* mbedtls-1.3:
Add ChangeLog entry for previous commit
cert_write : fix "Destination buffer is too small" error
Add ChangeLog entry for previous two commits
Test certificate "Server1 SHA1, key_usage" reissued.
Fix boolean values according to DER specs
Fix typo in an OID name
Disable reportedly broken assembly of Sparc(64)
ECHDE-PSK does not use a certificate
Actually ignore most non-fatal alerts
This commit fixes the `Destination buffer is too small` error returned
by `mbedtls_cert_write` command when the values of `subject_name` or
`issuer_name` parameters exceed 128 characters.
I have increased the size of these varaibles from 128 to 256 characters,
but I don't know if it's the best way to solve this issue...
Fixes#315.
In BER encoding, any boolean with a non-zero value is considered as
TRUE. However, DER encoding require a value of 255 (0xFF) for TRUE.
This commit makes `mbedtls_asn1_write_bool` function uses `255` instead
of `1` for BOOLEAN values.
With this fix, boolean values are now reconized by OS X keychain (tested
on OS X 10.11).
Fixes#318.
Not a security issue as here we know the buffer is large enough (unless
something else if badly wrong in the code), and the value cast to int is less
than 2^16 (again, unless issues elsewhere).
Still changing to a more correct check as a matter of principle
backport of bc5e508
If len is large enough, when cast to an int it will be negative and then the
test if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) will not behave as expected.
Ref: IOTSSL-518
backport of 261faed725
* mbedtls-1.3:
Fix spurious #endif from previous cherry-pick
Fix macroization of inline in C++
Add missing warning in doc
Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc
Found by Guido Vranken.
Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB())
could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the
buffer in the subsequent for loop.
Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than
SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system).
Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to
CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with
respect to future code changes.
There is only one length byte but for some reason we skipped two, resulting in
reading one byte past the end of the extension. Fortunately, even if that
extension is at the very end of the ClientHello, it can't be at the end of the
buffer since the ClientHello length is at most SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN and the
buffer has some more room after that for MAC and so on. So there is no
buffer overread.
Possible consequences are:
- nothing, if the next byte is 0x00, which is a comment first byte for other
extensions, which is why the bug remained unnoticed
- using a point format that was not offered by the peer if next byte is 0x01.
In that case the peer will reject our ServerKeyExchange message and the
handshake will fail.
- thinking that we don't have a common point format even if we do, which will
cause us to immediately abort the handshake.
None of these are a security issue.
The same bug was fixed client-side in fd35af15
Backport of f7022d1
