, but for now we'll just restrict
opaque PSA keys to be ECDSA keypairs, as this is the only thing we need for
now. It also simplifies testing a bit (no need to test each key type).
While at it, clarify who's responsible for destroying the underlying key. That
can't be us because some keys cannot be destroyed and we wouldn't know. So
let's leave that up to the caller.
Allow use of persistent keys, including configuring them, importing and
exporting them, and destroying them.
When getting a slot using psa_get_key_slot, there are 3 scenarios that
can occur if the keys lifetime is persistent:
1. Key type is PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, no persistent storage entry:
- The key slot is treated as a standard empty key slot
2. Key type is PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, persistent storage entry exists:
- Attempt to load the key from persistent storage
3. Key type is not PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:
- As checking persistent storage on every use of the key could
be expensive, the persistent key is assumed to be saved in
persistent storage, the in-memory key is continued to be used.
Add new functions, psa_load_persistent_key(),
psa_free_persistent_key_data(), and psa_save_persistent_key(), for
managing persistent keys. These functions load to or save from our
internal representation of key slots. Serialization is a concern of the
storage backend implementation and doesn't abstraction-leak into the
lifetime management code.
An initial implementation for files is provided. Additional storage
backends can implement this interface for other storage types.
Mbed TLS version 2.14.0
Resolved conflicts in include/mbedtls/config.h,
tests/scripts/check-files.py, and yotta/create-module.sh by removing yotta.
Resolved conflicts in tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile by continuing to run
mbedtls-psa job.
There was no test case of ECDH with anything other than
PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW. Exercise the code path from ECDH through a
"proper" KDF.
ECDH shared secret copied from an existing test, HKDF output
calculated with Cryptodome.
In ECDH key agreement, allow a public key with the OID id-ECDH, not
just a public key with the OID id-ecPublicKey.
Public keys with the OID id-ECDH are not permitted by psa_import_key,
at least for now. There would be no way to use the key for a key
agreement operation anyway in the current API.
Add test cases that do key agreement with raw selection in pieces, to
validate that selection works even when the application doesn't read
everything in one chunk.
A key selection algorithm is similar to a key derivation algorithm in
that it takes a secret input and produces a secret output stream.
However, unlike key derivation algorithms, there is no expectation
that the input cannot be reconstructed from the output. Key selection
algorithms are exclusively meant to be used on the output of a key
agreement algorithm to select chunks of the shared secret.
On key import and key generation, for RSA, reject key sizes that are
not a multiple of 8. Such keys are not well-supported in Mbed TLS and
are hardly ever used in practice.
The previous commit removed support for non-byte-aligned keys at the
PSA level. This commit actively rejects such keys and adds
corresponding tests (test keys generated with "openssl genrsa").
We had only allocated 40 bytes for printing into, but we wanted to print 46
bytes. Update the buffer to be 47 bytes, which is large enough to hold what
we want to print plus a terminating null byte.
Simplify the test case "PSA export a slot after a failed import of an
EC keypair": use an invalid private value for the specified curve. Now
the dependencies match the test data, so this fixes curves.pl.
Update some test data from the asymmetric_apis_coverage branch that
wasn't updated to the new format from the
psa-asymmetric-format-raw_private_key branch.
1. New test for testing bad order of hash function calls.
2. Removed test hash_update_bad_paths since it's test scenario
was moved to the new test.
3. Moved some scenarios from test hash_verify_bad_paths to
the new test.
1. Rename hash_bad_paths to hash_verify_bad_paths
2. Add test hash_update_bad_paths
3. Add test hash_finish_bad_paths
The different scenarios tested as part of hash_bad_paths are
moved to the relevant test.
This commit introduces variants test-ca_utf8.crt,
test-ca_printablestring.crt and test-ca_uppercase.crt
of tests/data_files/test-ca.crt which differ from
test-ca.crt in their choice of string encoding and
upper and lower case letters in the DN field. These
changes should be immaterial to the recovation check,
and three tests are added that crl.pem, which applies
to test-ca.crt, is also considered as applying to
test-ca_*.crt.
The test files were generated using PR #1641 which
- adds a build instruction for test-ca.crt to
tests/data_files/Makefile which allows easy
change of the subject DN.
- changes the default string format from `PrintableString`
to `UTF8String`.
Specifically:
- `test-ca_utf8.crt` was generated by running
`rm test-ca.crt && make test-ca.crt`
on PR #1641.
- `test-ca_uppercase.crt`, too, was generated by running
`rm test-ca.crt && make test-ca.crt`
on PR #1641, after modifying the subject DN line in the build
instruction for `test-ca.crt` in `tests/data_files/Makefile`.
- `test-ca_printable.crt` is a copy of `test-ca.crt`
because at the time of this commit, `PrintableString` is
still the default string format.
This commit introduces variants test-ca_utf8.crt,
test-ca_printablestring.crt and test-ca_uppercase.crt
of tests/data_files/test-ca.crt which differ from
test-ca.crt in their choice of string encoding and
upper and lower case letters in the DN field. These
changes should be immaterial to the recovation check,
and three tests are added that crl.pem, which applies
to test-ca.crt, is also considered as applying to
test-ca_*.crt.
streamline the API for the test test_derive_invalid_generator_state: by removing
the key_data parameter.
This parameter is not important for test flow and can be hard-coded.
Add boundary test cases for private key validity for a short
Weierstrass curve (0 < d < n).
Remove obsolete test cases "valid key but wrong curve". With the new
format, the private key representation does not contain an encoding of
the curve.
In preparation for the import/export format change for private
elliptic curve keys from RFC 5915 to the raw secret value,
remove ASN.1-based sanity checks. For the raw secret value, most byte
strings of the correct length are valid (the details depend on the
curve), so as a sanity check, just check the length.
In preparation for the import/export format change for private
elliptic curve keys from RFC 5915 to the raw secret value, transform the
test data to the new format.
Tests will not pass until the implementation has been changed to the
new format and some test cases and test functions have been adjusted.
I used the script below to look for lines containing a
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR and change the first hex string in the
line with an ASN.1 header that looks like the beginning of an RFC 5915
ECPrivateKey. This always happens to be a private key input.
perl -a -F: -i -pe 'sub pad { local ($_) = @_; s/^00// if length == $digits + 2; die if length > $digits; sprintf("\"%0${digits}s\"", $_) } if ($F[0] !~ /\W/ && /:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR\( *PSA_ECC_CURVE_[A-Z_]+([0-9]+)/) {$digits = int(($1+7)/8)*2; s/"30(?:[0-7].|81..|82....)02010104(..)([0-9a-f]+)"/pad(substr($2, 0, hex($1)*2))/ie}' tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
In the test function for export_public_key, don't just check the
length of the result. Compare the actual result to the expected
result.
Take an extra argument that allows using an export buffer that's
larger or smaller than needed. Zero is the size given by
PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE.
Don't check the output of psa_get_key_information. That's useful in
import_export because it tests both import and export, but not in
import_export_public_key whose goal is only to test public key export.
This commit adjusts the existing test data but does not add new test
cases.
Key derivation test now uses an indirect way to test generator validity
as the direct way previously used isn't compatible with the PSA IPC
implementation. Additional bad path test for the generator added
to check basic bad-path scenarios.
Add comments noting that the maximum length of a MAC must fit in
PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. Add a unit test that verifies that the
maximum MAC size fits.
Extend the mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_det test to check that it reports
the number as prime when testing rounds-1 rounds, then reports the
number as composite when testing the full number of rounds.
When using a primality testing function the tolerable error rate depends
on the scheme in question, the required security strength and wether it
is used for key generation or parameter validation. To support all use
cases we need more flexibility than what the old API provides.
Primality tests have to deal with different distribution when generating
primes and when validating primes.
These new tests are testing if mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() is working
properly in the latter setting.
The new tests involve pseudoprimes with maximum number of
non-witnesses. The non-witnesses were generated by printing them
from mpi_miller_rabin(). The pseudoprimes were generated by the
following function:
void gen_monier( mbedtls_mpi* res, int nbits )
{
mbedtls_mpi p_2x_plus_1, p_4x_plus_1, x, tmp;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &p_2x_plus_1 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &p_4x_plus_1 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &x ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &tmp );
do
{
mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &p_2x_plus_1, nbits >> 1, 0,
rnd_std_rand, NULL );
mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &x, &p_2x_plus_1, 1 );
mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &x, &tmp, &x, 2 );
if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &x, 0 ) == 0 )
continue;
mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &p_4x_plus_1, &x, 4 );
mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &p_4x_plus_1, &p_4x_plus_1, 1 );
if( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( &p_4x_plus_1, rnd_std_rand,
NULL ) == 0 )
break;
} while( 1 );
mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( res, &p_2x_plus_1, &p_4x_plus_1 );
}
Pass the nonce first, then the AD, then the input. This is the order
in which the data is processed and it's the order of the parameters to
the API functions.
Functional tests for various payload sizes and output buffer sizes.
When the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large for the output
buffer, verify that function writes some outputs. This doesn't
validate that the implementation is time-constant, but it at least
validates that it doesn't just return early without outputting anything.
Add signing tests with 528-bit and 520-bit RSA keys with SHA-512. These
selections of key and hash size should lead to an error returned, as
there is not enough room for our chosen minimum salt size of two bytes
less than the hash size. These test the boundary around an available
salt length of 0 or -1 bytes.
The RSA keys were generated with OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre8.
$ openssl genrsa 520
Generating RSA private key, 520 bit long modulus (2 primes)
.............++++++++++++
.................++++++++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBPwIBAAJCANWgb4bludh0KFQBZcqWb6iJOmLipZ0L/XYXeAuwOfkWWjc6jhGd
B2b43lVnEPM/ZwGRU7rYIjd155fUUdSCBvO/AgMBAAECQgDOMq+zy6XZEjWi8D5q
j05zpRGgRRiKP/qEtB6BWbZ7gUV9DDgZhD4FFsqfanwjWNG52LkM9D1OQmUOtGGq
a9COwQIhD+6l9iIPrCkblQjsK6jtKB6zmu5NXcaTJUEGgW68cA7PAiENaJGHhcOq
/jHqqi2NgVbc5kWUD/dzSkVzN6Ub0AvIiBECIQIeL2Gw1XSFYm1Fal/DbQNQUX/e
/dnhc94X7s118wbScQIhAMPVgbDc//VurZ+155vYc9PjZlYe3QIAwlkLX3HYKkGx
AiEND8ndKyhkc8jLGlh8aRP8r03zpDIiZNKqCKiijMWVRYQ=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
$ openssl genrsa 528
Generating RSA private key, 528 bit long modulus (2 primes)
.........++++++++++++
....++++++++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBQgIBAAJDAKJVTrpxW/ZuXs3z1tcY4+XZB+hmbnv1p2tBUQbgTrgn7EyyGZz/
ZkkdRUGQggWapbVLDPXu9EQ0AvMEfAsObwJQgQIDAQABAkJhHVXvFjglElxnK7Rg
lERq0k73yqfYQts4wCegTHrrkv3HzqWQVVi29mGLSXTqoQ45gzWZ5Ru5NKjkTjko
YtWWIVECIgDScqoo7SCFrG3zwFxnGe7V3rYYr6LkykpvczC0MK1IZy0CIgDFeINr
qycUXbndZvF0cLYtSmEA+MoN7fRX7jY5w7lZYyUCIUxyiOurEDhe5eY5B5gQbJlW
ePHIw7S244lO3+9lC12U1QIhWgzQ8YKFObZcEejl5xGXIiQvBEBv89Y1fPu2YrUs
iuS5AiFE64NJs8iI+zZxp72esKHPXq/chJ1BvhHsXI0y1OBK8m8=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Since we wish to generate RSASSA-PSS signatures even when hashes are
relatively large for the chosen RSA key size, we need some tests. Our
main focus will be on 1024-bit keys and the couple key sizes larger than
it. For example, we test for a signature generated using a salt length
of 63 when a 1032-bit key is used. Other tests check the boundary
conditions around other key sizes. We want to make sure we don't use a
salt length larger than the hash length (because FIPS 186-4 requires
this). We also want to make sure we don't use a salt that is too small
(no smaller than 2 bytes away from the hash length).
Test RSASSA-PSS signatures with:
- 1024-bit key and SHA-512 (slen 62)
- 1032-bit key and SHA-512 (slen 63)
- 1040-bit key and SHA-512 (slen 64)
- 1048-bit key and SHA-512 (slen 64)
The tests also verify that we can properly verify the RSASSA-PSS
signatures we've generated.
We've manually verified that OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre8 can verify the
RSASSA-PSS signatures we've generated.
$ openssl rsa -in rsa1024.pem -pubout -out pub1024.pem
writing RSA key
$ openssl rsa -in rsa1032.pem -pubout -out pub1032.pem
writing RSA key
$ openssl rsa -in rsa1040.pem -pubout -out pub1040.pem
writing RSA key
$ openssl rsa -in rsa1048.pem -pubout -out pub1048.pem
writing RSA key
$ cat message.bin | openssl dgst -sha512 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:62 -verify pub1024.pem -signature valid1024.bin
Verified OK
$ cat message.bin | openssl dgst -sha512 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:63 -verify pub1032.pem -signature valid1032.bin
Verified OK
$ cat message.bin | openssl dgst -sha512 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:64 -verify pub1040.pem -signature valid1040.bin
Verified OK
$ cat message.bin | openssl dgst -sha512 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:64 -verify pub1048.pem -signature valid1048.bin
Verified OK
We've also added a new test that ensures we can properly validate a
RSASSA-PSS 1032-bit signature with SHA-512 generated by OpenSSL. This
has been added as the "RSASSA-PSS Verify OpenSSL-generated Signature
1032-bit w/SHA-512" test. The signature to verify was generated with the
following command line.
$ cat message.bin | openssl dgst -sha512 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:63 -sign rsa1032.pem > valid.bin
The RSA private keys used by these tests were generated with OpenSSL
1.1.1-pre8.
$ openssl genrsa 1024
Generating RSA private key, 1024 bit long modulus (2 primes)
........................................++++++
......++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
$ openssl genrsa 1032
Generating RSA private key, 1032 bit long modulus (2 primes)
....................++++++
.................................++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
$ openssl genkey 1040
Generating RSA private key, 1040 bit long modulus
........++++++
........++++++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
$ openssl genrsa 1048
Generating RSA private key, 1048 bit long modulus (2 primes)
...............................++++++
.++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
It should be valid to RSASSA-PSS sign a SHA-512 hash with a 1024-bit or
1032-bit RSA key, but with the salt size being always equal to the hash
size, this isn't possible: the key is too small.
To enable use of hashes that are relatively large compared to the key
size, allow reducing the salt size to no less than the hash size minus 2
bytes. We don't allow salt sizes smaller than the hash size minus 2
bytes because that too significantly changes the security guarantees the
library provides compared to the previous implementation which always
used a salt size equal to the hash size. The new calculated salt size
remains compliant with FIPS 186-4.
We also need to update the "hash too large" test, since we now reduce
the salt size when certain key sizes are used. We used to not support
1024-bit keys with SHA-512, but now we support this by reducing the salt
size to 62. Update the "hash too large" test to use a 1016-bit RSA key
with SHA-512, which still has too large of a hash because we will not
reduce the salt size further than 2 bytes shorter than the hash size.
The RSA private key used for the test was generated using "openssl
genrsa 1016" using OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre8.
$ openssl genrsa 1016
Generating RSA private key, 1016 bit long modulus (2 primes)
..............++++++
....++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
This commit fixes some missing size comparison. In
aead_encrypt_decrypt, aead_encrypt and aead_decrypt, the test code
would not have noticed if the library function had reported an output
length that was not the expected length.
ASSERT_COMPARE tests that the two buffers have the same size and
content. The intended use is to replace TEST_ASSERT( size1 == size2 )
followed by memcmp on the content. Keep using memcmp when comparing
two buffers that have the same size by construction.
This commit resolves a bug whereby some test cases failed on systems
where mbedtls_calloc returns NULL when the size of 0, because the test
case asserted `pointer != NULL` regardless of the size.
The new macro ASSERT_ALLOC allocates memory with mbedtls_calloc and
fails the test if the allocation fails. It outputs a null pointer if
the requested size is 0. It is meant to replace existing calls to
mbedtls_calloc.
Setting the dh_flag to 1 used to indicate that the caller requests safe
primes from mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime. We generalize the functionality to
make room for more flags in that parameter.
If some algorithms are excluded in the build, it's ok for the corresponding
macros not to give the correct results. Therefore the corresponding test cases
should depend on the implementation of the algorithm. For example, it's ok for
PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE to be less than PSA_HASH_SIZE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) if we build
without SHA-512 support, and we indeed do this. It's even ok for an
implementation to return 0 for PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) if it doesn't
support SHA-512; we return 1 anyway but the tests are less
implementation-specific if we don't enforce it.
This commit adds dependencies on symbols that don't exist in Mbed TLS,
for algorithms that Mbed TLS doesn't implement. These are:
MBEDTLS_SHA512_256 for SHA-512/256, MBEDTLS_SHA3_C for SHA-3,
MBEDTLS_DSA_C and MBEDTLS_DSA_DETERMINISTIC for DSA, and
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED for elliptic curves that have a PSA
encoding but are not supported in Mbed TLS.
For all key types, validate feature test macros (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_xxx).
For asymmetric keys (public key or key pair), validate the
corresponding public/pair type.
For ECC keys, validate GET_CURVE.
For all algorithms, validate feature test macros (PSA_ALG_IS_xxx).
For hash algorithms, validate the exact hash size, and validate
xxx_GET_HASH macros on dependent algorithms.
For MAC algorithms, validate the MAC size. For AEAD algorithms,
validate the tag size.
There is a separate test case for each HMAC algorithm, which is
necessary because each has its own MAC size. For other hash-dependent
algorithms, there is no interesting variation to test here, so only
one hash gets tested.
OFB and CFB are streaming modes. XTS is a not a cipher mode but it
doesn't use a separate padding step. This leaves only CBC as a block
cipher mode that needs a padding step.
Since CBC is the only mode that uses a separate padding step, and is
likely to remain the only mode in the future, encode the padding mode
directly in the algorithm constant, rather than building up an
algorithm value from a chaining mode and a padding mode. This greatly
simplifies the interface as well as some parts of the implementation.
